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I. INTRODUCTION
It was hard to predict forty years ago that Japan would become the economic
superpower that it is today. 1 Japan has been able to continue developing its industry
and economy since the time immediately after World War II. Though in the 1970's,
Japanese industry was forced to face tough issues such as steep appreciation of the
yen2 and the two oil crisises,3 it successfully responded to them, and accordingly, it
has shown a favorable international balance of payments since 1981.4 While the
amount of surplus has been shrinking since 1988, Japan is still maintaining a
1 Just after World War II, Japan's economy had been destroyed. "Production in
the mining and manufacturing industries had fallen to one-seventh the 1941 level [at
the beginning of the War] and there were severe food shortages and rampant
inflation." NIPPON STEELHUMANRESOURCESDEVELOPMENTCo., LTD., NIPPON
THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE (3d ed. 1988). In addition to the fact that Japan
inherently is short of raw materials necessary for development of its heavy and
chemical industries, it had lost its productive facilities by aerial attacks and its
colonies in the War.
2Id. at 83-85; Though the yen had been fixed at 360 to the dollar since 1949, it
began to appreciate near the end of 1971 and went as high as about 260 to the dollar
in 1973. This rise in the value of the yen caused Japan's international balance of
payments to go to into the red.
3 The first oil crisis occurred in 1973, and the second one in 1979.
4 TSlrSHO SANGYOSHO [MINISTRYOF INTERNATIONALTRADEAND
INDUSTRY(hereinafter MITI)], TSOSHOHAKUSHO[MITI WHITE PAPER] 185 (1991).
2favorable balance. 5 Approximately two-thirds of its surplus is the balance with the
United States.6
The United States cannot tolerate this imbalance and is expressing its
frustrations to Japan. One of its complaints is in regard to Japan's Antitrust law, the
Act concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade
(hereinafter Antimonopoly Act).?
At the first Structural Impediments Initiative (hereinafter SII) at Tokyo in
September 1989, the United States requested strict implementation of the
Antimonopoly Act to Japan. 8
Further, Mr. T. Boone Pickens determined that Japan's unique form of
business practice, keiretsu, was a classic unlawful cartel. 9 He announced he was
5Id.
6 JAPANEXTERNALTRADEORGANIZATION(hereinafter JETRO), NIPPON 1990
BUSINESSFACTS & FIGURES59 (1990); Japan's current balance with all countries is
79.6 billion dollars, and in 1988 with the United States, is 51.3 billion dollars.
? Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi K6sei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru H6ritsu
[Act concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade],
Act No. 54 of 1947 (Japan), as amended, translated in ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATION
OF JAPAN 3 (Masanao Nakagawa ed. 1984) (hereinafter Antimonopoly Act).
8 DokkinhO Ishitsu no Nichibei DojO [The Antimonopoly Act: Different Foundation
between Japan and the United States], NrnON KEIZAI SHTNBUN[JAPANECON.
NEWSPAPER],Sep. 18, 1989, at 8.
9 T. Boone Pickens, The Heck with Japanese Business; Why I'm Nor Inrerested in
Trying to Compete in a Canei System, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1991, at Cl.
Keiretsu is "the unique form of business organization that links companies
together in industrial group." It is "often portrayed as exclusionary devises that make
Japanese companies unduly clannish and insular." There are two kinds of Keiretsu:
"The so-called financial keiretsu .... large groups of often-unrelated companies,
including a main bank, other financial institutions, and a giant trading company, are
3going to give up fighting with Japan's cartel system when he quitted trying to become
a director of Koito Manufacturing, the world's premier auto-lighting manufacturer,
although he was the largest shareholder possessing 26 percent of its share. 10
Moreover, another commentator indicated that all Japanese firms performed
the same conduct as others "to minimize the competitive threat. 1111
Does the Antimonopoly Act in Japan have no power against a cartel? Do
Japanese enterprises all enjoy concerted activities so enterprises in other countries
than Japan suffer injuries?
There must be room for improvement in the Antimonopoly Act in Japan.
Indeed, Japan responded to criticism from foreign countries with amending the
Antimonopoly Act and with considering further revisions. On July 1, 1991, Japan
enacted an amendment of the Antimonopoly Act that raised the surcharges from one
and a half percent to six percent of the amount of the sales against enterprises which
engaged in unreasonable restraint of trade, 12 Further, Japan is considering raising
linked together by cross-holdings of shares, by sales and purchases within the group,
and by formal and informal consultations; II and "production keiretsu -exemplified by
Toyota Motor Corp. and its friends-is best thought of as a web of interlocking long-
term relationships between a big manufacturer and its main suppliers. II Alan S.
Blinder, A Japanese Buddy System That Could Benefit U.S. Business, BUSINESSWK,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 32.
10 [d.
11 Richard Meyer, Preserving the "Wan, FIN. WORLD, Sep. 17, 1991, at 52.
12 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu
no Ichibu 0 Kaiseisuru Horitsu [Act concerning Amendment of a Part of the
Antimonopoly Act], Act No. 42 of 1991 (Japan). This Act amended Section 7-2 of
the Antimonopoly Act as follows:
4the criminal penalty from the current five million yen (approximately 38 thousand
dollars)I3 to 100 million yen (approximately 770 thousand dollars).14
While Japan should improve the Antimonopoly Act in order to harmonize with
the international economy, Japan may exonerate a part of its competition policies
which it believes correct. Mr. Pickens, for instance, contended that Japan's cartel
system had prevented him from making Koito more profitable. IS He suggested that
"Japan's industry is not necessarily smarter, more agile and more efficient than ours,"
A surcharge on an unreasonable restraint of trade rose from two
percent to six percent for manufacturers, from one percent to two percent for
the retail business, from a half percent to one percent for the wholesale
business, and from one and a half percent to six percent for others.
With respect to small and medium enterprises, a surcharge was set at
one percent for the wholesale and retail business, and at three percent for
others.
Small and medium enterprises are defined as those whose capital is not
more than 100 million yen (approximately 770 thousand dollars, one dollar is
equal to 130 yen) and whose employees do not exceed 300, in general. In the
case of the wholesale business, those whose capital is not more than 30 million
yen (approximately 230 thousand dollars) or whose employees do not exceed
100, in the case of the retail or service business, those whose capital is not
more than 10 million yen (approximately 77 thousand dollars) or whose
employees do not exceed 50.
13The Antimonopoly Act § 89. Section 89 also provides penal servitude for not
more than three years.
14KOSEl TORIHTKIINKAINENJI HOKOKU[FAIR TRADECOMMISSION
(HEREINAFTERJFTC) ANNUALREPORT] 10-11 (KOSEl TORIHIKIIINKAI[JFTC] ed.,
1991) (hereinafter JFTC ANNUALREPORTOF 1991).
See U.S. Says Japan's Planned Antitrust Fine Too Low, 1992 KYODO NEWS,
Mar. 13, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Newswire Library, JAPANECOM File;
Responding to this plan, however, Mr. James Rill, Assistant U.S. Attorney General
in charge of antitrust matters, said "the amount 'is far behind the world standard. '"
IS Pickens, supra note 9.
5but that Japan's international competitive advantage is simply its cartel system.16
His statement does not make sense because a formation of cartels cannot give
Japanese industry a competitive advantage in the foreign market even though a cartel
will possibly exclude foreign manufacturers from supplying to Japanese enterprises. 17
Furthermore, according to his opinion, Japan's system ultimately limits a consumer's
choice and increases prices. If Mr. Pickens were absolutely correct, then the
products which the Japanese manufacturers have a big market such as video disk
players,18 compact disk players,19 and facsimile machines20 would be limited and
very expensive. To avoid such misunderstandings, Japan must show its antitrust
policies in order to make themselves understood by the United States.
16Pickens, supra note 9.
17However, keiretsu actually does not mean to prevent access to the Japanese
market from foreign companies. If the purpose of keirersu was to deal only with
Japanese suppliers and to exclude foreign companies regardless that foreigners can
supply low-price, high-quality parts, then Japanese enterprises would soon lose their
competitive advantage. Only when manufacturers receive quality parts, can they
produce quality products assembled by such parts. For example, if a certain
American auto-parts maker shows superior productivity and efficiency that no other
makers achieve, Japanese auto-makers will place an order for their parts, or otherwise
lose competition with American auto-makers which use such parts.
Keiretsu is one example which makes the Japanese market seem closed to
foreign competitors, but it will not be discussed further because that is not the
purpose of this thesis.
18 BROOKLYN PUBLIC LIBRARY BUSINESS LIBRARY STAFF, 1990 BUSINESS
RANKINGS ANNUAL 162 (1990).
19 Id. at 537.
20 Id. at 256.
6This thesis will give a balanced examination of Japan's regulation against a
cartel which is the horizontal restraint of trade. First, it will explain the regulation
against the horizontal restraint of trade in the United States in general. Though the
courts used the per se rule and the rule of reason analysis to the horizontal restraint of
trade, their application of the two doctrines seems unstable where a challenged
conduct has both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.
This thesis will show, in Chapter III and VI, that the Antimonopoly Act in
Japan strictly prohibits a cartel and what is less strict in Japan compared to the
Antitrust laws in the United States. In Chapter V, it will especially focus on
exemptions from application of the Antimonopoly Act. To recognize how the
Antimonopoly Act prohibits a cartel, it is as important to understand exemptions as it
is to understand the provisions regulating cartels themselves. Though exemptions,
which immunize anticompetitive conducts from antitrust liabilities, are hazardous to
fair and free competition and consumer's welfare, Japan uses them more than the
United States. This thesis will analyze how the exempting laws from the
Antimonopoly Act protect and how they avoid adverse effects on free competition as
well as on international trade. By recognizing merits and demerits of exemptions, it
will become clear how those exemptions should be enforced.
Finally, this thesis will introduce an examples of immunized cartels in Japan: a
cartel in a depressed industry. Since it is not allowed in the United States, this
example will help to understand exemptions from antitrust liabilities in Japan.
II. APPROACH TO HORIZONTAL RESTRAINT IN THE UNITED STATES
Section 1 of the Sherman AcrI prohibits every agreement among companies
to restrain trade, but it is a very simple and vague provision.22 Though the courts
have developed standards concerning the application of the Sherman Act since the Act
was enacted in 1890,23 it seems that the definite approach to the agreement among
competitors has not been established. This chapter will show main doctrines
applicable to the horizontal restraint of trade, and thereafter examine some important
cases mainly relating to price fixing and market allocations.
21Sherman Act § 1, 15 D.S.C. § 1 (Supp II. 1990).
22 Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not provide a clear definition of illegal
conducts. For example: It is unclear whether Section 1, which examines the restrictive
conducts in question, considers the purpose of the agreement, conspirator's market
power, or results of the restrictive conducts including the anticompetitive impact to the
market, harm to consumer, economic efficiencies of the enterprise, improvement of
technology, level of employment, or the development of the national economy; or
whether the courts use the uniform standard to determine illegal conducts regardless of
the types of the conducts or the kind of the industries, or ignore any societal benefits
protected by the restrictive conduct or compare such interests with free competition.
23Sherman Act §§ 1-7, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
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8A. Three Doctrines
1. Ancillary Restraints doctrine
Though the Supreme Court had announced that every restraint of trade shall be
held illegal without exception,24 the Court changed its view.25 The first doctrine,
the ancillary restraints doctrine was developed from the Court's change.26 It is not
the conduct itself but the main purpose of the conduct which determines illegality.27
Where the restraint of the conduct is merely ancillary to the lawful contract and is
necessary to protect parties' legitimate benefits of the contract, the contract can be
24United States v. Trans-Miss. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
25United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898); The Court
held it is not illegal where the challenged conduct is the ordinary contract of sales,
purchase, or lease made in good will with an accompanying agreement not to engage
in a similar business. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898); The Court
also suggested it is not appropriate to hold an agreement illegal where it has a good
effect to commerce and does not directly or immediately restrain commerce.
26United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Manufacturers and vendors of cast-iron pipe agreed to
raise prices by dividing territories and possessing monopoly power in their region.
The defendants argued that their agreement was reasonable because its purpose was to
protect members from the evils of ruinous competition. [d. at 279.
27 [d. at 283; Judge Taft held the agreement was illegal since it had no main
purpose but "the sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition."
Nevertheless, he did not rule all conducts in restraint of trade illegal, but
focused on the main purpose of the contract to determine if it is unlawful:
It would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid down for
determining the validity of such an agreement that no conventional
restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is '
merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary
to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of these
fruits by the other party.
[d. at 282 (emphasis added).
9immunized from antitrust liability.28 To the contrary, if the contract is a naked
restraint of trade, or if the restraint exceeds a legitimate necessity of the restraint
presented by its main purpose, it is illegal per se.29
2. Rule of reason analysis
Given the rule of reason analysis, only unreasonable restraint of trade should be
illegal. 30 In order to determine whether the restraint is unreasonable, the Court
determined that all facts relating to the case should equally be considered,31 but this
28 Id.
29Id.
In order to analyze whether the agreement involving a restrictive activity is
illegal or not, the following procedure will be used under the ancillary restraints
doctrine.
Q. 1: What is the main purpose of the agreement?
If restraining competition, it is illegal.
If protecting the legitimate benefits of the agreement, go to Q. 2.
Q. 2: Is the restrictive activity necessary to protect the benefit?
If yes, it is lawful.
If no, it is illegal.
30Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States., 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
31Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Justice
Brandeis announced the standard for the rule of reason. Under this standard, the
lawful restraint merely regulates and may promote competition. Id. The courts must
consider factors including "the facts peculiar to the [defendant's] business," "its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed," "the nature of the restraint, and
its effect, actual or probable," and the purpose of the restraint. Id.
See also Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Later, the
Supreme Court stated that all of the circumstances should be weighed to determine if
there is unreasonable restraint on competition under the rule of reason analysis.
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criteria causes a heavy burden for the courts and for the plaintiffs. 32 This doctrine
may achieve the flexible application of the Sherman Act and a careful investigation in
32 See Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 690 (1991); The courts
should engage in a complicated investigation on the market impact to make a
judgement. Judges are not economists. Even though judges can hear testimony from
experts, it is still a tough job for them to judge the issue of law from an economic
standpoint.
The number of cases filed in the federal courts has been increasing. See
Warren E. Burger, Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, Introduction, 37
RurOERS L. REv. 217,217 (1985). Though the number of antitrust cases has
decreased a little from its peak in the late 1970's, there are still a lot of cases filed
every year. Steven C. Scalop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private
Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1002 (1986).
The antitrust cases are one of the "most complex, expensive and time
consuming" litigations. Piraino Jr., supra, at 701. The average length of antitrust
litigation is more than two years; the number of depositions by plaintiffs and by
defendants and that of judge orders are about three each in one case; the number of
docket entries is seventy; and the thickness of docket file is more than eight inches.
See Scalop & White, supra, at 1009. It is natural that the courts try to introduce a
simple method to analyze antitrust litigation. For efficiency, the courts often use
summary judgments to dismiss plaintiffs' claims because they failed to prove
conspiracy among defendants. Id. at 1016. See e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The longer the litigation, the cost increases.
The legal fee of antitrust litigation in current cases is estimated in the range of 250
million dollars per year. Id. Plaintiffs' cost is about one third of this total, or 80-100
million dollars per year. Id. at 1016 n.59. Prolonged litigation is a heavy burden for
the parties as well as for the courts.
One commentator indicates the number of cases will increase because the
parties are unsure of the outcome. Maxwell M. Blechen, The "New Antitrust" as Seen
by a Plaintiff s Lawyer, 54 ANTITRUSTL.J. 43, 45 (1985). But another suggests the
significant costs and an uncertain outcome under the rule of reason analysis will
discourage plaintiffs to bring antitrust law suits. Piraino Jr., supra, at 702-3. Indeed,
the number of private antitrust cases has declined by approximately 30 percent from
1978 to 1984 as the courts often introduce the rule of reason analysis. Scalop &
White, supra, at 1002. The rule of reason analysis would be an ideal way if the
private plaintiffs stop cheap law suits for the purpose of interfering with competitors
or for the monetary reward of settlements. However, if a heavy burden and
uncertainty prevent the necessary antitrust litigation which would promote free and fair
competition, it is not beneficial for society. Frequent application of the rule of reason
may create unnecessary elaborate economic analysis.
11
complicated cases, but it remains uncertain in its enforcement and sacrifices litigation
efficiency.
3. Per se rule
The last doctrine is the per se rule which does not need elaborate inquiry of
economic factors to prove an unlawful conspiracy.33 In Northern Pacific Railway v.
United States,34 Justice Black listed types of conducts which had been held illegal per
33United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); Where oil
companies had made a program to purchase "distress" gasoline from independent
refiners for the purpose of maintaining market prices of their products, the Court held
"[u]nder the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." The Court did not consider the
reasonableness of prices. It is enough proof of unlawful conspiracy that "a
combination was formed for the purpose of fixing prices and that it caused them to be
fixed or contributed to that result." Id. at 224. Further, it declared a price fixing
agreement is illegal regardless of the market power of the conspirators stating that
"[e]ven though the members of the price fixing group were in no position to control
the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be
directly interfering with the free play of market forces." Id. In sum, the Court
rejected considering the reasonableness of the agreement or economic justification of
price fixing. Id. at 221, 224 n.59.
See also United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273, U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927);
Though the Supreme Court did not use the term "per se," the Court held that a price
fixing agreement is illegal without considering whether it was reasonably exercised or
not, or whether the price fixed is reasonable or not. However, it did not mention
whether or not the market power of the defendant should be considered.
34Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5(1958); The Court held
conducts which have "pernicious effect on competition" and lack "any redeeming
virtue" should be "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use."
12
se such as price fixing,35 division of markets,36 group boycotts,37 and tying
agreements/8 and implied it would be reasonable to automatically apply the per se
rule to such conducts.39 Comparing to the complex rule of reason analysis, the clear
per se rule can save the significant costs of the antitrust litigations.40 In spite of the
litigation efficiency, the per se rule has a detractor that it cannot flexibly analyze a
35 E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
36 E.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aft d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
37E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm., 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
38E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 392 (1947).
39R. Bruce Phillips, An Appropriate Postscript to Topeo: We Were Just Kidding!,
42 OKLA. L. REV. 429, 435 (1989); Justice Black deemed Addyston Pipe as a per se
illegal case and not an ancillary restraints case, perhaps because, in Addyston Pipe,
only after the investigation the main purpose of the agreement, were the defendants
found illegal.
40 356 U.S. at 5; Justice Black explained the per se rule is reasonable and effective
because it can avoid an "incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation." See also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 333-34, 343-44 (1982).
Moreover, the per se rule can make up for Judge's inability to examine difficult
economic problems. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10
(1972).
Furthermore, without per se rule, businessman would be forced to predict with
little help "in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the
Sherman Act." See id. at 609 n.lO.
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complicated practice which seems to fall into its category but involves procompetitive
virtue.41
B. Confusion of Approach to Horizontal Restraint
1. Rigid per se rule and horizontal market division
The Supreme Court in United States v. Sealy, Ine.,42 held that the case
combined price fixing and division of markets43 is illegal per se,44however, it did
not make it clear whether horizontal market division unaccompanied with price fixing
41See Topeo, at 611; The Supreme Court admitted the inflexibility of the per se
rule and appointed the Congress to relieve restrictive business activities when
necessary.
42United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
43While most manufacturers of mattress and boxsprings began as single-plant
firms confined by high transportation cost to limited territorial markets, several small
manufacturers including Sealy had formed a joint venture to compete effectively with
larger [urns. See United States v. Sealy Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. ~~ 71,258, 80,074-75
(N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd, 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The Joint venture licensed manufacturers
of mattresses and bedding products to produce and sell their products under the Sealy
name and trademarks. 388 U.S. at 351. The member manufacturers allocated
mutually exclusive territories among themselves and set minimum retail prices for
their dealers. Id.
44388 U.S. at 357-58; The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.
Cf 1964 Trade Cas. at ~~ 80,083, 80,106-7; The District Court, though it found
the maintaining resale prices violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, allowed exclusive
market allocation under the ancillary restraints doctrine since the defendant's activities
had been developed "for entirely legitimate purpose" and had been directed "not
toward market division among licensees but toward obtaining additional licenses and
more intensive sales coverage." The legitimate purpose was royalty income for "the
Sealy name, trademarks and patents," and "the benefits to licensees of joint
purchasing, research, engineering and merchandising." Id. at ~ 80,063.
14
would be applied the per se rule45 even though division of markets were deemed to
be per se illegal in Northern Pacijic.46 Justice Fortas indicated that "[t]he territorial
restraints were a part of the unlawful price-fixing and policing,"47 and therefore held
unlawful "without necessity for an inquiry in each case as to their business or
economic justification, their impact in the market place, or their reasonableness. ,,48
The notable point is that the Court did not consider using the ancillary
restraints doctrine despite the fact that the defendant used this doctrine49 and that the
45Donald L. Beschle, "What, Never? Well, Hardly Even": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny
as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTING L.J. 471, 480 (1987).
46 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
47 388 U.S. at 353-54.
See Tirnken Roller Bearing v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1959); Justice
Black held the license agreement which divided the world market accompanied with
price fixing was illegal per se because such division of markets was "an aggregation of
trade restraints." "Trade restraints" meant price fixing.
48 388 U.S. at 357-58.
Note that it was also very important whether the division of markets was
horizontal or vertical. The defendant argued the division of markets was not
horizontal but vertical because Sealy principally engaged in the conduct Id. at 353.
Vertical territorial restraint was subject to the rule of reason analysis. See White
Motor Co., v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Horizontal territorial restraint, on
the other hand, was applied to the per se rule. See Tirnken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Therefore, the Supreme Court tried to distinguish
Sealy from vertical restraint cases.
However, the Court in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), ruled vertical territorial restraint also per se illegal on June 12, at the same
time as Sealy.
Both horizontal and vertical territorial restraint were deemed as per se illegal
for ten years, until the Supreme Court overruled Arnold, Schwinn and examined
vertical territorial restraint under the rule of reason in Continental T.v. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.,433 U.S. 36 (1977).
49388 U.S. at 356; Sealy defended by the ancillary restraints doctrine providing
that "the territorial restraints were incidents of lawful program of trade licensing."
lower court adopted this defense.5o While the Court recognized "that territorial
exclusivity served many other purposes,"51 it refused the defendant's argument
because of the connection of territorial restraint with the price fixing.52
The Court clearly distinguished Sealy from the small business cartel case
without a price fixing agreemen~3 which was very similar to United States v. Topco
Associates,lnc.54 Given the dictum in Topco, the Court at least would have to avoid
applying the per se rule.55 However, the Court in Topco explicitly denied this and
50 1964 Trade Cas. at ~ 80,083. As to the Sealy's defense, see id. at ~~ 80,071,
80,703.
51 388 U.S. at 356.
521d. at 356-357.
53 388 U.S. at 357;
It is urged upon us that we should condone this territorial
limitation among manufacturers of Sealy products because of the
absence of any showing that it is unreasonable. It is argued, for
example, that a number of small grocers might allocate territory among
themselves on an exclusive basis as incident to the use of a common
name and common advertisements, and that this sort of venture should
be welcomed in the interests of competition, and should not be
condemned as per se unla~ul. But condemnation of appellee's
territorial arrangements certainly does not require us to go so far as to
condemn that quite different situation, whatever might be the result if it
were presented to us for decision (emphasis added).
54United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
55Phillips, supra note 39, at 436.
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ruled that horizontal territorial restraint without a price fixing agreemen~6 is illegal
per se.57
In Topeo, small supermarket chains established a buying cooperative, Topco
Associates, Inc. (hereinafter Topco), to purchase high quality merchandise and sell it
under private labels. 58 The purpose of Topco was not to restrain trade59 but to
effectively compete with large supermarket chains.60 Its market power was not
56There were many cases with respect to horizontal market division, but they were
usually accompanied with a price fixing agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Tirnken Roller Bearing Co., v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff d,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
57405 U.S. at 609 at n.9.
58405 U.S. at 598; Such small and medium sized regional supermarket chains
were independently owned and operated. Though Topco had no manufacturing
processing or warehousing facilities, it distributed goods purchased from the packers
and manufacturers directly to the members, in most cases, under brand names operated
by Topco. Id.
59 See 319 F. Supp. at 1037; This licensing system did not include price fixing. It
was only an exclusive market division among independent small supermarket chains,
but did not include any agreement to control or affect prices, and Topco members
could sell and actually sold topco-brand products at whatever price they wished.
60405 U.S. at 598.
See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp 1031, 1034 (N.D. TIL
1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); At that time, a small number of large national
supermarket chains dominated the retail grocery business, and market power had been
concentrated in a few of the most powerful chains while smaller chains had
disappeared at an accelerating rate.
See also 405 U.S. at 599 n.3; The members of Topco were in a difficult
situation competing with larger chains such as A&P, because of the larger chains' own
private-label programs. It is obvious that, by using private-label products, a chain can
save its cost significantly in purchasing, transportation, warehousing, promotion, and
advertising. Because of these advantages, a chain can offer its private-label products
at lower prices than other brand-name products. An important advantage of the
program is that a chain can sell national-brand products at the same price as
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large,61 and its effect was procompetitive.62 The Government, nevertheless,
challenged Topc063 because Topco issued licenses to approve members selling
Topco-brand products64 exclusively in their designated territory.65 Topco members
insisted that, to maintain the private label program, territorial exclusivity is
competitors while it simultaneously sells its private-brand products as alternatives at
lower prices, or if the profit margin is sufficiently high on the private-brand products,
the store can afford to sell national-brand products at reduced prices. Other
advantages are: that a chain can obtain a more favorable bargaining position to
national-brand manufacturers by diversifying suppliers, then decreasing dependence
upon a limited large national-brand manufacturers; that a chain can use a "price-mix"
whereby prices on special items can be reduced in order to attract customers while
profits are maintained on the other items; or that a chain simply can offer high quality
products at lower prices.
61405 U.S. at 600; The market share of member supermarket chains in their
regional area was from 1.5 percent to 16 percent, the average was approximately six
percent.
62405 U.S. at 600; Topco members frequently possessed as strong a competitive
power in their areas as other large chains because of success of Topco-brand products.
Further, the Topco-brand products had improved the competitive potential of Topco
members with respect to other large and powerful chains. [d. As a result, their total
sales were more than 2.3 million dollars by 1967 exceeded only by three national
grocery chains; A&P, Safeway, and Kroger. [d.
63 405 U.S. at 601.
64405 U.S. at 602; In order to obtain the license, prior approval from the board of
directors and an affIrmative vote of the Topco members were necessary. Frequently
new small chains came in and old grown chains left, therefore Topco was constantly
seeking new members. 319 F. Supp. at 1038.
65405 U.S. at 601-2; There were three categories of territorial licenses:
"exclusive," "non-exclusive," and "coextensive," though "non-exclusive" proved to be
de facto exclusive. Although no member could sell Topco-brand products outside the
designated territory, Topco members could and did expand their business into other
members' territory without using Topco brand products. [d. at 602.
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indispensable66 to eliminate the "free ride" effect.67 While the Government
conceded68 Topco' s procompetitive effect,69 it contended that exclusive territorial
arrangements by Topco clearly had the effect to restrain competition among Topco
members who otherwise might have competed with each other. 70
66319 F. Supp. 1036; It is necessary for the successful private label program to
offer many hundred of items, and to sell a substantial volume to be able to afford the
heavy costs of development of Topco-brand products including continuous advertising
and promotion. Unless the Topco members could use the Topco private labels
exclusively in their market area, many of the members would not have joined Topco.
Id.
67319 F. Supp. at 1040; The Topco members were afraid of a "free ride" on the
advertising or promotion of their direct competitors, and testified that "they would not
spend the money, time and energy necessary to establish consumer acceptance of
Topco brands in their areas of operation if any of their substantial competitors could
likewise sell the same brand names."
68319 F. Supp. at 1040; The Government also contended that if Topco had been a
single, large national chain, its business activities would never have violated the
Sherman Act.
69319 F. Supp. at 1040; The Government conceded Topco's procompetitive effect,
their private label program, would encourage its members to compete more effectively
both with large national chains and with other small or medium chains.
70319 F. Supp. at 1040; The Government contended that the territorial exclusivity
was illegal "even if the ultimate result of these practices may be an over-all increase
in supermarket competition."
Note that it did not matter at that time whether the territorial restraint was
horizontal or vertical. The per se rule had applied to both restraints from United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) to Continental T.v., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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The District Court, applying the ancillary restraints doctrine,1' denied the
Government's per se contention for Topco's procompetitive purpose and impact in the
markeez in spite its effect of decreasing competition among Topco members.73
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this decision.74 Justice
Marshall, citing Northern Pacific,15 defined Topco's horizontal division of markets as
one of a classic per se illegal conducts.76
71 319 F. Supp. at 1038; The Topco's licensing program was recognized as being
"ancillary and subordinate to the fulfillment of the legitimate, procompetitive purpose
of the Topco cooperative, reasonable and in the public interest"
72 319 F. Supp. at 1038; The District Court said that the Topco cooperative serves
a legitimate pro-competitive purpose by:
(1) providing its members with commonly procured products to offer the consumer
another choice of high quality, low price, private-label merchandise;
(2) enhancing the ability of its members to compete more effectively in their
respective markets against the stronger national and large regional chains;
(3) enabling its members to exist as independently owned and operated businesses;
and
(4) benefitting the small manufacturers and processors which are the principal
source of private label products.
73 319 F. Supp. at 1043; The District Court criticized the relief which the
Government sought because it "would not increase competition in Topco private label
brand but would substantially diminish competition in the supermarket field." This
reasoning is similar to that in Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36,55 (1977), five years after Topco,
which the Supreme Court admitted the effect of promoting interbrand competition
rather than reducing intrabrand competition.
74 405 U.S. at 612.
75 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
76 405 U.S. at 607-608.
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He criticized the rule of reason because of judicial inability to examine difficult
economic problems77 and uncertainty of applying the Sherman ACt,78 While these
views above are indeed demerits to the rule of reason, it is doubtful these reasons
justify the courts abandoning it.79 Further, was it certain that the territorial
exclusivity by Topco really had a "pernicious effect on competition" and lacked "any
redeeming virtue,"80 and was "naked restraints of trade" only for the purpose of
eliminating competition?81 Moreover, though the majority suggested that the per se
rule is applicable only after the courts had considerable experience with the business
77405 U.S. at 609. The Supreme Court declared it was incapable of comparing
"destruction of competition in one sector of the economy" with "promotion of
competition in another sector." Id. at 609-10.
78 405 U.S. 609 n.IO.
79405 U.S. at 622, 624; While Chief Justice Burger recognized the merits of the
per se rule, he suggested that an examination of difficult economic problems is one
role of the courts, and that "we should not abdicate that role by formulation of per se
rules with no justification other than the enhancement of predictability and the
reduction of judicial investigation."
80 Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5.
81White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
See also Topco, 405 U.S. at 622; Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting
opinion, stated the majority did not tell us what "pernicious effect on competition" the
practices here outlawed are perceived to have; nor did it attempt to show that those
practices "lack ... any redeeming virtue."
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in question82 and that the Court had enough,83 it had never held a non-price fixing
market division case.84
The Supreme Court seemed to want to escape from complicated economic
investigation under the rule of reason. But the ancillary restraints doctrine also could
have released the Court. Although both Topc085 and the District Court86 introduced
the ancillary restraints doctrine, the Supreme Court just compared the rule of reason
with the per se rule.87 If the Court was not favorable to the ancillary doctrine,88 it
82405 U.S. at 607-8.
83405 U.S. at 608.
84405 U.S. at 615; Chief Justice Burger dissented because horizontal division of
markets had not previously been held to constitute per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
The majority introduced several cases to support their opinion as follows:
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Sertra Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States, 393 U.S. 534 (1969); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967): United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1(1958); Timken Roller Bearing Co., v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319(1947); United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). [d. at 526.
But there was no case in which horizontal market division unaccompanied with
price fixing had been held illegal per se.
85319 F. Supp. at 1039.
86319 F. Supp. at 1038.
87405 U.S. at 606-12. The Court consequently chose the per se rule due to the
enhancement of the ability to predict and the reduction of complicated investigation.
[d. at 609-12.
88There is an opinion that the Supreme Court may have intentionally not
addressed the ancillary restraints doctrine since "Topco's durationless assignment of
closed territories among potential competitors so large and numerous that they could
not have merged was so intentionally restrictive as to preclude the ancillary claim and
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should have expressed the ancillary doctrine was not suitable89 instead of ignoring it.
Furthermore, if the Court had analyzed the territorial exclusivity agreement under the
ancillary restraints doctrine, the Court could have held it was illegal because there was
an insufficient evidence that the market allocation had been really necessary to
maintain Topco.9O The Court, however, finally chose the "easy" per se rule.
to merit the per se label." Martin B. Louis, Restraint Ancillary to Joint Ventures and
Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast
Music?, 66 VA. L. REV. 879, 892-93 (1980).
89 The ancillary restraints doctrine's problem is that it is not well recognized as the
approach to the antitrust litigations. Though the ancillary restraints doctrine was
clearly articulated in Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282, the court held the defendants'
conduct was illegal. The court actually analyzed the main purpose of the restrictive
conducts, thus the ancillary restraint doctrine was not a dictum. However, the
Supreme Court classified Addyston Pipe as a per se illegal case. See Topco, 405 U.S.
at 608.
Moreover, in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), the ancillary restraint concept was absorbed by the rule of reason analysis
which is a broader concept examining every element equally. "Judges and antitrust
scholars have not openly articulated the distinctions between the ancillary restraints
doctrine and the rule of reason." Louis, supra note 88, at 882. See also Phillips,
supra note 39, at 433.
90 Topco showed reasons the territorial exclusivity among Topco members
necessary, and the District Court approved it. See 319 F. Supp. at 1035-36, 1040,
1043.
However a question still remains whether Topco would not be able to
successfully continue without the exclusive market allocation. The evidence is not
clear whether the Topco members would suffer seriously from sales of Topco-brand
products by other stores near the members, nor that there would be a way to prevent
the "free ride" by new members.
The Supreme Court actually doubted whether territorial restraint was really
necessary, 'Without territorial restrictions, Topco members may indeed "[cut] each
other's throats." But we have never found this possibility sufficient to warrant
condoning horizontal restraints of trade.' 405 U.S. at 611 (citation omitted).
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Instead, the Court appointed Congress as the authority to relieve such
restrictive business activities such as Topco's, if necessary.91 The Court limited its
own authority and decided, unless exemption laws from Antitrust laws provided
otherwise, to judge horizontal market divisions under the per se rule. This concept,
depending upon the exemption laws from the antitrust liabilities seems, similar to that
of Japan, though in the United States there are not as many exemptions.
The Court admitted the inflexibility of the per se rule. The per se rule,
however, can enhance predictability of its enforcement for the public and can promote
litigation efficiency compared to the rule of reason. The Court compared the
inflexible but clear per se rule with the flexible but uncertain rule of reason, and just
ignored the ancillary restraints doctrine. To conclude, in Topeo, the Supreme Court
gave up the flexible approach to certain horizontal restraint, and it ruled to apply the
rigid per se rule regardless of the procompetitive purpose of the restraint, the necessity
of the restraint, the procompetitive impact to the market, or the small market power of
the conspirators.
2. Per se rule eroded by rule of reason
The Supreme Court supported the rigid per se rule in Topeo.92 However, it
has been moving from the per se rule to the rule of reason analysis in order for
91405 U.S. at 611; Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, also stated only
the Congress can provide relief by legislation.
92United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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flexible application of the Sherman Act.
The first step began in a vertical territorial restraint case. Though the vertical
territorial restraint had been held illegal per se,93the Supreme Court in Continental
T.v. v. GTE Sylvania,94 overruled it. The Court95 examined vertical territorial
restraint unaccompanied with price fixing96 under the rule of reason analysis, since it
found neither "pernicious effect on competition" or lack of "redeeming virtue, ,,97but
93United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
94Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
95Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority's opinion in Topco, and Justice
Brennam dissented to overruling Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 71. Justice White concurred.
Id. at 59-71.
96433 U.S. at 37-39; The purpose of the franchise system in question was
procompetitive, the market share of the defendant was small, and the system had a
procompetitive impact in the market.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. (hereinafter Sylvania), a manufacturer of television sets,
made an agreement requiring retailers to operate only in a designated area. Sylvania's
market share was a relatively insignificant (1-2 percent) of national television sales
compared to other larger companies (RCA had a dominant power as much as 60 to 70
percent of national television sales). Id. at 37-38.
Sylvania then changed its strategy to have competitive advantage: it ceased
distribution through wholesalers and began to sell its television sets directly to a small
group of franchised retailers. For the efficiency of this franchise system, Sylvania
limited the number of franchises and required franchisees to sell franchised goods only
in the franchised locations. This franchise did not have strict territorial exclusivity nor
exclusive dealing. Id. at 38-39.
This new marketing strategy was very successful. Sylvania's market share of
national television sales increased to approximately five percent, and it ranked as the
nation's eighth largest manufacture of color television sets. Id.
97433 U.S. at 58-59; The Court could not find "that vertical restrictions have or
are likely to have a 'pernicious effect on competition' or that they 'lack ... any
redeeming virtue. '" Both factors are as conditions to apply the per se rule. See
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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a procompetitive effect.98 The Court removed vertical restraint from the per se
illegal category defined in Northern Pacific,99 and preferred the flexible application
of the Antitrust laws. This showed its positive attitude to the judgement based on
economic investigation.loo
Further, although the Supreme Court indicated that horizontal restraint still
should be analyzed under the per se rule in Sylvania,101 it considered some elements
before applying it where the restraint had been engaged in special business. In
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,102 the Court suggested
that the service by a learned professionalslo3 might survive under the rule of
98 433 U.S. at 54; "Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his
products" while they "reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers
of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers."
As an example, the Court showed the effect of preventing "free ride": "Because
of market imperfections such as the so-called 'free rider' effect, these services (service
and repair) might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation despite
the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if
none did." [d. at 55 (citing Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM.L. REv. 282, 285).
99 356 U.S. at 5.
100 433 U.S. at 58-59; "[D]eparture from the rule of reason standard must be based
upon demonstratable economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn - upon formalistic
line drawing."
101 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
102 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'r. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
103 Defendant, the National Society of Professional Engineers (hereinafter Society),
was the organization dealing with "the non-technical aspects of engineering practice,
including the promotion of the professional, social, and economic interests of its
members." 435 U.S. at 682. The Society made the canon of ethics which prohibited
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reasonlO4 because of the possibility of promoting competition in professional
service. 105 Actually, the Court considered whether the ethical canon prohibiting
bidding was reasonable or not in spite of the price restraint among competitors,l06
competitive bidding among its member professional engineers. [d.
104435 U.S. at 686; "[C]ertain practices by members of a leaned profession might
survive scrutiny under the Rule of Reason even though they would be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context." The Court recognized the character
of business between professional services and the others, and stated the former may be
treated under the rule of reason.
See also Goldfalb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); The Supreme
Court noted that certain kind of practices by professionals might be immunized from
antitrust liabilities under the rule of reason even though they appear to be violating the
Antitrust laws. [d. at 778-79, n.17.
105435 U.S. at 696.
106435 U.S. at 696.
The Society argued that the ban of competition was necessary to avoid risk to
public safety and health because bidding would cause deceptively low prices and
thereby inferior performance by engineers. [d. at 693.
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but found no justification for it, and therefore held it illegal per se.107 The Court in
fact seems to have applied the ancillary restraints doctrine to this case.I08
The rule of reason had reached even horizontal price fixing in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System.109 The defendants, BMI and
107 435 U.S. at 696; The Court held that the Society's argument was "a far cry
from such a position" which might promote competition, and that "the Rule of Reason
does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable. "
Had the purpose and effect of the ethical cannon been promoting competition,
efficiency, or safety and quality of their products or service, the Court might have
investigated it under the rule of reason. The Court showed an example although it
was vertical restraint case: "Courts have, for example, upheld marketing restraints
related to the safety of a product, provided that they have no anticompetitive effect
and that they are reasonably ancillary to the seller's main purpose of protecting the
public from harm or itself from product liability." Id. at 696 n.22. See e.g., Tripoli
Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
108 It is ambiguous what doctrine the Court used. Justice Stevens explained only
the per se rule and the rule of reason while the ancillary restraints doctrine seemed to
be used. 435 U.S. 692.
He ruled that unreasonableness under the rule of reason "could be based either
(1) on the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances
giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade
and enhance prices." Id. at 690.
Between the per se rule and the rule of reason, the difference is whether an
elaborate study is necessary or not. Both have the common purpose "to form a
judgement about the competitive significance of the restraint," and "not to decide
whether a policy favoring competitions is in the public interest, or in the interest of
the members of a industry." Id. at 692.
The Court denied to weigh all circumstances equally in the rule of reason. Id.
But see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 283 (1918); Continental
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36,49 (1977).
However, the Court examined whether the ethical cannon had a procompetitive
purpose and effect. 435 U.S. 692. The Court held the canon was illegal not just
because it fell into a category of horizontal restraint, but because the Court could not
find a procompetitive character.
109 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
28
ASCAP,110 issued the "blanket license" which had the effect of horizontal price
fixing among copyright owners.lII The purpose of the blanket license was the
convenience of policing copyrighted products,112 and the blanket license was a
necessary method to achieve that purpose. ll3 The blanket license had a
procompetitive effect.ll4 But BMI and ASCAP had a monopoly power in the
llOBroadcast Music, Inc. (hereinafter BMI) and the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (hereinafter ASCAP), were organizations
representing individual copyrighted owners and issued licenses and policed those who
wanted to perform or use copyrighted works. 441 U.S. at 4-5.
111441 U.S. at 5; The blanket license gave the licensees the right to perform any
and all of the music composition of members as often as the licensees wished during
stated terms. Fees for the blanket license was either a flat fee or a percentage of
revenues of licensees without regard to the amount or type of music used.
There might have been competition between the each individual composer.
The blanket license set common prices of their products regardless of their popularity.
112441 U.S. at 20-21; The blanket license offers unlimited access to the musical
repertory for public performance, and gives reliable protection against infringement.
The Court admitted its unique character gave immediate use of copyrighted
compositions without the delay of prior individual negotiations and a great flexibility
in the choice of musical compositions. [d. at 22-23.
Since 1897, owners of copyrighted musical compositions have been given the
exclusive right for public performance of their works by the copyright laws. [d. at 4.
However, it was impossible as a practical matter for the many individual copyrighted
owners to negotiate with license users, to collect royalties, and to prevent unauthorized
uses. [d. at 4-5. That is because performance of copyrighted music for profit were
very frequent, fleeting and widespread. [d. BMI and ASCAP were established in
order to resolve those problems above. [d.
113441 U.S. at 20; Without the blanket licenses, thousands of individual
negotiations between copyrighted owners and users would be necessary, and it would
be difficult and expensive for the copyright owners to police their copyrighted works.
ll4 441 U.S. at 21-22; The blanket license substantially lowers costs and results in
efficient policing of copyrighted works. ASCAP and BMI "made a market in which
individual composers are inherently unable to compete fully effectively." [d. at 22-23.
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market.115The Supreme Court implied how to decide the applicable doctrine to the
horizontal restraint: if the courts have "considerable experience" with the restraint and
the business at issue, then the per se rule will apply;1I6if not, the courts will
examine the purpose and the effect of the restraint in order to select the proper method
- the per se rule or the rule of reason.117At first, the Court admitted not having
"considerable experience" with the music industry involving copyright laws to apply
the per se rule immediately.1I8 Then, the Court found the procompetitive
115441 U.S. at 5; Almost every domestic copyrighted composition was in the
repertory either of ASCAP or of BMI.
116441 U.S. at 9-10. Justice White delivered the majority's opinion that it was
necessary to determine whether the blanket license would fall into the category of "per
se price fixing" which is '''plainly anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming
virtue.'" [d. at 9.
Further, citing Topco, 405 U.S. at 607-8, in which the Supreme Court declared
"[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that
courts classify them as per se violations... ," he admitted the Court did not have
enough experience to hold the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade because it
had "never examined a practice like this one before." [d. at 9-10. It seems interesting
that the Court doubted the automatic application of the per se rule considering Topco.
Also the Court stated the rule that: "The scrutiny occasionally required must
not merely subsume the burdensome analysis required under the rule of reason, or else
we should apply the rule of reason from the start. That is why the per se rule is not
employed until after considerable experience with the type of challenged restraint."
[d. at 19 n.33 (citation omitted).
117441 U.S. at 19-20. The Court pointed out the necessity of focusing on whether
the purpose and the effect of the practice "are to threaten the proper operation of our
predominantly free-market economy" before it characterizes the conduct in question
under the per se rule. [d. at 19. That is to say, the per se rule will be applied when
"the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output." [d. at 19-20.
118441 U.S. at 8-10.
Justice White criticized the Court of Appeals and the plaintiff because they
recognized the blanket license as price fixing only "in literal sense," when the practice
which literally fixes prices is not necessarily a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
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purposel19 and effect120 of the blanket license, and concluded that an examination
under the rule of reason analysis was necessary instead of the per se rule.121 The
Court finally declared every horizontal restraint is not necessarily per se illegal.122
Id. at 8-9.
Then, he admitted the Court did not have considerable experience to hold the
blanket license as a per se restraint of trade since it had "never examined a practice
like this one before." Id. at 9-10.
119441 U.S. at 20; The blanket license "is not a 'naked restrain[t] of trade with no
purpose except stifling of competition' but rather accompanies the integration of sales,
monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use" (citation omitted).
120 411 U.S. at 23; The blanket license made it possible for individual composers
to compete fully effectively by eliminating thousands of individual negotiations and by
simplifying fees for the use and protection of copyrights.
121 441 U.S. at 24-25; "[T]he blanket license has provided an acceptable
mechanism for at least a large part of the market for the performing rights to
copyrighted musical compositions."
122441 U.S. at 23; "Not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors
that have an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints."
See also id. at 14; The Courts distinguished business with unique character
from ordinary ones:
The Sherman Act has always been discriminatingly applied in
the light of economic realities. There are situations in which
competitors have been permitted to form joint selling agencies or other
pooled activities subject to strict limitations under the antitrust laws to
guarantee against abuse of the collective power thus created. This case
appears to us to involve such a situation. The extraordinary number of
users spread across the land, the ease with which a performance may be
broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted compositions, the enormous
quality of separate performances each year, the impracticability of
negotiating individual license for each composition, and the ephemeral
nature of each performance all combine to create unique market
conditions for pelformance rights to recorded music (quoting
Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae on Pet for Cert in K-
91, Inc., v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1045 (1968), OT 1967, No.147, at lO)(footnote
omitted)(emphasis added).
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In NCAA v, Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,123 the Supreme
Court expanded the application of the rule of reason.124 The NCAA set a plan
regulating televised college football games. 125 The Court held that the horizontal
price and output restraint by the NCAA violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act126not
under the per se rule but under the rule of reason127despite acknowledging the
plan's anticompetitive effects.128 The reason for applying the rule of reason was not
the Court's insufficient judicial experience with this type of restraint,129 or the plan's
123National College Athlete Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
124Interestingly, the Supreme Court doubted there was a clear boarder between the
per se rule and the rule of reason analysis stating "[i]ndeed, there is often no light line
separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis." 468 U.S. at 104 n.26.
125468 U.S. at 89-94; The NCAA constituted virtually all major universities and
colleges in the United States, and it made a plan to limit the number of football games
that anyone member college could televise and the total number of games that could
be broadcast. Under this plan, no member college could appear on television more
than six times and more than four times nationally in two years even if the college's
football team had a high reputation and was popular. Id. No college could set the
television rights except in accordance with the plan. Id. The plan allowed only two
networks to negotiate directly with member colleges concerning television rights of
football games. Id. at 94.
Further, the evidence showed that the prices were arranged as a recommended
fee by the NCAA. Id. at 93.
126468 U.S. at 120.
127468 U.S. at 100.
128468 U.S. at 104.
129468 U.S. at 100. Cf Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10; United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-608;
The Supreme Court announced it would not apply the per se rule until after it had
considerable judicial experience with a particular restriction.
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purpose130 and effect. It was rather that "this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all. "131 The Supreme Court needed to determine to apply either the per se rule or
rule of reason based on the character of the industry132 and not based on that of the
restraint itself.133 Consequently, as commentators indicated,134 the analysis in
NCAA impresses the rigid per se rule although the Court explicitly declared applying
130The purpose of the plan was to reduce "the adverse effects of live television
upon football game attendance," and "upon the athletic and related educational
programs." 468 U.S. at 91 n.6. With respect to the later purpose, the NCAA asserted
that the plan "tended to preserve a competitive balance among football programs of the
various schools," in other words, to avoid an adverse recruitment of its members. Id.
131468 U.S. at 101. In the case of league sports, some kinds of agreements among
league members are necessary in order to market the league, that is, to maintain
competitive games attractive to sports fans and athletes. Id. For instance, rules such
as "the size of the field, the member of players on a team, and the extent to which
physical violence" are necessary for the league sports. Id.
Further, college football, an amateur sport, has to preserve unique character and
quality. For example athletes must not be paid and must be required to attend class,
unlike professional sports. Id. at 101-102. The NCAA had served to preserve its
character. Id.
132 The Supreme Court took account of the unique character of the business at
issue. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S.
1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'r. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679.
133Instead, the Court examined whether the restraint can be justified under the rule
of reason analysis. The Court focused on the inquiry "whether or not the challenged
restraint enhances competition." 468 U.S. at 104.
134Phillips, supra note 39, at 452. See also Wesley 1. Liebeler, 1984 Economic
Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Restraints, Efficiency and the Per Se
Rule, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1019, 1055-60 (1986).
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the rule of reason.135 In sum, the Court ruled in NCAA, that the rule of reason
analysis is applicable to the horizontal restraint of trade even if it looks like a classic
per se conduct where an industry at issue requires some horizontal restraints so as to
maintain the products being offered in the market.
The Supreme Court has loosened up the Antitrust laws in horizontal restraints
other than price fixing and market division. With respect to group boycotts,136 in
Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc., v. Pacific Stationary & Printing CO.,137 the
135At the first step of the rule of reason analysis, the Court found the television
plan had significant anticompetitive effects. 468 U.S. at 104. Thereby the Court
placed upon the NCAA "a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which
competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market."
Id. at 113.
Given such a heavy burden, the NCAA gave four arguments but could not
prove that the television plan, horizontal restraint of price and output, was necessary in
order for that the college football game "to be available at all." See id. at 109-120.
Consequently, the Court just emphasized the anticompetitive character of
NCAA's plan under the rule of reason analysis. There was no explanation why the
Court did not analyze the main purpose of the plan before the rule of reason.
136There had been a lot of group boycotts held illegal per se. E.g., Silver v. New
York Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348 (1963); White Mortar Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 259-60 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959).
137Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985).
The defendant, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, inc. (hereinafter Northwest),
was a purchasing cooperative of a approximately one hundred office supply retailers.
id. at 286. The plaintiff, Pacific Stationary & Printing Co. (Pacific), which operated as
both a retailer and a wholesaler, was expelled from Northwest and therefore brought
suit alleging group boycotts in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 287-
88.
The reason for expulsion was in dispute. Pacific argued that "the expulsion
resulted from Pacific's decision to maintain a wholesale operation." Id. at 288.
Northwest, on the other hand, contended that "the expulsion resulted from Pacific's
failure to notify the cooperative members of the change in stock ownership." Id.
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Court showed a new rule: it should be proved to apply the per se rule that the
defendant "possesses market power or exclusive access to an element essential to
effective competition,"138 otherwise the rule of reason will be applied.139 The
Court admitted that some regulation is necessary for wholesale purchase cooperatives
to function effectively, 140 and found the challenged act of expulsion did not
necessarily imply anticompetitive effect.141
In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists/42 the Supreme Court followed the
138472 U.S. at 296.
139The issue was whether this expulsion by Northwest would fall into the category
conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive. 472 U.S. at 290.
Justice Brennan doubted the automatic application of the per se rule to group
boycotts. He reviewed group boycott cases in which the Court held per se illegal, and
found the boycotting parties frequently had possessed market power, and thereby
determined "not all concerted refusal to deal are predominantly anticompetitive." Id.
at 294-98.
140 This reasoning seems similar to the doctrine in NCAA v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). The Court also admitted the procompetitive
effect of Northwest stating "such cooperative arrangements would seem to be
'designed to increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less,
competitive. '" 472 U.S. at 296 (citing Broadcasting Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979)).
141 472 U.S. at 296.
Cf NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-102, 106; While the Supreme Court admitted some
horizontal restraints are necessary for college sports, it found the challenged horizontal
price and output restraint had an obvious anticompetitive effect.
142 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Indiana Federation of Dentists (Federation) was an association of dentists.
Though number of membership was small, less than 100, its members were
concentrated in two areas. Dental insurance evaluated diagnosis and treatment
recommendation in order to limit payment of benefits to the cast of the "least
expensive yet adequate treatment." To carry out the evaluation system, insurers often
requested dentists to submit x-rays that had been used. In order to resist this
evaluation system, Federation promulgated a "work rule" which forbad its member
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doctrine of Northwest Wholesale,143 but held group boycotts illegal under the "easy"
rule of reason analysis without elaborate market analysis.144 The decision in
Federation of Dentists, marks the border between the per se rule and the rule of reason
less clear since it expressed the rule of reason is not necessarily accompanied by
complicated and elaborate economic analysis.145 It is very interesting that the Court
dentists to submit x-rays to dental insurers for use in evaluating claims.
The FTC alleged the Federation had a conspiracy among dentists to refuse to
submit x-rays to insurers under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45).
143 476 U.S. at 458; "[T]he per se approach has generally been limited to cases in
which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage
them from doing business with a competition." The Supreme Court did not find
market power and decided to evaluate the group boycotts under the rule of reason. Id.
at 458-59.
See Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 296.
144 476 U.S. at 459-66; If obvious anticompetitive effects are shown, the rule of
reason does not require careful examination of all facts. This rule of reason analysis
is similar to NCAA in which the Supreme Court held horizontal restraint illegal under
the rule of reason emphasizing its anticompetitive character. 468 U.S. at 104-120.
But cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918);
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); The Supreme Court ruled
that all facts relating to the case should be weighed under the rule of reason analysis.
145 476 U.S. at 459-61; If the procompetitive effect of the conduct, in other words
"countervailing procompetitive virtue - such as, for example, the creation of
efficiencies in the operation of a market or the provision of goods and services" is
found, or if substantial anticompetitive effect is found, then the courts will hold the
restraint of trade illegal "even in the absence of elaborate market analysis." The
Supreme Court in Federation of Dentist called this analysis "the rule of reason."
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announced the rule of reason is not difficule46 although the Court in Topeo had
refused to apply it owing to its complicated character.147
3. The Surviving per se rule
While the Supreme Court tended to move to the rule of reason analysis in
1980's, the per se rule has survived. In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, ine./48 the
Supreme Court ruled "when a particular concerted activity entails an obvious risk of
anticompetitive impact with no apparent potentially redeeming value," it will be held
illegal per se despite "the fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in a
particular set of circumstances."149 That is to say that if the Court had found any
146476 U.S. at 459; "Application of the Rule of Reason to these facts is not a
matter of any great difficulty."
147405 U.S. at 609.
148Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); the Court held it was
a per se violation of the Sherman Act for price fixing where wholesalers made an
agreement among themselves requiring retailers to pay in cash in advance.
Beer wholesalers in California had competed with each other about the credit
terms for retailers, and they had extended credit without interest up to the 30-day and
40-day limits permitted by the state law. Id. at 643-45. To restrain competition,
wholesalers agreed that they would deal with retailers only if payment were made in
advance or upon delivery. Id.
149446 U.S. at 649-50. The Court unanimously decided the agreement to
eliminate credit is deemed as classic price fixing because credit terms are characterized
as an inseparable part of the prices. Id. at 645-49. "[S]ince price-fixing agreements
have been adjudged to lack any 'redeeming virtue,' it is conclusively presumed illegal
without further examination under the rule of reason." Id. at 650.
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redeeming virtue of the agreement in question, the agreement might not have been
defined as classic price fixing.150
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, the Supreme Court did not
waive the enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing.151 The Supreme Court
held illegal per se where physicians set the maximum fee schedule in order to provide
patients of health care with a unique desirable form of insurance coverage.152 With
respect to the issue whether the rule of reason analysis is applicable or not, the
majorityl53 refused the physician's argumentsl54 which are, relying upon
ISO See 446 U.S. at 649; Though the Court denied it was necessity to inquire into
the reasonableness of the agreement, it responded to the defendants' arguments which
had been upheld by the Court of Appeal and stated these arguments did not make
sense.
The Ninth Circuit had admitted the procompetitive effects of the agreement
such as "removing a barrier perceived by some sellers to market entry" and "the
increase visibility of price made possible by the agreement to eliminate credit."
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 643 (1980).
151 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982).
152 457 U.S. 339-41. Two county medical societies in Arizona established
foundations for medical care "for the purpose of promoting fee-for-service medicine
and to provide the community with a competitive alternative to existing health
insurance plans." [d. at 339-41. This foundation set the maximum fees of medical
services for the patients insured under the insurance plan authorized by the foundation.
[d. at 339.
Under the plan: (1) the authorized insurance companies were to pay in full for
medical services performed by member physicians; (2) the member physicians might
charge less than the scheduled maximum fees; and (3) when an insured patient would
go to a non-member physician, the insurance company should cover for patient's
charges up to the amount of scheduled maximum prices, and the patient should pay
the balance by himself. [d. at 341.
The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care, one of them, consisted of about 70
percent of the physicians in Maricopa County. [d. at 339.
153 It was controversial 4-3 judgment.
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Professional Engineers 155and Broadcast Music;156 that the restraint was set by the
members of the profession,157 that the Court lacked judicial experience in the health
care industry/58 and that the schedule involved price fixing "in only a literal
sense."159 Moreover, although the Court conceded there were merits of the
154First of all, the physicians contended that fixing maximum prices was not
subject to the per se rule. 457 U.S. at 342. The Court responded that maximum price
fixing is placed on the same legal footing as minimum price fixing, and therefore is
illegal per se. Id. at 348.
155National Soc'y. of Professional Eng'r. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
156Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
157Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 348. The Court refused this argument since "the price-
fixing agreements in this case ... are not premised on public service or ethical
norms." Id. at 349.
158457 U.S. at 349.
To this argument, the Court suggested "[w]hatever may be its peculiar
problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing arguments are
concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." Id. at 349
(citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940».
The Court distinguished Maricopa from Broadcast Music. In Broadcast Music,
the Court examined the challenged blanket licensing under the rule of reason because
the restraint involved the copyright and not because it involved a music industry. 441
U.S. at 9-10.
159See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8-9; The Supreme Court stated that though
the blanket license involved price fixing in the literal sense, for the judgement under
the per se rule "it is necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within
or without that category of behavior to which we apply the label 'per se price fixing. '"
However, the Court in Maricopa is distinguished from Broadcast Music
because:
Each of the foundations is composed of individual practitioners
who compete with another for patients. Neither the foundations nor the
doctors sell insurance, and they derive no profits from the sale of health
insurance policies. The members of the foundations sell medical
services. Their combination in the form of the foundation does not
permit them to sell any different product. Their combination has merely
permitted them to sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices
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schedule,160 it also rejected the procompetitive justification for escaping from the per
se rule,161and added that the price fixing among physicians was not necessary to
achieve procompetitive effects.162
and arguably to affect the prevailing market price of medical care.
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356 (footnote omitted).
Justice Powel, in his dissenting opinion, indicated this distinction by the
majority was unconvincing because each arrangement in Broadcast Music and in
Maricopa "involved competitors and resulted in cooperative pricing:' "was prompted
by the need for better service to the consumers," and "makes possible a new product
by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies." Id. at 364-365 (footnotes omitted).
160457 U.S. at 352; The Court acknowledged that a prior agreement between
physicians and insurance companies assures full insurance coverage and brings
potential to having lower insurance premium. The merits "can be obtained only if the
insurer and the doctors agree in advance on the maximum fee that the doctor will
accept as full payment for a particular services." Id.
The Court also conceded there was a competitive advantage for the
foundations' member physicians that they could not have otherwise obtained. Id. at
356 n.33. The member physicians could attract patients who evaluate the assurance of
"full health coverage" by an insurance and" a choice of doctors." Id.
161457 U.S. at 351; "The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing
agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are
offered for some." "Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing
agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the
central nervous system of the economy." Id. n.23 (citing United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)).
Besides, the majority additionally stated the schedule would not significantly
enhance competition. Id. at 351.
162457 U.S. at 352-53, 356 n.33.
It is not clear which doctrine the Court would have applied if it had found the
necessity of price fixing in the schedule. The Court announced that procompetitive
justification can not be a defense. Id. at 351. Further, the Court said "[e]ven if a fee
schedule is therefore desirable, it is not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing."
Id. at 352 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added). The Court seems to apply the per se
rule.
However, a question remains where the Court found the procompetitive merits
were "apparent potentially redeeming value." See Catalano, 446 U.S. at 649.
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In the latest Supreme Court decision, Jay Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc./63
the Court found the agreement of price fixing and horizontal market division illegal
per sel64where the Bar Review Group of Georgia (hereinafter BRG)165and the
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications (hereinafter HBJ)I66
made an agreement that BRG had an exclusive license to use HBJ's materials and
continued doing its business only in Georgia and that HBJ did its business only
outside Georgia. 167While the Eleventh Circuit denied the price fixing because the
agreement did not explicitly addressed the factor of price,168the Supreme Court
163Jay Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S._ , 111 S.Ct. 401 (1990).
164111 S. Ct. at 403.
165BRG offered a bar review course covering multi-state and Georgia law
materials only in Georgia. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 F.2d 1417, 1418 (11th
Cir. 1989), amended, 893 F.2d 293 (1990), rev'd, 498 U.S._, 111 S. Ct. 401 (1990).
166HBJ has offered bar review courses nationwide under the name "BarlBri." 874
F.2d at 1418. HBJ began offering a review course on a limited basis in 1976. 111 S.
Ct. at 401.
167 See 874 F.2d at 1418-19,1428-30.
BRG and HBJ had competed with each other from 1977 to 1979. 111 S. Ct. at
401. HBJ lost large profits because of the low price of BRG, and HBJ decided to
withdraw its business from Georgia in 1979. 874 F.2d at 1418. In 1980, BRG and
HBJ entered an agreement that:
(1) HBJ "gave BRG an exclusive license to use HBJ's name 'BarlBri' in Georgia;"
(2) HBJ "would no longer offer a bar review course in Georgia;"
(3) HBJ "would not compete with BRG on Georgia;" and
(4) BRG would not compete with HBJ outside Georgia. Id.
The price of BRG's course rose from 150 dollar to 400 dollars immediately
after the agreement. Id. at 1419.
168874 F.2d at 1424.
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ruled, citing Socony-Vacuum/69 a combination which aimed to affect price is per se
price fixing.170To the lower court's decision that it was a vertical licensing
agreement,I71the Court suggested, citing TOpCO,172 territorial restraint between
competitors to minimize competition are per se illegal emphasizing that the defendants
had done their business simultaneously in Georgia.173Note that this agreement had
169United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); "Under
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se."
170111 S. Ct. at 402. See also 874 F.2d at 1434; Judge Clark, in his dissenting
opinion, stated that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendants
literally fix prices, and that the revenue-sharing agreement was not inherently
anticompetitive because "the record establishes that the purpose and effect of the
agreement was to increase the price of bar review courses."
171874 F.2d at 1424; The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the only market ever
claimed by both BRG and HBJ was Georgia, and BRG and HBJ did not divide up the
Georgia market in which both were doing business, since (1) BRG had never done its
business outside Georgia; (2) BRG had never intended to do business outside Georgia;
and (3) HBJ has done the nationwide business but withdrew from Georgia.
172United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); "One of the
classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at
the same time level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize
competition .... This Court has reiterated time and time again that '[h]orizontal
territorial limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling
of competition'" (citations omitted).
173111 S. Ct. at 403; "Each agreed not to compete in the other's territories. Such
agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split a market within
which both do business or whether they merely reserve one market for one and
another for the other."
See also 874 F.2d at 1432-34. Judge Clark, in dissenting, found that BRG and
HBJ were horizontal competitors ruling that "[i]t is firmly established that entities in a
seemingly vertical relationship may be capable of horizontal restraints if they are
actual or potential competitors." [d. at 1432. Further, he denied the necessity of proof
that defendants sub-divided the relevant market because "market division is simply a
subset of market allocation both of which are per se antitrust violations." [d. at 1434-
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no lawful purpose nor economic efficiency between the defendants although it was
disputed whether this type of restraint had belonged to the per se category.
4. Summary
The Supreme Court has tried to eliminate inflexibility of the rigid per se rule
especially since Sylvania.114 Although Topco175 is still supported in Palmer,176 it
is clear that Supreme Court has been moving from a prompt decision under the per se
rule toward the flexible application of the Sherman Act on a case-by-case basis. In a
lower court decision, the District of Colombia Circuit announced that Topco and
Sealy177 "must be regarded as effectively overruled. ,,178 Other lower courts also
held that horizontal restraint are to be analyzed under the flexible approaches, namely
the rule of reason or the ancillary restraints doctrine.179
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174 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
175 United States V. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
176 Jay Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S._ , 111 S. Ct. 401 (1990).
177 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
178 Rothery Storage & Van Co., v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 216 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). Judge Robert Bork believed that "[i]n
BMI, NCAA, and Pacific Stationery, the Supreme Court returned the law to the
Formulation of Addyston Pipe & Steel and thus effectively overruled Topco and Sealy
as to the per se illegality of all horizontal restraints." Id. at 229.
179E.g., National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Polk Brothers, Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d
185 (7th Cir. 1985); Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984).
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The recently favored rule of reason analysis, however, has a critical detriment
which is not to be overlooked. Full consideration of relevant matters needs a
considerable amount of time and can be a tough burden for the court to analyze.
Besides, uncertainty of the flexible approach makes business and industry feel anxious
about antitrust litigation when they sue or are sued. Other problems are what the
Supreme Court indicated in TOpCO.180 The courts nevertheless are reluctant to apply
the per se rule in order to evaluate impact on competition, and the Court has applied
the rule of reason without elaborate fact findings.181
It is clear now that price fixing and horizontal market allocation will be held
illegal per se where they are inherently restrictive conducts unaccompanied with any
redeeming justification. 182 In the cases where concerted conducts involved some
procompetitive efficiencies, the courts will consider on a case-by-case basis under
which doctrine they will examine the challenged conduct. No matter what doctrine the
courts choose, they will examine more or less the facts which they think necessary
unless the restraint is an apparently naked one.183 Unfortunately, it seems that the
180 405 U.S. at 609-10.
181 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-61
(1986); National College Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 104-120 (1984).
182 See Palmer, 874 F.2d at 1432 n.12 ; "The plaintiff's price-fixing and market
allocation claims are the types that courts and economists have long condemned as per
se violations of the Sherman Act."
183 Even when the Court applied the per se rule, it explained why by referring to
the facts relating to the restraint. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y., 457 U.S. 332, 348-56 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S.
643, 649-50 (1980).
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standard of when and how they decide an applicable doctrine is still vaguel84 even
though the Sherman Act has a criminal charge.185 The courts should develop the
criteria for balancing litigation efficiencies and the flexible application of the Antitrust
laws.
184 In Broadcast Music, the Supreme Court suggested it is necessary to have
considerable experience with the type of challenged restraint to determine whether the
restraint falls within the category of per se illegal conduct 441 U.S. at 8-10. While
in Maricopa, the Court suggested the application of the per se rule to price fixing
uniformly in all industry alike, in NCAA, the Court admitted that there exist industries
in which some horizontal restraint on competition is necessary. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at
349; NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.
Further, in Broadcast Music, the Court ruled not to apply the per se rule to the
restraint which only literally involves price fixing, though it is not clear what is "only
a literal sense." Broadcast Music 441 U.S. at 8. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356.
Moreover, procompetitive justification cannot be taken into after the conduct
was determined as per se violation. E.g., Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351. However, in
Catalano, the Court announced a conduct "with no apparent potentially redeeming
value" will be deemed per se conduct. 446 U.S. at 649.
185 See Sherman Act §§ 1, 2.
III. ANTIMONOPOL Y ACT IN GENERAL
A. Brief History
"Free enterprise" and "free competition" are relatively new concepts in
Japan. ]86 It might be useful in understanding the Antimonopoly Act in Japan to
know the history and background of the Japanese competitive policy.
1. Before World War II
The Japanese Government had promoted policies of developing industries to
reach European countries and the United States before World War II. To achieve this
goal, while no policy to control a restrictive business practice nor to promote
competition was adopted, cartels were promoted and reinforced by laws for
rationalization and systematization of Japanese industries. ]87
For example, the Important Industries Control Act of 1931 was enacted for
rectifying the unstable condition of enterprises caused by excessive competition
through rationalization, and for eliminating national economic losses caused by such
]86 MITSUOMATSUSHITA,INTRODUCTIONTO JAPANESEANTIMONOPOLYLAW 1
(1990).
]87 ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 301.
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competition. 188 The government could control and supervise activities of non-
members of the cartels in designated industries under this ACt.189More than twenty
industries were covered by this ACt.190Additionally, Zaibatsu, a giant conglomerate
had developed before World War II. Zaibatsu were groups consisting of various
powerful companies from the banking, coal, steel, heavy industry, trading, securities
and other sectors, and usually were controlled by a holding company.191 These
Zaibatsu had an extremely strong influence over many areas of Japanese industry.192
The period until the end of World War II can be called the period of government
188HIROSHIIYORI& MINORI UESUGI,THE ANTIMONOPOLYLAWSOF JAPAN3
(1983).
189IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 3.
190 E.g.,Cotton spinning, silk spinning, paper, carbide, cement, sulfuric acid, flour,
pig iron, ferro-alloy, various steel products, refined sugar, beer and coal. IYORI&
UESUGI, supra note 188, at 4 (citing MrrSUBISHI KEIZAIKENKYOJO[MITSUBISHI
ECONOMICRESEARCHINSTITUTE],NIHONNO SANGYOTO BOEKINO HATTEN
[DEVELOPMENTOF INDUSTRIESANDTRADEIN JAPAN] 126-27 (1953)).
191MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 1.
See also AKIRA SHODA,ZENTEIDOKUSENKINSHIHOI [ANTIMONOPOLYLAW I
REVISEDED.] 4 (rev. ed. 1980); As to Mitsui Zaibatsu, for example, the Headquarter
of Mitsui Company which was a holding company and the Mitsui family together
owned 66.7 percent of interest in 10 so called directly affiliated companies. They also
owned 48.7 percent of interest in 12 so called semi-directly affiliated companies. Id.
These 22 companies controlled 151 domestic companies and 61 overseas companies in
1946. Id.
192IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 5; Especially the four largest Zaibatsu
(Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda) controlled huge share of Japanese
industries. At the end of World War II, they controlled 544 companies, directly or
indirectly. Id. Their controlling ratio of the total companies in Japan was 24.5
percent in all fields of industries, 49.7 percent in the financing business, 32.4 percent
in heavy industry, 10.7 percent in light industry, and 60.8 percent in the marine
transportation industry. Id.
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control because "free enterprise" or "free competition" could not be established under
the circumstances above.193
2. New Japanese economic policy
The end of World War II had completely changed these situations in Japan.
The Allied Occupation Forces, in which the United States was the leading power, took
some measures to reform the then wholly controlled economy into a free competitive
one.l94 One measure was the dissolution of Zaibatsu. So as to eliminate Zaibatsu,
holding companies which had controlled Zaibatsu were dissolved,195 combination
with the affiliated companies through stockholding or personal or contractual
relationships was prohibited,196 and the Zaibatsu families were forced to transfer
their securities197 and were also restricted from holding executive positions in
companies. 198
193MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 1.
194ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 301.
195Mochikabukaisha Seiri Iinkai Rei [Holding Company Liquidation Commission
Ordinance], Imperial Ordinance No.233 of 1946 (Japan).
196Kaisha no Shaken hoyti Seigen ta ni kansuru Ken [Restriction of Securities
Holding, etc. by Companies], Imperial Ordinance No.567 of 1946 (Japan).
197Amendment to the Holding Company Liquidation Commission Ordinance,
Imperial Ordinance No.592 of 1946 (Japan).
198Zaibatsu Dazoku Shihairyoku Haijoha [Act for Termination of Zaibatsu Family
Control], Act No.2 of 1948 (Japan).
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3. The Antimonopoly Act
Another important measure to reform the Japanese economy was to enact the
Antitrust laws in Japan. The Antimonopoly Act was promulgated in 1947, and the
Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter JFTC)I99 was established by this Act.2OOSince
the Japanese Government had a vague conception of free competition and little
knowledge of regulation of a restrictive business practice, the Allied Occupation
Forces had strongly advised them to draft the Antimonopoly Act.201 The
Antimonopoly Act, therefore, was patterned after the Antitrust laws in the United
States, and added several new improvements which were deemed necessary and
helpful in the light of American experiences.202
4. The 1953 amendment
The Antimonopoly Act has been amended several times to meet Japan's actual
economic conditions. The notable amendment concerning cartels was relaxation of the
Antimonopoly Act. The occupation by the Allied Occupation Forces was terminated
199The Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) is an independent administrative agency of
the Government, which aims to achieve the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act.
Although the JFTC is attached administratively to the Prime Minister, the chairman
and commissioners perform their duties independently. ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATION
OF JAPAN, supra note 7, at 328. Yet, the JFTC has been often less active against
private monopolies, cartels and unfair practices. SHIGEKAZUIMAMURA,DOKUSEN
KINSHIHOSHINBAN[ANTIMONOPOLYLAW NEW ED.] 15-26 (2d ed. 1978).
200Antimonopoly Act § 27.
201ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 301.
202ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 301.
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in 1952. The Korean War and the Cold War made the United States change its policy
from discouraging Japan's resurgence as a major economic power to rebuilding Japan
into a heavily industrial country for the purpose of making Japan as a bulwark against
Communism.203 Then, the request for an amendment to relax the Antimonopoly Act
became stronger when Japan was struggling with the depression following the end of
the Korean War?04 At the same time, Japan was introduced to West German's Bill
Against Restraint of Competition (Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen
Wettbewerbsdeschrankungen) which has provisions to exempt a depression cartel, a
rationalization cartel and an export cartel from application of the Bi11.205In 1953,
the Antimonopoly Act was amended to respond to these requests.206 As a result of
this amendment, the per se approach to a restrictive practice including a cartel was
203MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 3. See also SmGEKAZUIMAMURA,DOKUSEN
KINSHIHONYUMONKAITEIBAN[INTRODUCTIONTO ANTIMONOPOLYACT REVISED
ED.] 22 (rev. ed. 1988).
204IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 15.
205IMAMURA,supra note 199, at 19.
206 See ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 302; IYORI&
UESUGI, supra note 188, at 16; The major points of the 1953 Amendment were as
follows:
(1) By deleting or modifying provisions which had prohibited activities affecting
competition, the only activities which substantially restrain competition were
prohibited. In other words, the proof of market power eventually became
necessary.
(2) "Unfair methods of competition" was changed to "unfair business practices" so
as to widen the scope of application.
(3) The abuse of one's dominant bargaining position was additionally prohibited.
(4) Exemption of depression cartels and rationalization cartels under certain
conditions was approved.
(5) Exemption of the resale price maintenance for particular conditions was
approved.
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eliminated. And only those activities are prohibited when they constitute
"unreasonable restraint of trade" which restrain "substantially competition."207
Moreover, this amendment admits that a depression cartel208and a rationalization
cartel209 can be exempted by the JFrC's approval from application of the
Antimonopoly Act. This amendment seems to recognize the existence of "good
cartels" and "bad cartels," unlike the Antitrust laws in the United States.
In addition to the 1953 Amendment, separate laws providing for exemptions
from application of the Antimonopoly Act were enacted. They included a law
covering a small business cartel210and an import-export cartel.211
The original Antimonopoly Act, which was patterned after Antitrust Laws in
the United States, has been changed through several amendments.212 Especially by
the 1953 Amendment, the Japanese approach to the horizontal restraint of trade
differed from the that of the United States. This Amendment, however, does not mean
207Antimonopoly Act § 1(6).
208Antimonopoly Act § 24-3.
209Antimonopoly Act § 24-4.
210Chiisho Kigyo Dantai no Soshiki ni Kansuru Horitsu [Small and Medium Sized
Enterprise Organization Act], Act No.185 of 1957 (Japan), as amended, translated in
ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 235, (hereinafter Small and
Medium Enterprise Organization Act).
211E.g., Yushutunyii Torihikiho [Export and Import Trading Act], Act No.299 of
1952 (Japan), as amended, translated in ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,
supra note 7, at 257.
212Major amendments were enacted in 1949, 1953, and 1977. ANTIMONOPOLY
LEGISLATIONOF JAPAN, supra note 7, at 3.
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Japan abandoned a free competition policy or returned to the pre-World War II period.
It is evident that Japan has pursued its suitable competition policy utilizing concepts
introduced from the United States.
B. Purpose of Antitrust Laws
1. Explicit purpose of the Antimonopoly Act
The Antimonopoly Act was enacted to forward the antimonopoly policies in
Japan. As the history shows, the concept of antimonopoly policies was not familiar to
Japanese people at the end of World War II. Hence, it was necessary to have a
provision clearly expressing its purpose specified in order to realize the ideal of
antitrust policies.213 Note that this purpose is an important guiding principle when
the Antimonopoly Act is interpreted and enforced.214
The purpose of the Antimonopoly Act is as follows:
(1) "to promote free and fair competition;"
(2) "to stimulate the creative initiative of entrepreneurs, to encourage
business activities, to heighten the level of employment and people's
real income;" and thereby
(3) "to promote the democratic and wholesome development of the national
economy; "
213 SHIGEKAZUIMAMURA,Mokuteki [Purpose], in CHOKAIKEIZAIHOJOUKAN
[COMMENTARYECONOMICLAWS I] 20 (1975).
214 IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 42.
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(4) 11as well as to assure the interests of consumers in generaL11215
The first purpose of promoting free and fair competition is a classic but the
most important one. Undoubtedly, the second purpose is not to protect unproductive
companies from competition. Promoting free and fair competition will result in
economic efficiencies described in the second part. Though it seems to be correct on
the surface that over competition will make the national economy dangerous,
protection of inefficient companies or an unreasonable trade practice will not promote
economic efficiency. The third and fourth parts, developing national economy and
protecting consumers, are the goal of appropriate national economic policy rather than
the unique purpose of the Antimonopoly Act.216 The Antimonopoly Act pursues
these national purposes through protecting free and fair competition. Promoting
competition should not be inconsistent with the welfare of the national economy and
consumers. If a particular conduct seems to promote competition in the market as
well as be against development of the national economy or consumers' welfare, such a
conduct should be examined carefully to see whether it promotes competition for a
long term. The Antimonopoly Act, therefore, prohibits some unfair conducts which
seem consistent with free competition at the first. For instance, the Antimonopoly Act
prohibits price discrimination217 and unjust prices218 including unjust low price
215 Antimonopoly Act § 1.
216 IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 24.
217 JFTC Notification No.15 of 1982 Subsec. 3 (Japan). JFTC Notification No.15
of 1982 was enacted to specify unfair trade practices prohibited in Section 2(9) of the
Antimonopoly Act.
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sales219 and unjust high price purchasing.220 Further, even some kinds of cartels
can be exempted from the application of the Antimonopoly Act under a certain
circumstance.221 What is important is a clear standard to determine legality of
conducts which seem to make conflicts between free competition and other benefits.
The Congress in Japan provided a lot of specific provisions in the Antimonopoly Act
and other separate laws, including exemption laws, in order to help the public
understand the unlawful restraint of trade.
The measures taken to achieve the mentioned purposes above are prohibition of
(l)"private monopolization," (2) "unreasonable restraint of trade," (3) "unfair trade
practices," and (4) "excessive concentration of economic power. ,,222 These measures
are explained specifically as elimination of "unreasonable restraint of production, sale,
price, technology and the like, and all other unjust restriction of business activities
through combination, agreements and otherwise. "223
Subsection 3 prohibits "unjustly supplying or accepting a commodity or service
at prices which discriminate between regions or between the other parties."
ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 316.
218 Antimonopoly Act § 2(9)(ii).
219 JFTC Notification No.15 of 1982 Subsec. 6 (Japan).
220 JFTC Notification No.IS of 1982 Subsec. 7 (Japan).
221 See infra part V.
222 Antimonopoly Act § 1.
223 Antimonopoly Act § 1.
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2. Comparison with the United States
Although the Antitrust laws in the United States have no explicit statement
concerning their purpose, the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States224 announced the purpose of the Sherman Act. The Court indicated
that the Sherman Act "aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade" in order for "the best allocation of economic resources,""the lowest
prices,""the highest quality,""the greatest material progress" and "the preservation of
democratic political and social institutions."225 Further, there exists heated
arguments concerning the main goal of the Antitrust laws. Traditionalists support the
goal of free competition.226 Chicago School, on the other hand, insists it is
economic efficiency.227 The Traditionalists' view states the Antitrust laws also
enhance or encourage economic efficiency although their main concept is
competition.228 It is believed by Traditionalists that tension between free
competition and economic efficiency should not exist.229 Under this view,
224Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
225356 U.S. at 4.
226 See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust - Retrospective: Where
are we coming from? Where are we going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 936 (1987).
227 See ROBERTH. BaRK, THEANTITRUSTPARADOX15-16 (1978); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1984).
228Fox & Sullivan, supra note 226, at 971.
229Id.
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promoting free competition will consequently bring economic efficiency.230 While
the economic view of the Chicago School has influenced the Supreme Court,231free
competition still must be an important purpose of the Antitrust laws under the Chicago
Doctrine. Free competition cannot be ignored because economic efficiency is
promoted by free and fair competition in the free economy. In the free competitive
market, enterprises should always make an effort to promote efficiency for their
survival. At least, the Antitrust laws do not prohibit every agreement in restraint of
trade, but prohibit unreasonable ones which are contrary to the development of the
economy and consumers protection232 which results from free and fair
competition.233
In sum, both the Antimonopoly Act in Japan and the Antitrust laws in the
United States have the similar purpose of promoting competition and thereby to
achieve welfare of consumers and the development of the national economy.
230Id.
231John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitation of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the
Resolution of the Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1138 (1987). See, e.g.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
232Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); "Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription'" (citation omitted).
233See supra part II.
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C. Promoting Competition
The Antimonopoly Act has as its primary purpose "to promote free and fair
competition. "234 Enterprises develop their technology and make themselves more
procompetitive through competition. One contradictory situation is that a single
survivor dominates the market as a result of winning free and fair competition because
of its superior technology, diligent service, and excellent management. Once the
market is monopolized, the dominator may be able to enjoy its monopoly power. The
question here is whether prevention of such a situation is necessary.
1. Competition
It is important to recognize what is competition since the purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act is "to promote free and fair competition. ,,235 The recognition of
competition is necessary to judge whether a competitive relationship among
entrepreneurs exists.236 The Antimonopoly Act defines the term "competition" as "a
situation in which two or more entrepreneurs do or may" deal with the same customers
or same suppliers and in the same or similar services.237 "[T]wo or more
234 Antimonopoly Act § 1.
235 Antimonopoly Act § 1.
236 ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN45, supra note 7.
237 Antimonopoly Act § 2(4). Section 2(4) provides in full:
The term "competition" as used in this Act shall mean a situation
in which two or more entrepreneurs do or may, within the normal scope
of their business activities and without understanding any important
change in their business facilities or kinds of business activities, engage
in any act prescribed in anyone of the following paragraphs: Provided,
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entrepreneurs do or may" implies the term competition includes potential competitors
in the future as well as an actual competitors.238 Also in the United States, the
conduct eliminating potential competitor in the future is unlawful. 239
2. Monopolies resulting from lawful activities
a. Japan
The Antimonopoly Act pursues promoting competition by prohibiting "private
monopolization" and by preventing "excessive concentration of economic power. ,,240
A monopoly is obviously contrary to free and fair competition. An enterprise can
control the market where there are no other good competitors. It is an important role
for the Antimonopoly Act to prevent a monopoly or an excessive concentration of
economic power. Though the Antimonopoly Act prohibits private monopolization,241
it cannot eliminate an enterprise which has a dominant market power as a result of
That paragraph (ii) below shall not apply to such competition as
provided for in Chapter IV [Stockholding, interlocking directorates,
mergers and acquisitions of business]:
(i) Supplying the same or similar goods or services to the
same consumers;
(ii) Getting supplies of the same or similar goods or services
from the same supplier.
238MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 11.
239 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); The Supreme
Court in a conglomerate merger case held the conglomerate merger between a seller of
liquid bleach and a potential candidate for entering into the market violated Section 7
of the Clayton Act.
240Antimonopoly Act § 1.
241Antimonopoly Act § 3.
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natural growth.242 Section 2(5) of the Antimonopoly Act defines the term "private
monopolization" as a situation in which an entrepreneur excludes or controls the
business activities of other enterprises.243
The Antimonopoly Act had not had a provision to regulate such a monopolistic
situation until 1977. By Section 8-4 of the Antimonopoly Act added in 1977, the
JFfC got measures to restore competition where a monopolistic situation exists
regardless of whether the monopoly was caused by unlawful conducts or not.244 The
measures to restore competition is in order for the enterprise concerned "to transfer a
part of his business or to take any other measures necessary to restore competition
with respect to such goods or services.,,245 However because of its drastic effect, the
JFfC must consider several severe conditions when it issues such an order.246 A
242 An enterprise will be able to get dominant power without using anticompetitive
conducts if it has a superior technology or performs diligent services.
243 Antimonopoly Act § 2(5). Section 2(5) of provides in full:
The term "private monopolization" as used in this Act shall
mean that any entrepreneur, individually or by combination or
conspiracy with other entrepreneurs, or by in any other manner,
excludes or controls the business activities of other entrepreneurs,
thereby restraining, contrary to the public interest, substantially
competition in any particular field of trade.
244 Antimonopoly Act § 8-4.
245 Antimonopoly Act § 8-4(1).
246 The conditions required to the JFfC in order to issue an order to restore
competition in a monopolistic situation are provided in the Antimonopoly Act as
follows.
The JFTC must give consideration to the smooth conduct of business activities
by entrepreneurs and welfare of their employees based on following conditions:
(i) Assets, income and expenditures and other aspects of accounting;
(ii) Officers and employees;
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monopolistic situation is defined based on the market share of the enterprise,
difficulties for new entry into the market, aggregated amount of prices, excessive
profits, and excessive selling costs and general and administrative expenses.247
(iii) Location of factories, workyards and offices and other locational
conditions;
(vi) Aspects of business facilities and equipments;
(v) The substance of patent rights, trademark rights and other intangible
property rights and the technological features;
(vi) Capacity for and situations of production and sales, etc;
(vii) Capacity for and situations of obtaining funds and materials, etc;
(viii) Situations of supply and distribution of goods or services.
Antimonopoly Act § 8-4(2).
Further, no order can be issued under the following situations:
(1) It may reduce the size of business which will destroy its cost efficiency
sharply;
(2) Entrepreneurs may fall in financial difficulties;
(3) Entrepreneurs may become difficult to maintain its international competitions;
(4) Other alternative measures can be taken. Antimonopoly Act § 8-4(1).
Moreover, there are other procedural regulations when the JFfC issues an order
by the JFTC decision:
(1) The JFTC, when it believes an existence of a monopolistic situation, must
notify the competent Minister having jurisdiction over the relevant industry (§
45-2(1)), and the Minister can provide his opinion whether the monopolistic
situation and alternative measures exist (§ 45-2(2));
(2) The JFTC must hold a public hearing to obtain views of the public when it
starts an administrative procedure (§ 72-2);
(3) The JFTC must consult with the competent Minister when it starts an
administrative procedure
(4) The JFTC cannot issue an recommendation. To be careful, full procedure
should be taken (§ 48);
(5) The decision of issuance must be supported by at least three commissioners or
the chairman although usually a majority of affirmative votes of attending
commissioners are sufficient (§ 55(3)). The commission consists of the
chairman and four commissioners (§ 29(1));
(6) The JFTC decision cannot be enforced unless it becomes final (§ 58(2));
(7) A lawsuit to quash a decision can be filed within three months after the
decision becomes effective (§ 77(1)).
247 Antimonopoly Act § 2(7).
See ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 307-308:
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No order against a monopolistic situation has been issued so far,248while the
JFfC announced the Guideline249 and also often investigates and observes
enterprises in relatively concentrated industries. There will be few cases that the order
be issued against enterprises in a monopolistic situation. Because even if the
enterprise possesses a high market share, the enterprise will not be subject to Section
8-4 as long as it keeps its products low prices and does not get an excessive profit. In
other words, although Section 8-4 of the Antimonopoly Act allows the JFfC, without
proof of exclusive conducts by the enterprise, to eliminate the enterprise having a
The term "monopolistic situation" is defined as a circumstance in
which each of the following market structures and undesirable market
performance exist in any particular field of business where the total
amount of sales of goods or services of the same and similar description
supplied in Japan during the latest one-year period is in excess of 50
billion yen (approximately 390 million dollars):
(i) The market share of one entrepreneur is over 50 percent,
or a combined market share of two entrepreneurs is over
75 percent;
(ii) There exists a condition in which new entry into the
relevant field of business is extremely difficult; and
(iii) The price of particular goods or services has increased
remarkably, or decreased marginally over a period of
time, despite changes in costs and the fluctuation in the
supply and demand, and during such period the said
entrepreneurs have gained;
(a) extremely high profit margin, or have spent
(b) excessively high selling costs and general
administrative expenses.
248JFTC ANNUALREPORTIN 1991, supra note 14, at app. 12-13; No case
concerning Section 8-4 has been reported until 1990.
249JFTC, DOKUSENTEKIJOTAI NOTEIGI KITEI NO UCRIJIGYOBUNYA NI KANSURU
KANGAEKATANI TSUITE [INTERPRETATIONOF PARTICULARFIELDOF BUSINESS
WITHINTHEMEANINGOFTHEDEFINITIONOFMONOPOLISTICSITUATION](1977).
61
monopoly power in the market, the JFTC still needs to prove that the enterprise
improperly enjoys its dominant position.
This is the limit of the Antimonopoly Act against a monopolistic situation. But
this limit does make sense. Assume that an enterprise could produce quality goods at
low cost. Its products were welcomed by consumers, and the enterprise earned profits.
The enterprise spent their profits for research and development and improved their
superior technology. It invested its money in its productive facilities and increased its
amount of products in order to respond to growing demand. It expanded its business
and finally dominated the market. Even after the enterprise got the dominant power in
the market, it continued sincere management. Under this situation, nobody would
complain to this enterprise. Were such an enterprise held illegal just because of its
monopoly power, all private enterprises would be discouraged to make an effort at
their business. Discouraging enterprises to perform diligent business activities will
cause discouraging competition in the market. Furthermore, enterprises may possibly
choose cooperation with their competitors by concerted activities rather than
competition among them where the law does not allow a single winner. The
Antimonopoly Act therefore does not prohibit a monopoly resulting from a proper
business by the most efficient enterprise.
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b. United States
Section 2 of the Sherman Ace50 does not prohibit the existence of a
monopoly itself. Additional elements other than monopoly power are necessary in
order for proof of a violation of Section 2.251 Such additional elements are not
necessarily predatory conducts or direct restraints of competitors.252 In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, the Second Circuit held Alcoa was illegal despite
absence of predatory conducts or direct restraints of competitors.253 Judge Hand
concluded that Alcoa engaged in "exclusion" by embracing new business opportunity
progressively and showing new comers a new capacity already geared into a great
organization with the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of
personne1.254 Even given this doctrine, a monopolistic situation cannot be held
250 Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp II. 1990).
251 United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); The Supreme
Court declared the elements to be charged by Section 2 that "(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."
252 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. United Shoe March. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), aft d
per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
253 148 F.2d 430-31 (2d Cir. 1945). Aluminum Company of America (hereinafter
Alcoa) controlled more than 90 percent of the aluminum ingot market and had
increased its plant capacity in almost eight times meanwhile no one else produced
ingot in the United States. Id. at 425, 430. As a result, Alcoa effectively anticipated
and forestalled all competition, and succeeded in holding the monopoly in spite of at
least one or two attempts to enter the industry. Id. at 430.
254 148 F.2d at 431.
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unlawful where it is a result of fair and free competition and is maintained by proper
management.
In regard to monopolies, the Antimonopoly Act in Japan has a severer
approach than the Sherman Act in the United States because it may issue an order to
regulate a monopolistic situation caused by lawful conducts.
3. Prevention of a lawful monopoly
It is true that the market in which enterprises are competing is better than a
concentrated market power even where the monopolist did not abuse its power. The
Second Circuit in Alcoa announced "[m]any people believe that possession of
unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses
energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to
industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone."255 Monopoly itself is not a vice but
a danger. Once one enterprise has a big market power, it may be tough for other
enterprises or new entries to compete with its dominant power effectively. It seems it
would be better and more realistic to prevent a monopolist from appearing before it
gets dominant power. Is it possible to prevent a single big winner of competition and
to promote free and fair competition? It is also questionable who is authorized to
control competition in the market.
255 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
64
In Japan, the Antimonopoly Act authorized the Government and the JFfC to
control competition under certain circumstances by means of exemption systems.z56
For example, the Antimonopoly Act and other laws admit exempted cartels among
small and medium enterprises in order to compete with large enterprises
effectively.257 In addition, the Antimonopoly Act allows, under certain
circumstances, enterprises in depressed industries to establish a lawful depression
carte1.258 Less efficient enterprises should withdraw their business in depression.
Depression is a good opportunity to draw a line between productive enterprises and
less efficient ones. Excessive competition in a severely depressed industry, however,
may harm enterprises which have potential to do good business. Having protection for
limited period, such enterprises will be able to start a better business and compete
after the depression. Both exemptions from the Antimonopoly Act have the effect of
maintaining competition entities, but also include danger. The danger is that exempted
cartels may protect incapable enterprises which should have withdrawn their business
from the market. These exempted cartels will be discussed in following chapters.
To summarize this section; (1) a monopolistic situation is less favorable than
competitive market; (2) the provisions prohibiting cartels in the Antitrust laws and the
256 E.g., Antimonopoly Act §§ 21 - 24-4.
257Antimonopoly Act § 24; Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act;
Chusho Kigyo to Kyodokumiaiho [Small and Medium Sized Enterprise, etc.
Cooperative Act], Act No. 54 of 1947 (Japan), as amended, translated in
ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 219 (hereinafter Small and
Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act).
258Antimonopoly Act § 24-3.
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Antimonopoly Act cannot prevent a monopolistic situation maintained by good
management; (3) maintaining competition entities is useful to prevent a monopoly; and
(4) exempting cartels from the Antimonopoly Act is one way to keep competition
entities although it has the dangerous effect of restraining competition.
VI. PROHIBITION AGAINST CARTELS IN JAPAN
Both Japan and the United States similarly prohibit horizontal restraint of trade.
Though any kind of horizontal restraint of trade is generally prohibited in Japan, it
may be true that the Antimonopoly Act in Japan prohibits a cartel less severely than
the Antitrust laws in the United States. This Chapter will focus on how both countries
regulate horizontal restraint of cartels, and what the difference is.
A. Cartel
A cartel is, in short, an arrangement or conduct by enterprises to restrain
competition among themselves. The Antimonopoly Act prohibits a cartel as
"unreasonable restraint of trade" in the latter part of Section 3.259 The element of
"unreasonable restraint of trade" is determined in Section 2(6f60 as follows:
259 Antimonopoly Act § 3. Section 3 provides in full:
No entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or any
unreasonable restraint of trade.
260Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). Section 2(6) provides in full:
The term "unreasonable restraint of trade" as used in this Act
shall mean that any entrepreneur, by contract, agreement or any other
concerted actions, irrespective of the names, with other entrepreneurs,
mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as
to fix, maintain, or increase prices, or to limit production, technology,
products, facilities, or customers or suppliers, thereby restraining,
contrary to the public interest, substantially competition in any particular
field of trade.
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(1) Existence of a contract, agreement, or any other concerted activities
among entrepreneurs;
(2) That entrepreneurs mutually restrict or conduct their business activities;
(3) Business activities in such a manner as to fix prices, to limit production,
technology, productive facilities, or customers or suppliers;
(4) Activities being contrary to the public interest;
(5) Activities which restrain substantially competition in any part of field.
Business activities of trade associations have similar effects as cartels, so the
Antimonopoly Act has provisions to prohibit restrictive conducts of trade
associations.261
B. Evidence of Agreement
Existence of an agreement or a concerted activity is necessary to prove a cartel
illega1.262 It is easy to find a concerted activity where enterprises made a written
contract among them. To escape from the Antimonopoly Act, enterprises are not
supposed to remain any evidence of an agreement. The issue is what fact is sufficient
to constitute an evidence of an agreement.
261 Antimonopoly Act § 8(l)(i)-(iii).
262 Judgment of Feb. 9, 1956 (In re Nippon Oil), Tokyo K5sai [Tokyo High
Court], 7 Gy5shii 2849 (Japan). See, e.g., Akita Barbershop Coop., 13 K5sei Torihiki
Iinkai Shinketsushii [JFTC Decision Report] (hereinafter Shinketsushii] 55
(l965)(Japan); Nippon Columbia, 3 Shinketsushii 107 (1951)(Japan); Noda Say Sauce
Co., 4 Shinketsushii 1 (1952)(Japan).
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The JFTC ruled in 1949 that "[i]n order to establish concerted activities, the
existence of an external uniformity as a result of acts of entrepreneurs is not enough,
and it is further required that a liaison of wills of some sort exists among the
entrepreneurs concerted ... ," and that "the existence of a liaison of wills could
sufficiently be proved," when entrepreneurs exchanged their information, and when
one expected others' conducts and also consciously did same conducts as others.263
Given this principle, the existence of cartel can be proved while there is no direct
evidence of an agreement but circumstantial evidence. But merely showing that
entrepreneurs conducted similarly is not a sufficient proof of an agreement. Neither
does it constitute sufficient evidence that entrepreneurs consciously acted similarly.
The term "liaison of wills" needs a fact which shows an exchange of information or
communication among entrepreneurs existed.264 Thus, it is necessary for the proof
of an agreement that similarity of entrepreneurs' conducts appeared after they
exchanged information among them.
263 Yuasa Lumber Co., 1 Shinketsushii 62 (1949)(Japan).
This is a case of price fixing at an open bidding. A government agency
decided to purchase plywood for the Occupation Forces in Japan. The method of
bidding was that the agency requested prospective suppliers to show their estimated
prices, and then the agency allocated purchase contracts to the bidders who offered the
lowest prices, in ascending order to the bidding with the lowest bid. The prospective
suppliers held several meetings concerning the prices in advance. In those meetings,
one of the companies suggested a certain price as good price, and many of others
agreed. No price nevertheless was set in the meetings. As a result, many suppliers
offered the same price as or similar ones to the price previously suggested in the
meetings.
264 IMAMURA,supra note 199, at 96; MITSUOMATSUSHITA,KEIZArnO GAISETSU
[INTRODUCTIONTO ECONOMICLAWS] 115-16 (1986); MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at
45-46.
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The Tokyo High Court in the oil cartel case took the same position and found
ten oil companies' conducts illegal where they had talked with among themselves
about their bid prices informally several times, and actually entailed a bid at similar
prices.265 Unless there had been an evidence of meetings among companies, they
would have escaped from application of the Antimonopoly Act. Conscious parallelism
among competitors itself is not allowed as a sufficient evidence of a cartel in Japan.
In the United States, conscious parallelism does not necessarily support an
inference of a conspiracy under the Sherman Act. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States,266 the Supreme Court suggested that agreements or communications among
companies are not necessary but that the fact each company knowingly engaged in
similar conducts is enough to establish a conspiracy.267In Theatre Enterprises, Inc.
265Judgment of Sep. 26, 1980 (In re Idemitsu K6san Co.), Tokyo K6sai [Tokyo
High Court], 33 K6keishii 359 (Japan). See also Honshii Seishi K.K., 28 Shinketsushii
32 (1951)(Japan); Asahi Glass K.K., 22 Shinketsushii 92 (1975)(Japan); Kodama
Sushi, 15 Shinketsushii 9 (1968)(Japan).
266Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); The Court held
that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of conspiracy among
eight motion picture film distributors where: (1) the exhibitors of first-run films in
Texas had sent letters requiring each film distributor to restrict terms of contracts,
including price fixing, with other exhibitors of subsequent runs in Texas; (2) each
distributor had known other distributors also had been required same conditions
because the request letters had listed all eight distributors' name as addressees; and (3)
eight distributors had accepted an offer from the first-run exhibitors and had limited
the terms when they would licensed subsequent runs of their films.
267306 U.S. at 226-27. See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946).
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V. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,268the Supreme Court concluded
"[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy
inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious
parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely. ,,269The
difference between Interstate Circuit and Theatre Enterprises is, in Interstate Circuit
each conspirator knew of the existence of same invitations to competitors. For the
inference of a tacit agreement, some further evidence like the circumstance of
Interstate Circuit is necessary in addition to conscious parallel behaviors. According
to subsequent decisions following above the two Supreme Court Cases, mere
conscious parallelism will not be sufficient evidence to sustain the inference of
conspiracy.270
In sum, though there is a difference between Japan and the United States
concerning the degree of necessary evidence to establish a cartel, the difference is not
so great. To prove a cartel in both countries, evidence that an agreement existed is
268Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954); The Court denied conscious parallelism itself establishes evidence of
conspiracy where picture motion producers and distributors had each refused to grant a
suburban exhibition fIrst run rights.
269346 U.S. at 541. See also Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 247 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961).
270 E.g., Quality Auto Body v. Allstate Inc. Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839
(1962); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958), affd
on the grounds, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
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not necessary but mere conscious parallel behavior is insufficient. The difference is
that, in Japan, it is always necessary to show the communications among companies
existed before their uniform conducts.
C. Horizontal Agreement Only
There are arguments as to whether a vertical agreement should be included in
the category of "unreasonable restraint of trade" in Section 3 of the Antimonopoly Act.
In the United States, the definition of "restraint of trade" in the Sherman Act covers
both vertical and horizontal restraints.271 The Antimonopoly Act, however, defines
"unreasonable restraint of trade" as an activity which is mutually restricted or
conducted by any entrepreneur.272 Horizontal restraint is undoubtedly covered by
this provision because an agreement among competing enterprises requires each
enterprise not to compete among themselves.
Vertical restraint, in contrast, is an agreement among various levels of
enterprises which are not necessarily competing. There is no competitive relationship
in an agreement between a distributor and a buyer. For example, an exclusive dealing
agreement is a contract which a manufacturer forces dealers to deal in only the
manufacture's products. Under this agreement, only dealers had a duty on dealing, but
the manufacturer had no obligation.
271 See supra part II.B. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits the existence of a
contract, combination or conspiracy regardless whether vertical or horizontal.
272 Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
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The JFTC had recognized that vertical restraints could be regulated by Section
2(6) until 1953.273 The Tokyo High Court on the contrary denied the JFTC's view.
The court ruled that "to mutually restrict or conduct their business activities" means
concerted activities under the horizontal agreement only since it is necessary for an
enforcement of Section 2(6) that competing enterprises mutually restrict upon among
themselves.274
The JFTC, responding to this decision, has proceeded against vertical restraint
under other provisions, mainly as "unfair trade practice. ,,275 Exclusive dealing,
exclusive distributorship, resale price maintenance, and vertical customer and territorial
restraint fall into the category of Section 2(9)(iv) which prohibits "dealing with another
party on such terms as will restrict unjustly the business activities of the said party" as
273 See Hokkaid6 Butter Co., 2 Shinketsushfi 103 (1950)(Japan); A butter
manufacturer set the wholesale and resale prices and asked wholesalers to accept such
prices. The JFTC decided theses vertical agreements were unlawful as cartels. See
also Sh6chiku Co., 1 Shinketsushfi 114 (1950)(Japan).
274 Judgment of Mar. 9, 1953 (In re Asahi Newspaper), Tokyo K6sai [Tokyo High
Court], 6 K6minshfi 435 (Japan); Five major newspaper publishers agreed with
newspaper sellers that each of the sellers would have their exclusive sales territory.
The JFTC condemned that agreements of territorial allocation as unlawful under
Section 2(6) of the Antimonopoly Act. The Tokyo High Court denied the JFTC's
argument because these agreements imposed an obligation to do their business within
their territories only upon newspaper sellers and thereby mutuality was lacking.
See also Judgment of Dec. 7, 1953 (so-called T6h6 and Shin T6h6 case),
Tokyo K6sai [Tokyo High Court], 5 K6minshfi 118 (Japan); A film distributor could
exclusively distribute all movies which a film maker made under the contract.
Although the JFTC brought a suit under Section 2(6), the Tokyo High Court held it
was not a cartel since the film maker was bound to supply all their movies for the
distributor but the distributor had no obligation.
275 Antimonopoly Act § 2(9); "The term 'unfair trade practices' as used in this Act
shall mean any act ... which tends to impede the fair competition .... If
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D. Types of Activities
Price fixing is illegal in Japan. No justification of reasonableness can be
In any case,controlled the market price by means of resale price maintenance.278
280 Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). See supra text accompanying note 260.
Though the Tokyo High Court clearly established the rule not to treat vertical
restraint as a cartel, some Japanese academics have criticized this judgement.279
as unreasonable coercion.277 Further, resale price maintenance has been held
an "unfair trade practices. "276 Tying arrangements are prohibited by Section 2(9)(iii)
(1) price fixing; (2) limiting production, technology, products or facilities; or (3)
The Antimonopoly Act shows examples of the form of concerted activity as:
vertical restraint of trade cannot be immunized from antitrust liability in Japan.
unlawful as private monopolization where the price leader with a big market share
allowed to escape from the Antimonopoly Act. Even where the fixed price was a
customers or suppliers limitation.280
277 Antimonopoly Act § 2(9)(iii). See also JFTC Notification No.15 Subsec. 10.
278 Judgment of Dec. 25, 1957, Tokyo Kosai [Tokyo High Court], 8 Kominshu
2300 (Japan).
reasonable one, such a price fixing agreement is unlawful. The JFTC decided that
276 Antimonopoly Act § 2(9)(iv). See also Kosei Torihiki linkai Kokuji 15 go
[JFTC Notification No.15] Subsec. 11-13 (1982)(Japan) (hereinafter JFTC Notification
No.15).
279 See, e.g., Ieyoshi Fukunaga, Tate no Ketsugo ni yoru Torihikiseigen [Restraint
of Trade by Vertical Agreement], 5 KOBEHOOAKUZASSHI82 (1955); SHODA,supra
note 191, at 227; MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 100-101.
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fixing a maximum price was also illegal because the power of private companies to
control prices was a disadvantage for consumers.281 This decision may be affected
by the judgement of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Josehp E. Seagram & Sons282 one year
before. Though the Antimonopoly Act explicitly prohibits an agreement "to fix,
maintain or increase prices, "283 it does not mention decreasing prices. According to
the JFTC's decision which prohibited maximum price fixing, every agreement to
control price should be contrary to the Antimonopoly Act.284 In the United States,
the Supreme Court stated that lowering the price is also per se illegal.285 Exchange
of price information is recognized as lawful in case of past and current pricing, but
exchange of future price information can be an evidence of a carteL286 In the United
States, the Supreme Court held that the exchange of price data is illegal per se as price
281 Noda Soy Sauce Co., 4 Shinketsushii 1 (1952)(Japan); The Price Administration
Agency asked soy sauce companies to set their prices not more than 75 yen
(approximately 60 cent) per 1800 milliliter by Administrative guidance under the
severe inflation after World War n. Soy Sauce companies argued that fixing
maximum prices contributed towards consumers' benefit under the circumstance of
inflation. See also Motokazu Kikuchi, Saikoukakaku no Ky6tei [Maximum Price
Fixing Agreement], 110 BESSATSUJURISUTODOKKINHOSHINKETSUHANREI 100 SEN
DAI 4 HAN [SELECTED100 DECISIONSBY THEJFTC ANDJUDGMENTSOF
ANTIMONOPOLYACT (4TH ED.)] 44 (1991).
282 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). With
respect to maximum price fixing, see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982).
283 Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). See supra text accompanying note 260.
284 Noda Soy Sauce Co., 4 Shinketsushii 1 (1952)(Japan).
285 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
286 IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 53.
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fixing under certain circumstances because of its effect of stabilizing prices.287
However, price exchange itself is not illegal per se.288
Limiting production unaccompanied with price fixing is illegal under the
Antimonopoly Act.289 Under a recession, enterprises tend to control the amount of
products in the market. In addition, Japanese industry often has been annoyed by the
excess capacity. The Japanese Government, especially the MITI, has frequently
advised enterprises and trade associations.29O Yet, a cartel limiting output is illegal
unless such a cartel is approved by the JFTC to be exempted from the Antimonopoly
Act. Limiting facilities has a similar effect as limiting output and is unlawful.
Current amount of products is not reduced where enterprises limit excess capacities or
287 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
288 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442 (1978); United
States V. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
289 E.g., To-Ray Co.,19 Shinketsushii 112 (1972)(Japan); Teijin Co., 19
shinketsushii 116 (1972)(Japan); Mitsubishi Rayon Co., 19 Shinketsushii 121
(1972)(Japan); In the three cases above, synthetic fiber manufacturers set a certain
reduction ratio of their products. See also Nihon Concrete Indus. K.K., 17
Shinketsushii 86 (1970); Six companies agreed to set the market share of each
company.
290 Judgment of Sep. 26, 1980, Tokyo K5sai [Tokyo High Court], 33 K5keishii 359
(Japan); The Japanese Petroleum Association, based on the MITI's petroleum policy,
issued a program limiting the maximum annual output of petroleum products. Tokyo
High Court found this program was illegal regardless the MITI's Administrative
guidance. See Tateo Wada, Genyu Shoriryo no Seigen to Sekiyushohin no
Torihikibunya [Restricting Amount of Refining Oil and Relevant Market of Petroleum
Products], 110 BESSATSUJURISUTODOKKINHOSHINKETSUHANREI 100 SENDAI &
HAN [SELECTED100 DECISIONSBYTHEJFfC ANDJUDGMENTSOF ANTIMONOPOLY
ACT (4TH ED.)] 20 (1991).
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investment for future facilities. There is so far no case in which limiting future
productive facilities was held illegal.291
Limiting products means to limit types or kinds of products.292 Such a
conduct may limit a choice of consumers, slow the development of new technology,
and prevent new products from entering the market. Some forms of these cartels can
be allowed upon the approval by the JFfC as rationalization cartels where they are
deemed to be necessary for the good effect on technology, quality of goods, cutting
costs or others.293
Limiting customers or suppliers includes market divisions and group boycotts.
Market division without price fixing is unlawful. In Japan, an agreement of market
division is usually concluded by a trade association in order to make it effective. The
JFfC hence enforces not Section 2(6) but Section 8(1)(i) which regulates a trade
association.294 For example, the JFfC held conducts of members of a trade
association illegal where they made an agreement not to deprive other members of
291 KENJI SANEKATA,DOKUSENKINSHIHO[ANTIMONOPOLYACT] 72 (1987).
292 IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 53.
293 Antimonopoly Act § 24-4. See infra part V.c.1.
294 Antimonopoly Act § 8(1)(i); "No trade association shall engage in any acts
which comes under anyone of the following paragraphs: (i) Substantially restraining
competition in any particular field of trade .... "
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their customers.295 In the United states, market division unaccompanied with price
fixing is still illegal per se regardless of its reasonableness.296
Group boycotts are, as well as Section 2(6), prohibited as "unfair trade
practice" by Section 2(9) and its designative provision.297 As a result, the JFTC
usually enforces Section 2(9) on a group boycotts without price discrimination instead
of Section 2(6).298 In the United States, the Supreme Court ruled group boycotts are
illegal per se where defendants have a market power, otherwise the rule of reason
analysis is applied.299
295National Harbor Shipping Promotion Assoc., 12 Shinketsushu 18 (1963)(Japan);
The trade association ordered its members to respect the past relationships and not to
attract other members' customers. See also Tokorozawa Milk Sales Coop., 16
Shinketsushu 109 (1969)(Japan); The trade association required members not to catch
other members' customers using lower prices.
296Jay Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S._, III S. Ct. 401 (1990); United
States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See supra part II.B.1, 3.
297JFTC Notification No.15 Subsec. 1, 2.
298 E.g., Hokkaido Stationery Sales Coop., 10 Shinketsushu 31 (1961)(Japan)(The
trade association prohibited its members to deal with non-members.); Home Electric
Apparatus Market Stability Comm., 9 Shinketsushu 11 (1957(Japan)(The trade
association decided not to deal with a discount shop who sold goods much cheaper
than members).
299Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986);
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985). See supra part 1I.B.2.
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E. Contrary to the Public Interest
A business activity must restrain competition "contrary to the public interest" to
prove an unlawful "unreasonable restraint of trade. ,,300 The definition of the term
"contrary to the public interest" is a very important issue in understanding the concept
of cartel regulation under the Antimonopoly Act. The difference of its interpretation
affects the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act against a cartel. If "the public
interest" includes any benefit to the economy, the defense of a cartel based on its
economic efficiency can easily be allowed even if such a cartel substantially restrains
competition. 301
1. Three views
There are various interpretations of "contrary to the public interest" among
Japanese academics. This section will describe three major opinions of what "the
public interest" is.
First, the public interest means free competition itself or only maintaining or
promoting economic order based on free competition. 302 Second, in the broader
view, the public interest should include not only free competition but also the
development of national economy, consumers' welfare and cooperation with foreign
300 Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
301 MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 17.
302 IMAMURA,supra note 199, at 83; SANEKATA,supra note 291, at 182,
ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 307.
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countries.303 Third, the public interest requires a balancing test between benefits of
free competition and those of permitting the restrictive activities in question.304
The JFTC took the first narrow view and stated that:
The act of joint price fixing by entrepreneurs on the occasion of
the open bidding competition is a violation of the spirit of the provision
of Section 1 of the Antimonopoly Act, of which the printing purpose is
to ensure free competition .... Such activity as price fixing should be
recognized as being contrary to the public interest. Whether the agreed
price is appropriate or not, or whether the national economy has
sufficient any loss or not, all these considerations should not furnish any
basis for deciding to public interest or not. 305
Further, the Tokyo High Court found the conduct newspaper sellers illegal where they
divided their sales territories among them, though they argued their market division
would not put consumers at a disadvantage because the qualities of newspaper and the
prices set by newspaper publishers are the same.306 Under this opinion, any business
activity which restrains competition is contrary to the public interest. Only the
elimination of such restraint of trade can meet the public interest. This view seems to
be same as the per se approach in the United States. No depression cartel, applying
this doctrine, would be allowed unless there were an exemption system for them.
303 KEIZAIDANTAIRENGOKAI[FEDERATIONOF ECONOMICORGANIZATION],
DOKKINHOMONDAINI KANSURUKENKAI[VIEWSIN ISSUESOF ANTIMONOPOLYACT]
9-10 (1983).
304 MATSUSHITA,supra note 264, at 64-65.
305 Yuasa Lumber Co., 1 Shinketsushii 62 (1949)(Japan). With respect to the facts
of this case, see supra note 263.
306 Judgment of Mar. 9, 1953 (In re Asahi Newspaper), Tokyo K5sai [Tokyo High
Court], 6 K5minshii 435 (Japan). With respect to the facts of the case, see supra note
274.
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The second broader view has been insisted by the business community and the
MITe07 This view argues that the public interest is more than merely a free
competition and includes interests of the national economy as a whole. Under this
doctrine, a cartel is not necessarily unlawful just because it restrains competition
substantially. This doctrine always requires the rule of reason analysis on examination
of restrictive conducts. Furthermore, it would be difficult to prohibit a cartel by
considering any factors which justify the cartel as reasonable in light of a broader
interpretation of the public interest.308
The third view requires a balancing test considering the ultimate purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act.309 The ultimate purpose of the Antimonopoly Act is "to promote
the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as assure
the interests of consumers in general.'1310 "To promote free and fair competition" is
also a primary purpose.3l1 Both purposes should be consistent with each other. This
position, however, admits an exception which may restrain competition but comply
with the ultimate purpose of the Antimonopoly Act. The Supreme Court in the oil
price fixing case announced under this doctrine that although the public interest under
the Antimonopoly Act should in principle mean free competition, an agreement among
307IYORIANDUESUGI,supra note 188, at 50.
308MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 18; MATSUSHITA,supra note 264, at 63-4.
309MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 19-20; MATSUSHITA,supra note 264, at 64-5.
310Antimonopoly Act § 1.
311Antimonopoly Act § 1.
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competitors can be justified under exceptional circumstances when the courts find the
agreement is not substantially inconsistent with the ultimate purpose as a result of
comparing benefits of free competition with those of permitting restrictive
conducts.312 According to the Supreme Court, in short, some exceptional horizontal
restraints may not fall into the category of "unreasonable restraint of trade." That is,
even where the cartel at issue was not protected by the exemption system, this
judgment would make it possible to admit an exempted cartel from the Antimonopoly
Act through an interpretation of "contrary to the public interest."
2. Free competition and the ultimate purpose of the Antimonopoly Act
Which view of the three is the most appropriate? The short answer is that the
third one should be applied rather than the first one or, of course, second one. The
judgment of the Supreme Court does not admit the broader concept of "the public
interest" like the second view. A cartel must not be allowed because of its economic
efficiency if it is contrary to the consumers' welfare.
The third doctrine nonetheless is closer to the position of the first view which
determines the public interest is free competition, since the Supreme Court emphasized
312 Judgment of Feb. 24, 1984 (so-called Oil Cartel case), Saik5sai [Supreme
Court], 38 Keishii 1287 (Japan); The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) had
jointly raised their crude oil prices in 1970's. Defendants, oil refining companies in
Japan, needed to raise their prices because their purchase prices had increased. The
oil companies agreed to set a certain price and date on which they would raise their
prices, and raised their prices simultaneously. Defendants argued that "contrary to the
public interest" should be interpreted as "contrary to the benefit of the wholesome
national economy including manufacturers as well as consumers."
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free competition and acknowledged that a restrictive activity could be allowed only in
exceptional cases.313 The difference between the fIrst doctrine and the third one is
only that the third one admits a potential exceptional situation which will restrain
competition but will not be inconsistent with the ultimate purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act. Moreover, the definition of the exceptional case is not clear
because the Supreme Court did not admit the cartel in this case as an exceptional
situation.314 As it will be described in following chapter, there are many cartels
which are exempted from the Antimonopoly Act in Japan.315 Such exempted cartels
indeed are exceptional cases which are explicitly approved by statutes. Exceptional
cases under the third doctrine, hence, should be admitted very narrowly. The business
circumstances will be changing in the future. New business activities will appear.
Some of them may have the good effect of pursuing the ultimate purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act while they also restrain competition. The exemption system cannot
expect all such new business activities. The third doctrine can cover such a new
unforeseeable fIeld until a new exemption provision has been legitimated.
In sum, exceptional cases under the third doctrine can be allowed only where
the current exemption system does not expect them. For instance, there is less
possibility that a small business cartel, which primary purpose is to effectively
compete with large enterprises, is deemed as an exceptional case under the third
313 MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 19.
314 Judgment of Feb. 24, 1984 (so-called Oil Cartel case), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 38 Keishii 1287 (Japan).
315 See infra part V.
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doctrine where it is not approved as an exempted one by the exemption system. It is
otherwise unclear why a small business cartel can be exempted from the
Antimonopoly Act by statutes.316 An agreement among enterprises in a depressed
industry should not be allowed either unless the cartel is approved by the JFTC as the
legitimate depression cartel.317 Exemption system has a role to make a category of
exceptional case clear.
The first doctrine seems similar to the holding in United States v. Topeo
Associates, Ine. In Topeo, the Supreme Court, by applying the per se rule, did not
allow any possibility of horizontal market division unless the Congress exempts it
from the Antitrust laws by statutes.318 The third doctrine seems similar to the
competition policy in the United States. While the horizontal restraint of trade is
generally illegal per se in the United States, the Supreme Court has admitted some
exceptional cases under the rule of reason analysis.319 There may be, nevertheless,
more debatable situations than in Japan since the United States has less of a exemption
system.
316 Antimonopoly Act § 24; Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act; Small
and Medium Enterprise Organization Act; A small enterprise can establish a legitimate
cartel under certain circumstances. For further explanation, see infra part V-VII.
317 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3. For further explanation, see infra part V-VII>
318 United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
319 E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
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F. Substantial Restraint of Trade
A business activity is held unlawful where the activity restraints substantially
competition in any particular field of trade.320 The question is what substantially
means.321
The Tokyo High Court defined substantial restraint of trade as follows: "[A]
situation where competition itself has decreased and some situation is present or is
about to appear whereby a certain entrepreneur or a group of entrepreneurs can,
according to its own will, manipulate price, quality, quantity or other various
conditions, thereby controlling the market."m The Supreme Court in 1954 affirmed
this judgment of the Tokyo High COurt.323
Although there is no precise criterion to measure a substantial restraint of
competition, it may be defined as a functional test rather than a quantitative one.324
The Tokyo High Court stated this point as follows: "The question of under what
circumstances a market control is established is a relative one and cannot be
determined uniformly, but depends on economic conditions of the case. It cannot be
determined only by the share of the supplies (or demands) of concerned entrepreneurs
320 Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
321 As described earlier, the term "competition" in the Antimonopoly Act includes
potential competition in the future as well as actual one. See supra part IILC.I.
322 Judgment of Sep. 19, 1951 (so-called T5h5 and Subaru case), Tokyo K5sai
[Tokyo High Court], 2 Gy5shii 562 (Japan).
323 Judgment of May 25, 1954 (so-called T5h5 and Subaru case), Saik5sai
[Supreme Court], 8 Minshii 950 (Japan).
324 MATSUSHIT A, supra note 186, at 16.
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in a market. "325 The court thereby denied a substantial restraint of competition
merely because plaintiffs possessed one third of the market share. Functional elements
necessarily taken into consideration are, for example, the scale of business, capital
procurement ability, marketing ability, the ability of competitors, the possibility of new
entry or countervailing power of buyers or suppliers. 326 These functional elements
weigh as standards to judge substantial restraints of competition.
The JFTC, however, has usually proceeded against a cartel when almost all
companies in the relevant market participated in the agreement: in many cases, their
market share reached 80 to 90 percent. 327When conspirators have a large market
share, other functional elements are not necessarily taken into account in order for
proof of a substantial restraint of competition.328 Nevertheless, the JFfC had held
the cartel illegal despite conspirators' small market share. The JFTC held the price
fixing agreement among tofu329manufacturers substantially restrained competition
although the total market share of the companies participating in the cartel was about
50 percent. 330 In this case, tofu manufacturers in Takamatsu City331agreed to
325Judgment of Dec. 7, 1953 (so-called T5h5 and Shin T5h5 case), Tokyo K5sai
[Tokyo High Court], 5 K5minshii 118 (Japan).
326IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 46.
327SANEKATA,supra note 291, at 165.
328 [d.
329Bean curd. One of traditional oriental foods.
330Chii5 Foods Co., 15 Shinketsushii 135 (1968)(Japan). See a/so Noumi Bonsai
Indus., 28 Shinketsushii 51 (1981)(Japan); Noda Say Sauce Co., 4 Shinketsushii 1
(1951)(Japan).
86
raise their prices. Their market share in Takamatsu City was about 50 percent. The
cartel constituted of large tofu manufacturers, including the leading company which
possessed 30 percent of the city's market share. The rest of the share was possessed
by many small companies mainly family operated. These outsiders chose the way to
raise their prices rather than have price competition against large companies since
these small companies had no ambition to expand their business due to their small
size. As a result, the whole market price in Takamatsu City increased. The JFTC
found that the cartel had an actual power to control the market price. This case is one
example that a cartel can be held unlawful regardless of its market share.
The requirement of substantial restraint of competition shows that the
Antimonopoly Act should eliminate an unfavorable effect on competition and not
prohibit a concerted activity itself. It is one of the biggest differences between Japan
and the United States that an agreement among competitors is illegal in Japan only
when the agreement substantially restrains competition in the market. In the United
States, horizontal restraint of trade is illegal without regard to its market power under
the Sherman Act.332 In Japan, a cartel without market power is recognized as a
331 Takamatsu City is the seat of the prefectural office in Kagawa Prefecture,
Shikoku Island.
332 See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 600 (1972); The
horizontal market division agreement among small supermarket chains was held illegal
per se where the average market share of Topco was approximately 6 percent. See
also United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
But cf Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986); The Supreme Court ruled the per se rule can apply to group
mere agreement which has no effect to the competition. The Sherman Act is
apparently much severer than the Antimonopoly Act in respect to the market power
the conspirators possess.
boycotts only when the enterprises boycotting have a market power.
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V. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT
It is obvious that a cartel, a horizontal restraint, has an anticompetitive
effect.333 Once a cartel is established, competition in the market will be restrained.
Consumers cannot enjoy low prices nor good services which might be caused by
competition. A cartel may maintain inefficient enterprises, keep potential competitors
from entering the market, and slow the development of technology down. There is no
justification based on the consumers' benefit or economic efficiencies.
Although the anticompetitive activities by enterprises and trade associations are
generally prohibited, there are some areas in which agreements among enterprises are
exempted from the Antimonopoly Act. These exempted areas include the focus of this
thesis, cartels in the depressed industries. Exemptions are provided by both the
Antimonopoly Act and other separate laws. To understand cartel regulations in Japan,
it is necessary to consider provisions of both the Antimonopoly Act and other separate
exemption laws.
333 Price fixing, for example, has an "actual or potential threat to the central
nervous system of the economy." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150,
224 n.59 (1940).
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A. Rationale for Exemption
Both the Antimonopoly Act in Japan and the Antitrust laws in the United
States are designed to promote competition,334 and they strictly prohibit a carteL
Some business activities or industries nevertheless are exempted from the application
of the Antimonopoly Act or the Antitrust laws in both countries. Why are such areas
allowed in spite of their possibility to restrain competition?
The reason for the admission of exemptions from the Antimonopoly Act are
varies depending on each case. But there are two common questions concerning the
various exempted businesses: (1) whether these exempted business activities inherently
violate the Antimonopoly Act; and (2) what is the role of the exemption laws. The
short answer for the first question is yes for some business activities.
The fIrst question has a close relationship with the purpose335 and "the public
interest"336 of the Antimonopoly Act. Any cartel has the effect of restricting the first
purpose of the Antimonopoly Act, "to promote free and fair competition. ,,337 Some
cartels may be consistent with from the second to the fourth purposes, such as
economic efficiency, or the development of economy and welfare of consumers.338
Business activities or industries from the Antimonopoly Act should comply with at
334 See supra part ILB.
335Antimonopoly Act § 1.
336Antimonopoly Act § 2(6). See supra part liLE.
337Antimonopoly Act § 1. See supra part liLB.
338Antimonopoly Act § 1. See supra part III.B.
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least one of these purposes above. No restrictive business activities should be allowed
even by the Antimonopoly Act itself or other statutes which are inconsistent with any
purpose of the Act. Further, even if business activities have some benefits in light of
the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act, they can restrain competition "contrary to the
public interest." As described earlier, the public interest in principle means free
competition, and only an exceptional case can be lawful under the comparison between
free competition and the ultimate purpose - the development of national economy and
consumers' welfare.339 There may be few such exceptional cases. For example,
enterprises in a depressed industry can establish depression cartels under Section 24-3
of the Antimonopoly Act. It is necessary for enterprise to get a prior approval from
the JFfC, otherwise the cartel would be illegal.340 The unauthorized enterprises, to
be acquitted, must have the tough burden of proving that the loss to the national
economy caused by the depression will be bigger than the loss of free competition
caused by the cartel. This is an example which inherently violates the Antimonopoly
Act without protection of the exemption laws.
To answer the second question, what is the role of exemption laws, the first
role of exemptions is to eliminate the application of the Antimonopoly Act to the
inherently unlawful business activities.341 The exemption laws make originally
unlawful conducts legal for reasons except that they promote competition. In other
339 See supra part VI.E.
340 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(3).
341 MATSUSHITA, supra note 264, at 225.
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words, the exemption laws shift restrictive activities from an unlawful category to a
legal one.
The second role of exemption laws is merely to confirm that activities covered
by such laws do not violate the Antimonopoly Act.342 Some activities will be
exempted from the application of the Antimonopoly Act without regard to exemption
laws. The proper exercise of copyrights, for example, should be exempted from the
application of the Antimonopoly Act even if there were no exemption provisions.343
Property rights are inherent human rights, and the protection of copyrights is necessary
for the development of culture. It is important to understand which role each
exemption provision has.344 If the provision permitting the depression cartel345
were misunderstood as merely confIrming the depression cartel does not violate the
Antimonopoly Act, it would not be recognized as being inherently contrary to the
public interest. If so, an unauthorized cartel in the depressed industry could be held
lawful. It should be recognized that a cartel among depressed companies is inherently
unlawful under the Antimonopoly Act. Such a cartel can be allowed only when it was
approved and observed by the JFTC.346
342 MA TSUSHIT A, supra note 264, at 224.
343 Section 23 of the Antimonopoly Act exempts intangible property rights from
the Act.
344 MA TSUSHIT A, supra note 264, at 226.
345 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3.
346 Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act authorizes the JFTC to judge whether
the depression cartel will be contrary to the public interest, to decide on a reasonable
period to form the cartel, and to observe whether the cartel is actually performed
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The third role of exemption laws is to give the public a clear standard for the
application of the Antimonopoly Act. For example, Section 24-3 of the
Antimonopoly Act makes it clear that any cartel among companies in a depressed
industry, without a prior approval by the JFTC, is illegal even if it is economically
efficiency.
B. Conduct Where the Government Is Involved
1. State action
There is a unique issue on federalism in the United States, as to whether the
Antitrust laws can apply to a conduct which involved the state or local government
agencies. The Supreme Court approved exemptions from the Antitrust laws where the
private companies engaged in restrictive conducts with the authorization of the state
legislation347 or the state court.348 This thesis will not discuss this issue further.
Since Japan does not adopt federalism, no issue exists concerning conflicts of laws.
2. Government action
Federal officials have no authority to exempt private companies from the
Antitrust laws without statutory authorization made by Congress.349 In Japan, it is
reasonably. See Antimonopoly Act §§ 24-3, 66.
347 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
348 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
349 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-28 (1940).
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debatable whether private companies' activities based on the Administrative
guidance35o, an informal process issued by the government agency, can be exempted
by the Antimonopoly Act. This section will discuss this issue briefly despite its
complex character.351
A government agency, particularly the MITI, requests or advises private
companies to achieve its industrial policy by means of the Administrative
guidance.352 The Administrative guidance sometimes involves an arrangement of a
cartel. 353 The question is whether the Antimonopoly Act can apply to the
company's conducts in accordance with the Administrative guidance involving
anticompetitive effects where the government issued it despite absence of the
applicable exemption laws. Both the JFTC and the courts delivered their opinions, but
some differences exist.
350 So-called Gyosei Shido. As to the Administrative guidance in general, see
MITSUOMATSUSHITA& THOMAS1. SHOUENBAUM,JAPANESEINTERNATIONALTRADE
ANDINVESTMENTLAW 31-41 (1989).
351 An example of the complexity is that the defendants believe their conducts are
lawful when they complied with the Administrative guidance. Unless defendants'
intention of committing illegal conducts is absent, they can be held guilty in a criminal
case. As shown above, a doctrine of criminal law should be considered in a case
which involved the Administrative guidance. See Judgment of Sep. 26, 1980 (so-
called Oil Cartel case), Tokyo K5sai [Tokyo High Court], 33-359 (Japan); Mikito
Hayashi, Karuteru ni taisuru Keiji Seisai [Criminal Punishment against Cartel], 110
BESSATSUJURISUTODOKKINHOSHINKETSUHANREI 100 SENDAI & HAN [SELECfED
100 DECISIONSBY THEJFfC ANDJUDGMENTSOF ANTIMONOPOLYACT (4TH ED.)]
254 (1991).
352 MATSUSHITA,supra note 186, at 46-47.
353Id. at 47.
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The JFTC held a maximum price fixing agreement is unlawful even where the
Price Administration Agency set the maximum price of soy sauce and requested soy
sauce companies to refrain from raising their prices above the designated price.354
The JFTC made it clear that the illegality of restrictive conducts cannot be affected by
the existence of the Administrative guidance furnished by a government agency. The
JFTC also declared this doctrine in the guideline concerning trade associations in
1979.355
The Tokyo High Court held that a cartel violated the Antimonopoly Act in
spite of the Administrative guidance by the MITI, but stated in its obiter dictum that
the cartel could be exempted from the Antimonopoly Act if it were commissioned by
the government, provided the guidance itself was lawful and the method employed to
solicit compliance was reasonable.356 The Supreme Court also announced its
opinion in its dictum that a cartel based on the Administrative guidance can be
executed as long as the Administrative guidance is substantially consistent with the
purpose of the Antimonopoly Act, that is "to promote the democratic and wholesome
development of the national economy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in
354 Noda Soy Sauce, 4 Shinketsushii 1 (1952)(Japan). See also Synthetic Fibers
Ass'n, 5 Shinketsushii 17 (1953)(Japan).
355 Jigyosha Dantai no Katsudo ni Kansuru Dokusen Kinshiho j5 no Shishin
[Guidelines Concerning the Activities of Trade Associations under the Antimonopoly
Act] (1979).
356 Judgment of Sep. 26, 1980 (so-called Oil Cartel case), Tokyo Kosai [Tokyo
High Court], 33 Kokeishii 511 (Japan).
95
general,"357 and where the method was necessary and reasonable. 358 Given this
doctrine, a cartel can be exempted from the Antimonopoly Act where it was formed
by the appropriate Administrative guidance.
There is a difference concerning the assessment of the Administrative guidance
between the JFfC and the courts. The essential issue may not be the Administrative
guidance itself but whether a cartel is contrary to the public interest or not. As
described earlier, there is a room for a lawful exceptional case where a cartel restrains
competition but is not contrary to the public interest. 359 If a cartel under the
Administrative guidance is not contrary to the public interest, it can be exempted. The
exception, however, should be very limited. Therefore, the Administrative guidance
itself has no authorization to exempt enterprises from the application of the
Antimonopoly Act.
C. Exempted Business in Japan
1. Overview
Exemptions have been provided both in the Antimonopoly Act itself and other
exemption laws. While there are some explicit statutory exemptions from the
357Antimonopoly Act § 1.
358Judgment of Feb. 24, 1984 (so-called Oil Cartel case), Saik5sai [Supreme
Court], 38 Keishu 1287 (Japan).
359 See supra part V.E.
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application of the Antitrust laws in the United States,360the Sherman Act, which
prohibits the horizontal restraint, does not have any express exemptions in its
provisions.361 On the other hand, the Antimonopoly Act itself has provisions of
exemption for cartels.362 In Japan, the exemption system is extensive. There are
sixty separate exemption systems authorized by forty-two separate statutes as of June
1991.363 The exemptions for cartels constitute most of them: fifty-six kinds of
cartels are exempted by thirty-seven separate statutes from the application of the
Antimonopoly Act. 364 This section will explain business activities exempted from
the Antimonopoly Act in general, compared to those in the United States.
2. Exemption by the Antimonopoly Act
The Antimonopoly Act provides exemptions from its application in Sections 21
through 24-4. These provisions can be classified in two groups: exemptions originally
provided and those added as amendment.
360ABA ANTITRUSTSECTION,ANTITRUSTLAW DEVELOPMENTS599 (2d ed.
1984).
361 Cf Section 6 of the Clayton Act exempted labor, agricultural and horticultural
organizations from the application if the Antitrust laws. Section 20 of the Clayton Act
also exempts activities concerning labor disputes from the Antitrust laws. Clayton Act
§§ 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 52 (1988).
362Antimonopoly Act §§ 21 - 24-4.
363DOKUSENKINSHIH0TEKIY0 JOGAISEIDONO GENJ0 TO KAIZENNO H0K0 [THE
STATUSQUO ANDCOURSEOF IMPROVEMENTCONCERNINGEXEMPTIONSYSTEMFROM
ANTIMONOPOLYACT], general remarks 6 (JFfC ed., 1991)(hereinafter THE QUO AND
IMPROVEMENTOF EXEMPTION).
364 Id.
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a. exemptions originally provided
First, Sections 21 through 24 were originally provided at the enactment of the
Antimonopoly Act in 1947. These provisions were considered by academics as the
natural limit which was not necessarily inconsistent with the purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act.365 Since the activities covered by these provisions are not
contrary to the public interest, they can be allowed as lawful conducts unless these
provisions exist.366 These provisions make it clear that categories of a business
activity and conditions are to be exempted from the Antimonopoly Act.
(1) Natural monopoly (Section 21)
The Antimonopoly Act does not apply to conducts performed in the course of
proper business by an enterprise inherently constituting a monopoly by the very
nature.367 The railway, electricity and gas industries are examples of enterprises
constituting a monopoly by their very nature.368 The activities of these enterprises
must be in the proper course of business, otherwise the Antimonopoly Act will apply.
For instance, a gas company must not force its customers to buy gas equipments from
itself or from others which it designated.369
365 IMAMURA, supra note 203, at 194.
366 [d.
367 Antimonopoly Act § 21.
368 [d.
369 IYORI & UESUGI, supra note 188, at 110.
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In the United States, the energy industry and the transportation business are
each regulated by specific statute. Because the industry's character constitutes a
monopoly cannot be a reason to exempt it from the Antitrust laws. Unlike Japan, the
United States does not have a concept of "natural monopoly." Congress, however,
exempts certain industries from the Antitrust laws by statutory regulations regardless
of their nature. 370
(2) Regulated industry (Section 22)
Where there is a law concerning a special industry, the conducts engaged in
accordance with such legislation are subject to exemptions from the Antimonopoly
Act. 371 Such special laws372 are specified by the Act Concerning of Exemptions
from the Antimonopoly Act.373 Additionally, there are 29 other special exemption
laws which are not specified by the Act of Exemption from the Antimonopoly
370 See infra notes 380-85.
371 Antimonopoly Act § 22.
372 E.g., Rikujo Kotsii Jigyo Choseiho [Land Transportation Business Adjustment
Act], Act No. 193 of 1948 (Japan), Agreements among the land transportation business
companies based on the Transportation Business Adjustment Committee; Songai
Hoken Ryoritsu Sanshutsu Daitai ni Kansuru Horitsu [Non-life Insurance Rating
Organizations Act], Act No. 193 of 1948 (Japan), Agreements on the premium rates,
terms, acceptance rates and commissions by the Non-life Insurance Rating
Organization.
373 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu
no Tekiyo Jogai tou ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act Concerning the Exemptions from the
Application of the Antimonopoly Act] § 1, Act No. 138 of 1947 (Japan)(hereinafter
Act of Exemptions from the Antimonopoly Act).
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Act. 374 They regulate the transportation business,375 the warehouse industry,376
insurance,377 agriculture378 and others.379
In the Vnited States, there are several regulated industries such as banks,380
security,381 energy,382 insurance,383 transportation384 and professional and
374JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 14, at Supp. 52-53.
375 E.g., Doro Vnsoho [Road Transportation Act], Act No. 183 of 1951 (Japan);
Jidosha Taminaruho [Car Terminal Act], Act No. 136 of 1951 (Japan); Kokiiho
[Aviation Act], Act No. 231 of 1959 (Japan); Kowan Vnso Jigyoho [Harbor
Transportation Business Act], Act No. 161 of 1951 (Japan).
376 E.g., Sokoho [Warehouse Industry Act], Act No. 121 of 1956 (Japan).
377E.g., Hokengyoho [Insurance Business Act], Act No. 41 of 1939 (Japan).
378 E.g., Sanshigyoho [Silk Yarn Industry Act], Act. No. 57 of 1945 (Japan); Kaju
Nogyo Shinko Tokubetsu Sochiho [Fruit Agriculture Production Special Measures
Act], Act No. 15 of 1961 (Japan).
379 E.g., Shuzei no Hozen oyobi Shuruigyo Kumiai tou ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act
Concerning Protection of Liquor Tax and Liquor Business Association], Act No.7 of
1953 (Japan); Oroshiuri Shijoho [Wholesale Market Act], Act No. 36 of 1971 (Japan).
380Bank Merger Act Amendment of 1866, 12 V.S.C. § 1828 (1988), Banks
exempted from Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
381Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 V.S.c., §§ 80a-1 - 80a-52 (1988);
Maloney Act, 15 V.S.C. §§ 780, 780-3, 78g, 78cc, 78ff (1988).
382 E.g., Natural Gas Act, 15 V.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1988): Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, 15 V.S.C. §§ 3301-3342, 3364 (1988); Federal Coal Leasing Amendment Act
of 1976, 30 V.S.c. §§ 184(1),(2) (1988); Federal Power Act, 16 V.S.C. §§ 791a-828c
(1988).
383McCarran-Fergunson Act, 15 V.S.C. §§ 1101-15 (1988), If the business is
regulated by the state law, the Antitrust laws are not applicable. However, group
boycotts, coercion and intimidation are not immunized. Id. at § 1013(b).
384Interstate Commercial Act, 49 V.S.c. (1988).
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amateur sportS.385 The statutes regulating these industries above do not necessarily
have express provisions to exempt regulated industries from the Antitrust laws. Yet,
the courts admitted that the statutes have an implied intent to immunize regulated
industries from antitrust liabilities under certain circumstances.386
Both Japan and the United States recognize the necessity of adjusting conflicts
of interests between some industries and free competition.
(3) Intangible property rights (Section 23)
Activities exercising any rights "under the Copyright Act,387the Patent
Act,388the Utility Model Act/89 the Deign Ace90 or the Trademark Act"391are
exempted from the Antimonopoly Act. 392 Nonetheless, if the activities are deemed
385Amateur Sport Act, 36 U.S.c. §§ 371-96 (1988).
386 See, e.g., Silver v. New York Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); The Supreme Court
found implied exemptions from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.c. §§
78a-78ll (1988).
See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Federal Baseball Club v.
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Once the Supreme Court held professional
baseball was exempted from the Antitrust laws in Federal Baseball Club, the Court
later recognized professional baseball as inter-commerce but still is exempted by stare
decisis in Flood.
387Chosakukenho [Copyright Act], Act No. 48 of 1970 (Japan).
388Tokkyoho [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959 (Japan).
389Jitsuyo Shinanho [Utility Model Act], Act No. 125 of 1959 (Japan).
390Ishoho [Design Act], Act No. 126 of 1959 (Japan).
391Shohyoho [Trademark Act], Act No. 127 of 1959 (Japan).
392Antimonopoly act § 23.
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to be improper or abuse of these industrial property rights, the Antimonopoly Act will
apply to the misuse of such rights.393 The JFfC issued two guidelines concerning
unfair business practices involving industrial property rights. 394
In the United States, the Constitution has a provision promoting invention and
creative work providing, "The Congress shall have Power .... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Investors the exclusive Right in their respective Writings and Discoveries. ,,395 The
Patent Act also allows those who discover new and useful things to obtain the right of
excluding others from making, using, or selling the invention in the United States.396
For example, the Supreme Court allowed the price fixing condition in a licensing
agreement where General Electric Co. had licensed another to manufacture and sell
lamps under its patents.397 Abuse of patent is, however, in violation of the Antitrust
laws.398
393 IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 111.
394 Kokusaiteki Gijutsu Donyii Keiyaku ni Kansuru Nintei Kijun [Antimonopoly
Act Guidelines for International Licensing Contracts] (1968); Yunyii Sodairiten
Keiyaku tou ni okeru Fukosei na Torihiko Hoho ni Kansuru Nintei Kijun
[Antimonopoly Act Guidelines on Unfair Trade Practice in Sole Distributorship
Contracts, etc.] (1972).
395 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
396 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,103, 154 (1988).
397 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). See also United
States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
398 E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100 (1969);
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoin Corp. v. Mid-Continental Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
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(4) Certain acts of cooperations (Section 24)
A cooperative is a mutual aid organization consisting of small enterprises or
consumers,399 and is recognized having a procompetitive effect in Japan.4oo The
Antimonopoly Act exempts cooperatives' activities which satisfy requirements of
Section 24.401 A cooperative is formed in accordance with separate laws, and there
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
399ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 324.
400 A cooperative has been founded historically as an association of small
companies or consumers in order to strengthen their bargaining power against large
enterprises. By binding and organizing small companies and consumers, a cooperative
can obtain countervailing power. Section 24 of the Antimonopoly Act not only
protects small companies and consumers, but also creates effective competitors against
large enterprises which potentially have a monopoly power.
The Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act provides its purpose, that is
"jointly to carry out the business under the spirit of mutual aid, to secure an
opportunity for these persons' fair and equitable economic activities, and thereby to
promote their independent economic activities and to contribute to the heightening of
their economic position." Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act § 1.
401 Antimonopoly Act § 24.
The important requirement of Section 24 is "small scale entrepreneurs or
consumers." While the Antimonopoly Act does not define what are "small
entrepreneurs," the Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act provides it based on
the entrepreneur's capital and its number of employees. Small entrepreneurs are
defined as those whose capital is not more than 100 million yen (approximately 770
thousand dollars) or whose regular employees do not exceed 300, in general. In the
case of the wholesale business, those whose capital is not more than 30 million yen
(approximately 230 thousand dollars) or whose employees do not exceed 100, and in
the case of the retail or service business, those whose capital is not more than 10
million yen (approximately 77 thousand dollars) or whose employees do not exceed
50. Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act § 7(1).
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are several separate laws covering them402 such as the Small and Medium Enterprise
Cooperative Act which deals with small business cartels.
In the United States, conducts by an agricultural cooperative and a fisheries
cooperative can be exempted from the Antitrust laws by express statutes. Section 6 of
Clayton Act, one of the Antitrust Laws, exempts an agricultural cooperative.403
Other statutes also provide exemptions for an agricultural cooperative404 and a
fisheries cooperative.405 While Japan allows many cooperatives which can be
exempted from the application of the Antimonopoly Act, the United States allows only
a few.
b. 1953 amendment
The second group, Section 24-2 through 24-4 were added to the Antimonopoly
Act in 1953. These amendments were recognized by academics as a demotion of the
anti-cartel policy in Japan because these exempted cartels have an effect of restraining
402 E.g., N5gy5 Ky5d5 Kumiaih5 [Agricultural Cooperative Act] § 9, Act No. 132
of 1947 (Japan); Sh5hi Seikatsu Ky5d5 Kumiaih5 [Consumers Cooperative Act], Act
No. 200 of 1948 (Japan); Suisangy5 Ky5d5 Kumiaih5 [Fisheries Cooperative Act] § 7,
Act No. 242 of 1948 (Japan); Shinrin Kumiaih5 [Forest Cooperative Act] § 6, Act No.
36 of 1978 (Japan); Shiy5 Kinkoh5 [Credit Banking Act] § 7, Act No. 238 of 1951
(Japan); R5d5 Kinkoh5 [Labor Union Banking Act] § 9, Act No. 227 of 1953 (Japan).
403 Clayton Act § 17.
404 E.g., Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.c. § 291 (1988); Cooperative Marketing Act
of 1926, 7 U.S.c. § 455 (1988); Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1973, 7
U.S.C. § 608 (1988).
405 Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 521, 522 (1988).
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competition in the market.406 The reason these exempted cartels were approved is
that some benefits, for example the development of national economy or consumers'
welfare, were deemed to have priority over free competition under certain
circumstances.
(1) Resale Price Maintenance (Section 24-2)
Resale price maintenance in general is prohibited as an unfair trade
practice.407 However, to have enterprises refrain from resorting to unjust price
cutting or loss leader sales, individual entrepreneur's conduct for restricting resale
prices of copyrighted works and such commodities as designated by the JFfC are
exempted from the Antimonopoly Act.408 The JFfC can designate commodities
which have resale prices that can be maintained only where the commodities satisfy
the following requirements: (1) "The commodity shall be for the daily use by
consumers in general,"409 (2) "Free competition shall exist with respect to the
commodity,"410 and (3) Uniform quality of the commodities can be easily identified
by consumers.411 The Antimonopoly Act will apply to resale price maintenance
406IMAMURA,supra note 203, at 201.
407Antimonopoly Act § 19; JFfC Notification No. 15 Subsec. 8.
408ANTIMONOPOLYLEGISLATIONOF JAPAN,supra note 7, at 324.
409Antimonopoly Act § 24-2(2)(i).
410Antimonopoly Act § 24-2(2)(ii).
411Antimonopoly Act § 24-2(1).
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where it is likely to grossly injure the interest of the general consumers, or where it is
against the will of the manufacturers.412 The JFfC is decreasing the number of
commodities allowed resale price maintenance.413
The United States had two statutes to allow resale price maintenance for a
while, which conditions were similar to section 24 of the Antimonopoly Act.414
These exemption statutes were replaced in 1975.415 The Supreme Court held that
resale price maintenance was illegal per se in 1911.416 While the Court did not
overturn this decision, it held resale price maintenance was lawful417 or could be
lawfuL418
412 Antimonopoly Act § 24-2(1).
413 JFTC Annual Report, supra note 14, at 129.
The designated commodities are as follows: (1) copyrighted works including
books, magazines, newspapers, cassette tapes and playing records; (2) drug (26 items);
and (3) cosmetics for which the list price is less than one thousand yen (approximately
7 dollars)(24 items).
414 ABA ANTITRUSTSECTION,supra note 360, at 56.
Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 314, 50 Stat. 693 repealed by
Consumer Goods pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801; McGuire Act
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat. 631 repealed by Consumer Goods pricing Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801; They exempted certain agreements fixing
minimum price or stipulated resale price of brand commodities which were in free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed
by others.
415 Consumer Goods pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
416 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
417 United States v, Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); The Court ruled that a
manufacturer can refuse to deal with others which do not accept keeping a designated
resale price.
418 Monsanto co. v. Spray-rite ServoCorp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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(2) Depression Cartels (Section 24-3)
If the prices of goods fall below the average cost of production and a great
number of producers are likely to be forced to discontinue their business, then
enterprises can make an agreement limiting prices or products by prior approval from
the JFfC.419 The JFfC has been recently reluctant to approve the depression cartel.
A cartel among shipbuilders and manufacturers of a large diesel engine for ships had
been approved from 1987 to 1989, but no other depression cartel has been approved
since 1984.420
In the United States, restraint of trade in a recession has not been exempted
from the application of the Antitrust laws since the judgment of the Supreme Court in
1935 in which the National Industrial Recovery Act421 was held unconstitutional.422
(3) Rationalization Cartel (Section 24-4)
If a certain cartel was found particularly necessary for an advancement of
technology, an improvement of the quality of goods, a reduction of costs, an increase
in efficiency and any other rationalization of enterprises, then it will be exempted from
419 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3.
420 JFfC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 14, at 54-55.
421 National Industry Recovery Act §§ 1, 3-10, 303, 304, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195
(1933)(amended 1935); Id. § 2, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933)(repealed 1966); Act of
June 19, 1934, ch. 677 §§ 1-6, 48 Stat. 1183 (repealed 1966).
422 A.L.A. Schechten Poultry Corp. v. United States, 275 U.S. 495 (1935).
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the Antimonopoly Act.423 By the prior authorization from the JFfC, the enterprises
can undertake concerted activities regarding restrictions on technology or kinds of
products, common use of facilities for transportation or storage of raw materials or
finished goods, or utilization or purchase of scraps or waste materials.424 No
rationalization cartel has been approved by the JFTC since January 1982.425
In the United States, there is no statute to admit the rationalization cartel as
there is in Japan. Under the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, a joint
research and development venture is immunized from the per se approach of the
Sherman Act.426 The purpose of this Act, however, is to develop technology in the
United States, and not to promote rationalization by the joint activities.
3. Exemptions by separate laws
In addition to the Antimonopoly Act, there are 29 laws that provide exemptions
from the application of the Antimonopoly Act.427 These exemption laws were
enacted separately from the Antimonopoly Act although the character of the exemption
laws might be inconsistent with the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act. Moreover,
instead of the JFTC, the competent minister has an authorization to approve a lawful
423 Antimonopoly Act § 24-4(1).
424 Antimonopoly Act § 24-4(2).
425 JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 14, at 121.
426 National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.c. §§ 4301-5 (1988).
427 JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 14, at 119.
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cartel under the separate exemption laws.428 These exemption laws have a risk of
making the Antimonopoly Act ineffective. To eliminate such a risk, exemption laws
usually require approved cartels not to impede the interests of consumers or the related
enterprises429 or not to employ unfair trade practices.43o Furthermore, under
certain circumstances, the competent minister must notify,431consult with,432or
obtain the consent of the JFTC.433 Main laws are following.
(1) Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act434
While a cartel by small entrepreneurs is approved as activities of cooperatives
by Section 24 of the Antimonopoly Act and the Small and Medium Enterprise
Cooperative Act, the Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act was enacted to
428 E.g., Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act § 5-17. See also Export
and Import Trading Act: The Minister of International Trade and Industry is appointed
as the competent minister.
429 E.g., Export and Import Trading Act § 5(2)(v); Small and Medium Enterprise
organization Act § 19(1)(iv).
430 E.g., Export and Import Trading Act § 33(1)(i); Small and Medium Enterprise
organization Act § 89(1)(i).
431 E.g., Export and Import Trading Act §§ 34(3)-(5); Small and Medium
Enterprise organization Act § 90(3).
432 E.g., Export and Import Trading Act §§ 34(1),(2); Small and Medium
Enterprise organization Act § 90(2).
433 E.g., Small and Medium Enterprise organization Act § 90(1).
434 See supra note 257.
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stabilize and to rationalize small business operations.435 The Small and Medium
Enterprise Organization Act allows a formation of cartels among small enterprises
under less severe conditions than those of the cooperative cartels and the depression
cartels.436 Under the Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act, the competent
minister, not the JFTC, has an authorization to approve a cartel. 437
(2) Environmental Sanitation Act438
The Environmental Sanitation Act is, surprisingly, relating to the small business
cartels. The original purpose of the Environmental Sanitation Act is to maintain high
435 Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act § 1.
436 IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 149.
The purpose of both Acts may represent their difference. While the Small and
Medium Enterprise Cooperative Act aims to promote a bargaining power of
cooperatives by their mutual aid, the Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act
aims to protecting small companies for the development of the national economy. The
purpose of the Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act is "to secure for them
(small entrepreneurs) the opportunity of fair and equitable economic activities and
stabilize and rationalize their business operation, thereby to contribute to the sound
development of the national economy." Small and Medium Enterprise Organization
Act § 1. With respect to the purpose of the Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperative
Act, see supra note 400.
Further, the Small and Medium Organization Act allows a large enterprise may
join a cartel under this Act where the small and medium entrepreneurs constitute two
thirds in the specific business field. Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act §
12.
437 Small and Medium Enterprise Organization Act § 5-17.
438 Kankyo Eisei Kankei Eigyo no Unei no Tekiseika ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act
Concerning Improvement of Operation of Business Relating to Environmental
Sanitation], Act No. 164 of 1957 (Japan)(hereinafter Environmental Sanitation Act).
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standards of sanitation and to secure improvement of existing sanitation facilities.439
Some business such as barber-shops, beauty parlors and laundries are required to have
environmental sanitation but many entrepreneurs are so small and less profitable that
they may lack finances to invest in sanitation facilities.440 The Minister of Health
and Public Welfare can approve a cartel which restricts service charges, sales prices or
methods of business in order to protect the business from excessive competition.441
This type of cartel is exempted by the Antimonopoly Act.442
(3) Fishery Production Adjustment Association Act443
The fishery production business often consists of small companies and
individual fishermen.444 Fishery Production Adjustment Association Act allows
439 Environmental Sanitation Act § 1-3.
440 Only barber-shops are now still approved to form a cartel exempted by the
Antimonopoly Act. Thirty-six prefectures have a cartel in each. JFfC ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 14, at 127.
441 Environmental Sanitation Act § 8(1)(iii).
442 Environmental Sanitation Act § 9.
443 Gyogyo Seisan Chosei Kumiaiho [Fishery Production Adjustment Association
Act], Act No. 128 of 1961 (Japan).
444 KINYA KIMOTOETAL., KEIZAIHO[ECONOMICLAW] 203 (1986); there are
approximately twenty thousand houses of fishermen, and only a limited number of
large fishery companies exist.
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fishermen to engage in production adjustment.445 The Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries can approve a cartel when excessive competition exists.446
(4) Industry Conversion Smoothing Act447
The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act was enacted to help enterprises in a
depressed industry to smoothly withdraw their current business and convert them to a
new more hopeful business.448 The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act is not
defined as an exemption law from the Antimonopoly Act because the Antimonopoly
Act is theoretically applicable to business activities in accordance with the Industry
Conversion Smoothing Act.449 However, a similar effect to exemption laws can be
expected from the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act. When the competing minister
examines activities filed for an approval under the Act, the JFfC will be notified in
advance, and it can deliver its opinion if the activities seem to violate the
445 Fishery Production Adjustment Association Act § 10.
446 Fishery Production Adjustment Association Act §§ 2,6.
Three cartels now are approved to be exempted from the Antimonopoly Act.
Object items of the cartels are sauries, sardines, saurels and mackerels. JFfC ANNuAL
REPORT, supra note 14, at Supp. 70.
447 Sangy6 K6z6 Tenkan Enkatsuka Rinji Sochih6 [Industrial Structure Conversion
Smoothing Temporary Measure Act], Act No. 24 of 1987 (Japan)(hereinafter Industry
Structure Conversion Smoothing Act).
448 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 1.
449 The JFfC does not list the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act as an
exemption laws from the Antimonopoly Act. See JFfC ANNuAL REPORT,supra note
14, at Supp. 52-3.
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Antimonopoly Act.450 Though a prior notification to the JFTC does not necessarily
guarantee to immunize the enterprises from the liability under the Antimonopoly Act,
it can be expected that the JFTC, in practical matters, will not challenge business
activities under the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act.
450 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 9.
VI. EXAMPLE: DEPRESSION CARTEL
It might be contrary to the antitrust policy that a lawful cartel can be formed in
a recession. The depression cartel, however, can be exempted from the Antitrust laws
under certain circumstances in Japan.451 Japan allowed cartelization as an
adjustment policy in a depression unlike the United States. This section will describe
a lawful depression cartel and its effect.
A. Cartels in Cyclical Depression by the Antimonopoly Act
1. Purpose of the depression cartel
There is a business cycle in which economy weakens and falls into a decline
following a period of an active market.452 A cyclical depression is one phase of a
normal business cycle. The market will become active after a period of depression.
Less effective enterprises must withdraw their business, because only efficient
451 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3.
452 MATSUSHITA, supra note 264, at 323.
"Business cycles are 'recurrences of rise and decline in activity, affecting most
of the economic processes of communities with well-developed business organization,
not divisible into waves of amplitudes nearly equal to their own, and averaging in
communities at different stages in economic development from about three to about
six or seven years in duration. '" JAMESW. ANGELL,INvESTMENTANDBUSINESS
CYCLES3 (1941)(citing WESLEYC. MITCHELL,BUSINESSCYCLE:THE PROBLEMAND
ITS SETTING468 (1927».
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enterprises can survive in a free and fair competition. Especially during a depression,
a less efficient enterprise will easily fail because demand is much smaller than supply
in the market. This is a market mechanism under the free and fair competition.
Promoting free and fair competition is, of cause, the primary purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act.453 At too severe depression, however, demand in the market
may depress, and the whole national economy will suffer severely until the market has
adjusted the imbalance of supply and demand and has become active. Many
enterprises may go bankrupt even if they have potential to do business efficiently and
to be vivid competitors in the market. An adverse effect of depression may be too
severe for certain industries as a whole to recover after the depression. High
unemployment may OCCUr.454Related industries also may be affected by the
depressed industry. It is too harsh for the whole economy and society in Japan to
endure such a severe depression.
In the case of a cyclical depression, it is necessary for the Government to
promptly terminate it. A temporary restriction of supply is one positive way to adjust
the imbalance of supply and demand instead of the autonomous adjustment mechanism
of the market itself.
The depression cartel system by Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act was
enacted in 1953 as an exceptional and temporary emergency relief in order to adjust
453 Antimonopoly Act § 1.
454 Heightening the level of employment is one of the purposes of the
Antimonopoly Act. Antimonopoly Act § 1.
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the supply and demand gap caused by excessive production.455 The Government
thereby helps enterprises survive in the depression, prevents the industry from losing,
keeps the society from confusion, and maintains competing entities in the market. The
depression cartels, thus, can be exempted from the application of the Antitrust Act
only when demand is severely depressed.
Besides, note that at the time of the depression cartel system in 1953, Japan
was under a severe depression because the special procurement demands had ended
due to the cease-fire of the Korean War in 1951 and because Japan had not recovered
from the injury of World War II.456
2. Subject of the cartel
Only manufacturers which produce commodities are permitted to form the
depression cartel since its purpose is to adjust disequilibrium of supply and
demand.457
Approved concerted activities are "restrictions on output or sales, or on
facilities or equipments except for renovation or improvement of facilities"458 and
price fixing.459 Market allocation is not approved since the purpose of this
455IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 114.
456 See supra part III.A.4.
See also IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 15.
457Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(1).
458Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(2).
459Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(3).
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exemption is to adjust the imbalance of supply and demand.460 For the same reason,
price fixing can be approved under more limited situation than others. Price fixing
will be approved where (a) restriction on output of the commodity is extremely
difficult for technical reasons, or (b) concerted activities other than price fixing had
been engaged in first but, as a result, were found inadequate to overcome the
depression.461 Even under the cartel, renovation or improvement of facilities cannot
be barred since these activities are consistent with rationalization.462
3. Conditions for approval
Severe conditions are required to obtain an approval for the depression cartel
by the JFTC. They are provided in Section 24-3 as follows: (a) "there exists an
extreme disequilibrium of supply and demand for a particular commodity;"463 (b)
"the price of the said commodity is below the average cost of protection;"464 (c) "a
considerable part of the entrepreneurs in the trade concerted may eventually be forced
460Sh5go Itoda, Section 24-3, in CHUKAIKEIZAIHOJOUKAN[COMMENTARY
ECONOMICLAWS I] 523 (Shigekazu Imamura et al. eds., 1975).
461Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(3).
462Antimonopoly Act 21 § 24-3(2).
463Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(1).
464Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(1)(i).
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to discontinue production;"465 and (d) "it is difficult to overcome such circumstances
... by the rationalization of individual enterprises. ,,466
"[A] considerable part of the entrepreneurs" in (c) does not mean only a
concept of quantity like "more than a half. ,,467Its meaning includes a degree in
which relatively efficient enterprises cannot continue their production.468 "[T]o
discontinue production" in (c) means not only that the prices are below the average
cost but also that the period of the prices below the average cost will last for a long
time with no hope of ending.469 The factors to be considered include the number of
new entries into the market and those retreating from it, product cost, product
capacity, product situation, financing situation, supply and demand, and prospect for
the future.47o "[D]ifficult to overcome" in (d) implies preventing entrepreneurs from
easily forming a carte1.471
Further, the depression cartel shall be approved under these following
limitations: (a) cartels "do not exceed the necessary extent to overcome" the
465Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(1)(i).
466Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(1)(ii).
467Itoda, supra note 460, at 524.
468 Id.
469SANEKATA, supra note 291, at 367.
470Itoda, supra note 460, at 524.
471Itoda, supra note 460, at 524; Entrepreneurs, before they apply for the cartel,
had to make an effort for rationalizations such as cutting cost, improving the
productivity, renovation of productive facilities and technologies.
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depression;472 (b) "there is no likelihood of unjustly injuring the interests of the
consumers in general, and of related entrepreneurs;"473 (c) cartels "are not unjustly
discriminating;"474 and (d) cartels "do not restrict unjustly participation in or
withdrawal from" them.475
The period of the depression cartel is usually limited to a short time in order
not to exceed the necessary extent to overcome the depression. Nonetheless, the
period is sometimes renewed. The latest depression cartel was approved in April 1987
at first for one year,476but continued for two and a half years.477 The condition of
(b), "no likelihood of unjustly injuring the interests of the consumers" is an ironic
provision because a cartel must have an anticompetitive effect to consumers. This
provision tries to avoid an unjust injury against consumers and tries to minimize an
anticompetitive effect.478 "[N]ot unjustly discriminatory" in (c) means that the
depression cartel must not put certain enterprises in an advantageous or
disadvantageous position.479 No entrepreneur is forced to participate in or to
472Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(4)(i).
473Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(4)(ii).
474Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(4)(iii).
475Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(4)(iv).
476JFTC ANNUAL REPORT122 (JFTC ed., 1989).
477 Japan Shipyards Set to End Production Cartel, Reuters, Sep. 19, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
478Itoda, supra note 460, at 526. However, this criteria is just vague.
479Itoda, supra note 460, at 526.
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withdraw from the depression cartel. Nobody can restrict the activities of
entrepreneurs who do not join the cartel even when their activities dilute an effect of
one.
Even after a depression cartel is approved by the JFTC, the cartel cannot be
exempted from the application of the Antimonopoly Act where the cartel participants
employ unfair trade practices.480
When entrepreneurs intend to form a depression cartel, they should obtain a
prior approval by the JFTC by filing an application in accordance with the JFTC
Regulation No.3 of 1953.481 The JFTC must consult with the competent minister in
charge of the industry concerned prior to an approval or rejection of the
application.482 The JFTC must make public the reasons for their approval.483 If
an objection to the decision of the JFTC is filed, the JFTC must have an open
summary hearing.484 The JFTC can revoke or modify its approval after it has
already been issued when the conditions for the approval seem to have been
480 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(1).
481 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi K6sei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru H6ritsu
Dai 24 J5 no 3 oyobi Dai 24 16 no 4 no Kitei ni yoru Ninka Shinsei Todokede oyobi
Ch6mon ni Kansuru Kisoku [JFTC Regulation Concerning Application for
Authorization, Notification, and Hearing in Accordance with Section 24-3 and 24-4 of
the Antimonopoly Act], JFTC Regulation No.3 of 1953 (Japan).
482 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(8).
483 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(5).
484 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(7).
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disappeared or to have changed.485 In the same situation, the entrepreneurs who
formed a depression cartel can voluntarily file a notification to discontinue the
approved carteL486 In regard to the latest depression cartel among shipbuilders, the
JFTC recommended they resolve the depression cartel six months before its legal
expiration because of the recovery of the shipbuilding market after ten years of
recession.487 The shipbuilders accepted the recommendation and filed to cease the
cartel by themselves.488
B. Industry Conversion Smoothing Act for Structural Depression
1. Structural depression
An industry in depression cannot welcome the next phase of the business cycle,
prosperity, where: (1) enterprises in the industry lose a competitive advantage to
imported goods or competing alternative products; (2) demand has generally declined;
or (3) suppliers have established an excessive productive capacity.489 Such an
industry is in a structural depression without regard to a phase of business cycle of the
whole economy.490
485Antimonopoly Act § 66(1).
486Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(6).
487 Japan Shipyards Set to End Production Cartel, supra note 477.
488 Id.
489MA TSUSHIT A, supra note 264, at 323.
490 Id.
121
Where the market is structurally over competitive, less competitive enterprises
must withdraw their business from the market until the market's disequilibrium
disappears. Where some enterprises in the industry lost the competition, they also
must retreat their business from the market. In the case where all enterprises in the
industry lose their competitiveness, Japan should abandon the industry. It is not
beneficial for the national economy and consumers to maintain inefficient enterprises.
In light of employment and a stable society, it is best for such enterprises not only to
withdraw their business but also to convert them to a new business with a potential.
There are some industries in a structural depression in Japan while others, such
as the automobile industry, succeed.491 Japan has developed its industrial structure
in response to the change of economic circumstances. But all industries cannot keep
competitiveness in the changing situation.
Japan recently shows a large amount of surplus,492 and this favorable balance
maintains high yen rate.493 Enterprises which depend on exports were forced to
rationalize themselves under the high yen rate situation. If the Japanese economy
491 The Ordinance by the MITI indicates depressed industries involving steel,
fabrics, nonferrous metal. Sangy6 K6z6 Tenkan Enkatsuka Rinji Sochih6 Dai 4 J6
Dai 2 K6 no Tokutei Setsubi 0 Sadameru Sh6rei [The Ministerial Ordinance which
Defines Specific Machinery under Section 4(2) of the Industrial Conversion Smoothing
Act Ordinance No. 30 of 1987 (Japan) as amended. See also Sangy6 Kenkyiisho
[Institute of Indust. Res.], Sangyo KOlo chosei oyobi Kokusaika no Shiten ni TaiOshita
Kyoso Seisaku no Arikata ni Tuite [Ideal of Industrial Structure Adjustment and
Competition Policy in Accordance with Development of Internationalism] 121 (1988).
492MITI WHITE PAPER,supra note 4, at 185; Japan's current balance in 1987 at
its peak reached approximately 870 million dollars.
493MITI WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 62-63; One dollar is in the range from
120 to 160 yen since 1986.
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were growing strongly, enterprises in a structurally depressed industry could easily
convert their business to another which would grow more. In a fast growing
economy, a structural change is easy because a growing industry induces investment,
risk taking and innovation in an unexplored area, and contributes higher employment
which enhances labor mobility and skill acquisition.494 But the slow growth itself
makes a structural adjustment more difficult.495 The real economic growth rate has
been around only five percent in recent years.496 Japan will keep moderate
economic growth, but rapid economic growth cannot be expected. Further, Japan
cannot protect a structurally depressed industry from competition with foreign
companies in the current situation. Japan should respond to foreign countries'
criticism that the Japanese market is not open for them.497
494 ORGANIZATIONFORECONOMICCO-OPERATIONANDDEVELOPMENT,POSITIVE
ADJUSTMENTPOLICIESMANAGINGSTRUCTURALCHANGE7-8 (1983)(hereinafter
OECD).
495 [d.
496 MITI WHITE PAPER,supra note 4, at 124.
497 The Japan' average tariff on industrial products is one of the lowest among any
industrial countries. JAPANEXTERNALTRADEORGANIZATION,supra note 6, at 120.
Further, Japan abolished tariffs on 1,004 items of industrial products in 1990. [d.
Furthermore, imports of beef and fresh oranges was liberalized in the spring of 1991,
followed by orange juice a year later. [d. at 173. Import restrictions on ten items of
agricultural products earmarked by GATT was lifted by April 1990. [d. at 172-3.
They are fruit purees and pastes, miscellaneous beans, processed cheese, tomato
products, non-citrus juice, dairy products, canned pineapples, grape sugar and
isomerized sugar, prepared beef products, and prepared products with sugar as a chief
component. [d.
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Under this situation, Japan should convert its industrial structure to what
cooperates and harmonizes with the world economy. Japan should expand
imports,498 transfer its industries to foreign countries by means of direct investment
abroad,499 and develop new businesses especially those which target the domestic
market.5°O Enterprises in the structurally depressed industry also convert their
business in accordance with the conversion of the Japanese economic structure.
However, if enterprises are in a situation that they cannot easily withdraw their
business from the structurally depressed industry because, for example, they have
already possessed huge product facilities, then they may continue having severe
competition without succeeding, and injuries may be aggravated.
Positive adjustment policies are therefore required to assist enterprises in
withdrawing their current business and entering a new one. The Industry Conversion
Smoothing Act was consequently enacted in 1987.
498The value of Japan's imports has been growing rapidly; the value of Japan's
imports in 1990 increased 80 percent from 1985. MITI WHITE PAPER, supra note 4,
at 150.
499Japanese manufactures' overseas investment also has been growing very much.
Annual investment (flow based) within the manufacturing industry in 1990 fiscal year
increased about 10 times relative to the 1980 fiscal year. MITI WHITE PAPER, supra
note 4, at 150.
500 Takashi Fukui, Sangy6 K6z6 Tenkan Enkatsuka Rinji Sochih6 no Kaisetsu
[Explanation of the Industrial Conversion Smoothing Act], 1118 KOKUSAISHan HOMU
[JOURNALOF THEJAPANESElNST. IF !NT'L Bus. LAW]' July 25, 1987, at 14, 16.
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2. Purpose
The purpose of the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act is to help enterprises
convert their current business to promising ones.501 The Industry Conversion
Smoothing Act aims also to stabile and develop the economy in a particular regional
area.502 If a certain industry falls into a depression, the area which depends upon
such an industry will suffer severely with regard to the regional economy and
employment.503 The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act, in brief, seeks to support
smooth conversion of business by private enterprises and to lessen an adverse effect of
the conversion in a regional area while the Japanese industrial structure, heavily
dependent upon exports, is moving to harmonize with the world economy.
3. Assistance for the entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs must face drastic economic change such as high yen rate which
is out of their controL Such an economic change deprives entrepreneurs of price
competitiveness, and thereby increases imports, declines exports and demand in the
domestic market, and an excessive productive capacity will result.
501 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 1.
502 Id.
503 Some regional areas heavily depend upon a particular industry. If the main
industry in the area withdraws its business, the regional economy and employment will
badly suffer. In approved areas, under the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act, a joint
venture among private companies and regional municipalities can get financial support.
See Industry Conversion Smoothing Act §§ 13-15.
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Under these circumstances, productive machinery may be defined as a "specific
machinery" where it has an excessive capacity.504 The entrepreneur who possesses
the specific machinery can submit a business plan to the competitive minister for
approval.505 The contents of the business plan concerns the abandonment or
assignment of the specific machinery and the conversion of business.506 There
should be specific details involving the time period and finance.507 An approved
entrepreneur can get benefits in regard to tax and finance.
The notable matter is that more than one entrepreneurs in the same industry
can jointly make a business plan and submit it to the competent minister for
approval. 508 The contents of the joint plan concerns joint manufacturing, joint sales,
merger, and assignment of their business. Approved entrepreneurs can withdraw or
convert their business with the cooperation among them. The joint business plan
system encourages entrepreneurs to convert their business through cooperation with
competitors and to achieve a smooth conversion otherwise unattainable. These
activities are horizontal output restraints although entrepreneurs limit only the
excessive capacity. The competent minister may notify the JFTC prior to the issuance
504Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 4(2).
505Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 5(1).
506Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 5(3).
507 Id.
508Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 7.
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of an approval for the joint business plan.509 The JFfC, if necessary, will deliver its
opinion concerning the joint business plan to the competent minister.510 If the
economic circumstance changes after the approval of the joint business plan, the plan
may not be proper. If the JFfC finds that the approved concerted activities of the
joint business plan violate the Antimonopoly Act, the JFfC will notify the competent
minister.511 The competent minister, responding to the notification, will order to
cancel or modify the plan.512
The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act does not have any provision
exempting the business plan from the application of the Antimonopoly Act. However,
the JFfC and the competent minister have a meeting to observe that the joint business
plan does not to violate the Antimonopoly Act. This meeting may give the
entrepreneurs the presumption that the joint plan does not violate the Antimonopoly
Act.513 When the change of economic circumstances affects the necessity of the
joint business plan, the competent minister will be notified by the JFfC and will
509 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act §§ 9(1), (2).
510 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 9(3).
511 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 9(4).
512 Industry Conversion Smoothing Act §§ 8(2), 9(6). The competent minister, in
this case, can deliver its opinion to the JFTC. Id. § 9(5).
513 Note that the meeting does not necessarily guarantee the joint business plan is
exempted from the Antimonopoly Act.
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cancel or modify the plan before the JFTC challenges the joint activities with antitrust
liability.514
The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act has an effect of exemption from the
Antimonopoly Act. The goal of the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act is to change
the current Japanese industrial structure to harmonize or cooperate with the world
economy with the least injury to industries, and to aid the economy and employment
in the region dependent upon the structurally depressed industry.515 Congress, when
it enacted the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act, considered both exemptions as a
positive adjustment policy and an assessment of Japan from the other countries.
C. The Depression Cartel in Other Jurisdiction than Japan
1. Europe
There are only two countries, Germany and Spain, other than Japan, in which a
competition law expressly provides exemptions for a depression cartel under certain
conditions.516 In Germany and Spain, the legislation on restrictive business practices
has provisions to authorize a depression cartel "in order to facilitate structural
adjustment in industries faced with a lasting or irreversible decline in demand. "517
Because of extremely strict conditions for the approval of a depression cartel, an
514Industry Conversion Smoothing Act §§ 8(4), 9(4)-(6).
515Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 1.
516 Competition Policy in Recession: Crisis Cartels, THE OECD OBSERVER,No.
114, Jan. 1982, at 29.
517 Id. at 30.
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authorization of a depression cartel has been the rare exception, and recently none
have been approved.518
2. United States
In the United States, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (hereinafter
NIRA), was enacted to approve a depression cartel of a cyclical nature in order to
respond to the Great Depression.519 Congress at that time respected speedy
economic recovery more than social goals such as consumer protection and
environmental regulation.520 Under the NIRA, codes to limit the amount of
products, to fix prices, and to prohibit sales below cost were issued.521 Thereby not
only the prices of products increased unjustly, but also artificially high prices attracted
new companies and the productive capacity expanded.522
The Supreme Court in ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, held the
NIRA was unconstitutional since Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its
legislative power for the rehabilitation and expansion the trade or industries without
sufficient statutory standard or limits.523
518 I d.
519 National Industrial Recovery Act, Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
520 Carl J. Mager, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 594 (1990).
521 Competition Policy in Recession, supra note 516, at 30.
522 I d.
523 ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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The Supreme Court decisions at that time also relaxed the application of the
Antitrust laws. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,524 the Supreme Court
examined the horizontal price fixing under the rule of reason analysis.525 In its
analysis, the Court considered the fact that the coal mining industry was in
distress.526 It mentioned that "[t]he interests of producers and consumers are
interlocked," and that "[w]hen industry is grievously hurt, when producing concerns
fail, when unemployment mounts and communities dependent upon profitable
production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry."527
In National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States, the
Supreme Court allowed an agreement for wage scales where handblown window glass
manufacturers agreed that they all could operate only for one half of the year.528
The Court indicated that the hand blown window glass producers and the handmakers
needed to meet a short supply of labor.529 The Court admitted the necessity of the
adjustment for the shrinking and depressed industry.
524Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
525Defendants, who produced about 73 percent of the bituminous coal in
Appalachian territories, established an exclusive selling agency. Defendants owned all
capital of the agency and agreed to fix their prices. 288 U.S. at 356.
526 288 U.S. at 372.
527288 U.S. at 372.
528National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923).
529263 U.S. at 412-13; The factories using machines could produce window glass
at half the cost of the hand made. Under the these circumstances, the severe working
conditions reduced the number of workers for handblown window glass factories so
that all factories could not maintain sufficient labor to operate all year.
130
In both cases, the Supreme Court considered that the industries were severely
depressed when it examined the horizontal restraint of trade. Yet, the horizontal
restraint of trade was deemed per se illegal in later decisions.53o Since ALA
Schechter Poultry, a depression cartel, generally speaking, has not been immunized
from the antitrust liability.53l
D. Anxiety for Trade Conflicts
As described earlier, Japan, unlike other countries, utilizes a cartel for the
depressed industries as an adjustment tool. The question here is whether the
depression cartel in Japan prevents free and fair international trade. The short answer
IS no.
1. Restriction of imports
The OECD, yet, was afraid that the government would use a cartel for the
protection of domestic industries from foreign companies.532 It can be anticipated
that foreign countries will fear that the Japanese government, in order to support the
depressed industries, might restrict access to the Japanese market in which foreign
companies have more competitive advantage.
530 E.g., United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
53l Competition Policy in Recession, supra note 516, at 29.
532 DECD, supra note 494, at 12; "Indeed, if governments tolerate cartels, they are
frequently induced to protect these national producers from international competition."
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However, neither the provision of the depression cartel in the Antimonopoly
Act or in the Industry Conversion Smoothing Act restrict imports from abroad. The
purpose of Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act is to adjust the imbalance of the
supply and demand gap caused by excessive production. This provision allows
approved entrepreneurs to limit the amount of products or sales, but it does not
prohibit non-members of cartels, including foreign companies, to do business as they
wish.
One possible argument for protectionism is that since inefficient companies
remain in the market owing to the depression cartel, imports from abroad cannot
increase or the importers will hesitate to engage in aggressive business because of over
competition.533 Nevertheless, if efficient foreign companies enter into the depressed
market in Japan, the effect of the depression cartel will be diluted and inefficient
Japanese companies should withdraw their business from the industry.534 Were the
company so efficient that it could get sufficient profits even in the depressed industry,
a cartel would not be effective. A member enterprise of a cartel is not necessarily
guaranteed survival by the depression cartel. Efficient enterprises with the competitive
533Akinori Uesugi, Japan's Cartel System and Its Impact on International Trade,
27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 389, 394 (1986).
534If an efficient company has its competitive advantage, for example in its prices
and qualities, it will perform its business ignoring the existence of the depression
cartel. Its attractive products will be welcomed by consumers much more than
products of the cartel member. A productive outsider must win the competition with
the cartelist and therefore need not mind the authorized cartel.
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advantage can win the competition even in the market where the depression cartel is
authorized. The depression cartel cannot bar competitive imported goods.
When foreign enterprises can get profits but Japanese ones cannot, the industry
may not be in the cyclical depression but in the structural depression.535 In this
case, it is no use for permitting the depression cartel under Section 24-3 of the
Antimonopoly Act. Enterprises which lost the international competitive advantage
should withdraw their business and convert to a new one with potential. The Industry
Conversion Smoothing Act assists such enterprises in withdrawing their business and
does not protect them from competition.536 Hence, the Industry Conversion
Smoothing Act is not contrary to free international trade, either.
2. Unjust exports
If enterprises export their products while they are protected by an authorized
cartel in the domestic market, such enterprises seem to be supported by export
subsidies. The GECD suggested that export subsidies have a "serious danger of
aggravating the problems of excess capacity in other countries. ,,537
535 Such a cyclical depression where only Japanese enterprises cannot continue
their business because of their inefficiency compared with foreign companies will
exist. Anyway, as long as any profitable entrepreneur exists, the government do not
have to keep inefficient ones until the depression ends.
536 See supra part VLB.
537 GECD, supra note 516, at 20; "Whist one country can always solve its own
problems of excess capacity by subsidizing exports, all nations taken together cannot.
Export subsidies can thus amount to structural beggar-thy-neighbour policies which
lead to international repercussions in the form of countervailing interventions. The
final effect would be an overall deterioration of the world trade system."
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However, to repeat, Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act just seeks to
ameliorate the imbalance of the supply and demand gap in the market. This provision
does not allow enterprises which can afford dumping exports to gain excess
profits.538 The depression cartel system is only a positive adjustment policy for a
cyclical depression. The JFTC always observes the depression cartel and can cease or
change its approval of it if necessary.539
Besides, it is not easy for Japanese entrepreneurs to get excessive profits
through the depression cartel. A reduction of supply by Japanese enterprises does not
raise their prices much if the quality of imported products meets the demand and
imports are not restricted by the tariff or non-tariff barriers.540
Further, unless the JFTC allows Japanese entrepreneurs discrirninately to
restrict only their domestic sales, the enterprises cannot promote their exports using
the profits from their domestic sales. Only when enterprises agreed among themselves
to limit their outputs or sales only for the domestic market, does the depression cartel
mean subsidize exports.541
538According to the survey by the MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, 11 of 41 Japanese manufactured products are cheaper in the United
States than Japan. These products, nevertheless, are not made by enterprises which are
approved to form a lawful depression cartel. JAPANEXTERNALTRADE
ORGANIZATION,supra note 6, at 70-71.
539Antimonopoly Act § 66( 1).
540Uesugi, supra note 533, at 396.
541But if the Japanese manufacturers restrain competition only in the domestic
market and can get excessive profits, foreign companies will enter the Japanese
market. It is doubtful that Japanese enterprises can earn profits from the domestic
market by the restraint of trade and export their products aggressively.
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If there are efficient foreign competitors, the Japanese enterprises should
compete with them in and out of the domestic market. The depression cartel system
does not necessarily provide protection for all approved enterprises as long as efficient
foreign competitors exist.542 There is, therefore, less possibility that the depression
cartel system plays the role of export subsidies.
E. Factors Affecting the World Trade
1. World-wide depression
A depression cartel may not be allowed where a depression occurred only in
the domestic market. Where only domestic demand is declined, Japanese enterprises
will tend to convert their domestic sales to exports in order to make up for the decline
in the domestic market. In this case, Japanese enterprises can survive in the world
market without a formation of carteL543
Where the world market is also in a severe depression, even efficient
enterprises having international competitiveness will face a hard time, and in some
circumstances the depression cartel can be approved.
542 If there are no foreign companies which can compete with Japanese enterprises
effectively, a lawful cartel by Japanese companies may strongly affect the foreign
market.
543 The conditions for an approval of a depression cartel are very strict. The
depression cartel may not be allowed unless a considerable part of enterprises cannot
continue their production. See Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act and supra part
VI.A.2.
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2. Competitive advantage
This section will discuss the effects for an international trade where enterprises
participating in a depression cartel possess the competitive advantage and where they
do not.
Assume that in a certain industry Japanese enterprises possess the competitive
advantage compared with foreign enterprises. Enterprises which possess the
competitive advantage will try to maintain their amount of outputs by depriving a
market share from others, including foreign competitors. A depression and Japan's
competitive advantage will be a natural barrier against potential new entries from
abroad. By the depression cartel, Japanese enterprises can prevent harmful losses
among themselves during the recession. However, foreign enterprises will not suffer
from the depression cartel because the depression cartel just adjusts supply by
Japanese enterprises.544 What prevents foreign companies from the Japanese market
is not the depression cartel but the depression and Japan's competitive advantage.
When the depression ends, only the market mechanism shall control the supply
and demand. No cartel may be approved. If a lawful cartel remains, Japanese
enterprises can restrain competition by the cartel in the domestic market.
545
The
competitive advantage of Japanese enterprises will make foreign companies hesitate to
544 The depression cartel does not harm foreign enterprises but gives them
advantages because the cartel will make Japanese products less attractive.
Therefore, the participants of the cartel do not limit their output so much as to
attract imported goods.
545 The purpose of the depression cartel system is temporary emergency relief in a
severe recession. See supra note Vl.A.1.
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enter the Japanese market in spite of the fact that the market seems attractive because
of the cartel.546 Further, the depression cartel subsidizes Japanese enterprises for
their exports.547 It is one of the worst effects of the depression cartel.
If Japanese enterprises do not the possess the competitive advantage against
foreign enterprises, the depression cartel cannot be effective unless the Japanese
market is closed from the international competition. Without protection such as tariffs
and non-tariff barriers, foreign enterprises can freely engage in their business
regardless of the existence of the depression cartel. If there were import barriers in
the Japanese market, the depression cartel would not only protect inefficient Japanese
enterprises from imports, but also give them export subsidies. Both consequences will
badly affect the international trade order. Where Japanese enterprises do not possess
international competitiveness, the Government should not apply the depression cartel
system but should assist these enterprises to convert their business to other
markets.548
In summary, the depression cartel can be approved only when the enterprises in
a depressed industry possess a relatively competitive advantage, and the cyclical
depression is severe. By contrast, for enterprises which lost the competitive advantage
546 If a lawful cartel still remains after the end of the recession, the Japanese
enterprises can perform a balanced output restraint where they can earn excessive
profit but foreign companies cannot enter the domestic market because of the quality
difference. The wider the difference of competitiveness between Japanese companies
and foreign companies, the more profits the Japanese cartelist can get.
547 The cartel in a recovered domestic market gives the Japanese enterprises
excessive profits by which they can afford to export in low prices.
548 That is the Industrial Recovery Smoothing Act.
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against foreign enterprises, the depression cartel should not be allowed, but instead, an
another adjustment policy is necessary to help them to withdraw their business
smoothly.
F. Assessment of the Depression Cartel
It is true that any cartel restrains competition to some extent. The OBCD
concluded that "it is difficult ... to conceive an effective system of competition in
which a large number of firms are protected or subsidized. ,,549 The question here is
how the depression cartel is contrary to antitrust policy.
1. Protection of inefficient enterprises
The OECD indicated that cartel agreements are more anticompetitive than
dominant firms and mergers because a cartel protects inefficient enterprises.55o It is,
however, unclear whether the depression cartel system of the Antimonopoly Act551
and the Industry Recovery Smoothing Act really maintain inefficient enterprises and
excess productive capacities longer than the market mechanism does.
The MITI has argued that "without cartels or some other forms of government
intervention excess capacity would not be eliminated in Japan, and that only with
549 Competition Policy in Recession, supra note 516, at 29.
550 OECD, supra note 494, at 12; "From a positive adjustment point of view,
cartels are much more problematic than dominant [urns and mergers, as they tend to
entail all the disadvantages of large firm size. Cartel agreements restrict the flow of
resources from inefficient to efficient firms, because cartels protect high-cost firms."
551 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3.
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government encouragement can it be eliminated speedily and completely. 11552
Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act aims to adjust excess supply in a cyclical
depression. As described in the former section, the depression cartel should not be
allowed for enterprises which lost competitive advantage. Under the approved
depression cartel, the member enterprises can jointly limit their output or eliminate
excessive capacities. 553
Eliminating excessive capacities is one measure of rationalization for
manufacturers to regain a competitive power. Nonetheless, few will voluntarily and
immediately decrease their productive facilities because of the merit of mass
production. Japanese manufacturers do not mind continuing their business for low
profits under severe competition.554 Further, Japanese companies, unlike American
ones, tend not to layoff their employees because of lifetime employment. 555 When
Japanese enterprises withdraw a part of their business, they should consider their
552 Uesugi, supra note 533, at 394.
553 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(2).
554 See JAPANEXTERNALTRADEORGANIZATION,supra note 6, at 102;
Manufacturer's net profits to sales (after tax profits / year sales) of Japan is much
lower than that of the United States: 2.15 percent in Japan and 5.41 percent in the
United States in 1987.
555 See JAMESC ABBEGGLEN,THE STRATEGYOF JAPANESEBUSINESS70 (1984).
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employees in the relevant section.556 Hence, it is very tough for Japanese companies
to shrink or to withdraw their business.
Where the total productive capacity of relatively competitive facilities exceeds
the total demand in the depressed market, even efficient enterprises may suffer until
the least efficient ones finally withdraw due to the market mechanism. But, of course,
there exists a dangerous possibility that the depression cartel will protect inefficient
enterprises which otherwise should have withdrawn their business. The strict
conditions for the approval of the depression cartel is necessary to utilize the system
as a useful tool of adjustment,557 The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act obviously
aims to smooth conversion or withdrawal of inefficient enterprises in a structural
depression. However, it is arguable whether the joint business plan558is really
necessary in order to facilitate business conversion.
Thus, the strict and careful application of both laws is necessary to prevent
maintaining less efficient enterprises.
556Instead of a layoff, an employer usually uses two ways for their employees:
(1) moving employees to other sections of the company or to their subsidiaries; and
(2) inviting employees who hope to quit by using, for example, a high retirement
allowance.
557Indeed, the Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act provides rigid conditions to
form the depression cartel. See supra part VI.A.2.
558The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act § 9.
140
2. Innovation and economic growth
The OECD also suggested that cartels tend to "discourage the introduction of
innovative processes and products for fear of upsetting the often delicate stability of
cartel agreements. ,,559 It is clear that an innovation is important for future economic
growth.560 If the depression cartel gave enterprises a calm situation in which they
can enjoy business without any effort of innovation, then the level of technology
would not rise in Japan. The depression cartel provides enterprises a situation in
which they can survive by their efforts.561
The enterprises will promote innovative activities as long as they compete
among themselves. Note that monetary investment is necessary for an new
technological development. Though it is not true that competition may be restrained
in order for the investment to research and development, too severe competition will
deprive enterprises from innovating. The Industry Conversion Smoothing Act may
promote development in technology since technological innovation can be expected
when enterprises enter into an unexplored area.
559 OECD, supra note 494, at 12.
560 OECD, supra note 494, at 14; "Innovation is crucial for future growth and
positive adjustment, and there is no doubt that government have an important role to
play in promoting creative investment and new technological developments."
561 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(l)(i); The depression cartel can be approved only
when entrepreneurs cannot overcome the crucial depression through the rationalization
by themselves.
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3. Consumer Protection
A cartel creates the danger of limiting output and increasing prices much above
the operating costs. In any case, the consumer can get no direct profit from the lawful
depression cartel. Therefore, the depression cartel should be limited to a minimum
time period.
So long as the cartel works as a temporary relief for a cyclical severe
depression, consumers' heavy burden of the depression cartel can be limited. The
JFfC will cease an approval of the depression cartel when enterprises in the depressed
industry can easily earn profits.562Further, consumers are guaranteed to choose
alternative products made by other non-member enterprises, including imported goods,
even while the depression cartel is approved. Moreover, the depression cartel system
can prevent a lawful monopoly which is a result of a single winner in competition.
Consumers can get benefits of competition among competitive enterprises after the end
of a depression.
The Antimonopoly Act explicitly provides the condition for an approval that
the depression cartel has "no likelihood of unjustly injuring the interests of consumers
in general,"563although this language is not specific or clear. To repeat, the rigid
application of Section 24-3 is necessary to minimize the consumers' inconvenience.
562Antimonopoly Act § 66(1).
563Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(4)(ii).
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566 Id.
54 cartels
25
11
5
95
73567
(a) Restrictions on output
(b) Restraints on facilities
(c) Restraints on sales volume
(d) Restraints on prices
TOTAL
NET total
restrictions:566
570 The depression cartels approved to fix prices are as follows:
Vinylchloride Resin (11/18/58 - 03/31/59)
Sheet Celluloid (12/02/58 - 11/30/59)
568 Antimonopoly Act § 24-3(2).
As of June 1991, seventy-three depression cartels564 have been approved by
the JFfc.565 These cartels are permitted to engage in the following types of
The JFfC usually permits concerted activities only relating to restrictions on
output, facilities, or sales.568 Most of the restrictions approved were among them.
Price fixing was permitted only in exceptional cases in which restrictions on output
had not been effective.569 All of them were approved in depressions between the
1950's and the 1970's, and have not been approved in recent cases.570
565 THE STATUSQUO ANDIMPROVEMENTOF EXEMPTION,supra note 363, at 3
itemized discussion.
564 The same cartel which was approved to extend its period several times is
deemed one cartel.
567 There were twenty depression cartels which contained more than two types of
restrictions in the joint actions approved by the JFfC. Id.
569 THE STATUSQUO ANDIMPROVEMENTOF EXEMPTION,supra note 363, at 3
itemized discussion.
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A drawback of the depression cartel is that too long a duration may maintain
inefficient enterprises which would otherwise be phased out and may create an
unhealthy tendency towards relying on joint activities which are widespread among
enterprises in a depressed industry.571 The term of the depression cartel should be
limited to period which the JFTC estimates the depression lasting, though an accurate
estimate is difficult.572
The JFTC hence approves only as a short period as possible, generally three
months,573 while the Antimonopoly Act does not provide any limitation. Moreover,
in the case the JFTC thought the depression cartel is no longer necessary, it ceases the
approval before the examination.574 In brief, the JFTC tends to approve the
Hard Vinylchloride Tube (03/02/59 - OS/20/60)
Alloy for Structures (01127/65 - 09/30/77)
Small Steel Bars (11/05/76 - 09/30/77).
IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 184-186.
571IYORI& UESUGI,supra note 188, at 115.
572THE STATUSQUO ANDIMPROVEMENTOF EXEMPTION,supra note 363, at 3
itemized discussion.
573 [d. at 4.
574The depression cartels which ceased before the expiration are as follows:
Ferro Alloys (11/18/65 - 09/30/66)
Cotton Yarn & Spun Rayon Yarn (10/01/65 - 06/30/67)
Steel Vessels (04/01/87 - 09/30/89)
Large Diesel Engine for Vessels (04/01187 - 09/30/89).
THE STATUSQUO ANDIMPROVEMENTOF EXEMPTION,supra note 363, at 4; JFfC
ANNUALREPORT,supra note 476, at 122-123; Japan Shipyards Set to End Production
Cartel, supra note 477.
See also Antimonopoly Act § 66(1).
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depression cartel to only the extent necessary with respect to both types of restrictions
and the time limitation.
H. Examination of the Current Enforcement: Shipbuilders
Only for two industries, shipbuilders and manufacturers of large diesel engines
for vessels, has the JFTC approved depression cartels since 1984 under the
Antimonopoly Act.575 This section will examine the depression cartel approved for
a shipbuilding industry.
1. Background for approval
Japan's 33 shipbuilders, on March 13, 1987, filed an application to the JFTC
for an approval of a depression cartel which would restrict their output under Section
24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act.576
Japan has been the leading shipbuilding country in the world since the 1950's
because of their competitive advantage such as superior technologies, use of low price
and high quality steel, good process control, and dependable delivery.577
575 See JFTC ANNuAL REpORT,supra note 14, at 54-55 app.; JFTC ANNuAL
REPORT, supra note 476, at 121-123.
576 See JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 476, at 121-22.
577NIPPONSTEELHUMANRESOURCESDEVELOPMENTCO., LTD., supra note 1, at
119-20; The reasons the Japanese shipbuilding industry has grown to the best one said
to be (1) "successful development of welding technology, the block construction
method, pre-equipping of ships (ordinary, equipping is done after the launching, while
pre-equipping partially fits out the vessel while under construction), and other
technologies which the industry has succeeded in developing;" (2) "a supply of low-
priced, high-quality steel" from Japanese steel manufacturers; (3) "good process
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However, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 changed the circumstances. Due to
a decline in marine transport volume and surplus tonnage, orders for new shipbuilding
sharply fell.578 The total orders the industry received in 1986 were approximately
4,830 thousand gross tons which was decreased by 25.1 percent from the previous
year.:U9 Further, the total tonnage of new ships completed in 1986 was less than
half of the peak in 1975.580 Sales prices had been below the average costs since the
latter part of 1985.581 Although the shipbuilding companies worked to streamline
their operations by, for instance, "consolidating their shipbuilding facilities, reinforcing
their non-shipbuilding operations, and redeploying their personnel,"582 the total
deficit of 33 shipbuilders reached 410 million yen (approximately 3.2 million dollars)
in the 1985 fiscal year.583 Among seven major shipbuilders, only the largest one
showed a net profit in the 1986 fiscal year.584
control;" and (4) "dependable delivery by the promised date."
578NIPPONSTEELHUMANRESOURCESDEVELOPMENTCO., LTD., supra note 1, at
120.
579JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 476, at 122.
580New ships completed in Japan: 16,991,230 gross tons (930 ships) in 1975;
8,177,935 gross tons (648 ships) in 1986. LLOYD'S REGISTEROF SHIPPINGSTATICAL
TABLE 36-37 (1990).
581JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 476, at 122.
582NIPPONSTEELHUMANRESOURCESDEVELOPMENTCO., LTD., supra note 1, at
120.
583JFTC ANNUALREPORT,supra note 476, at 122.
584 Three Major Japan Shipyards in Talks on Link, Reuters, Jan. 4, 1988, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Only Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. could keep its net
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2. Content of restriction
The JFTC approved a depression cartel among 33 shipbuilders with respect to
restriction on output from April 1, 1987 to March 31, 1988.585 The depression cartel
among shipbuilders was approved to extend twice, one year each, because of the
lasting severe depression in the shipbuilding industry.586 But in the middle of the
third year, the JFTC recommended the member shipbuilders to end the cartel early due
to the recovery of the shipbuilding market after ten years recession.58? The
shipbuilding industry accepted this recommendation and broke up the cartel on
September 30, 1989, six months earlier than its legal expiration.
During the two and a half years the cartel was permitted, the total output of the
33 shipbuilders was limited.588 Moreover, each shipbuilder agreed with the Ministry
of Transport to reduce its excessive productive facilities under a government-driven re-
structuring plan.589 The JFTC approved only the output restriction as a lawful
profit.
585JFTC ANNUALREpORT,supra note 476, at 122.
586 Japan Shipyards Want to Extend Production Limit, Reuters, Mar. 23, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
58?Japan Shipyards Set to End Production Cartel, supra note 477.
588The maximum total production among member shipbuilders was approximately
3 million compensated gross registered tons (hereinafter cgrt) for ships over 2,500 cgrt
in the fust year, and 2.4 million cgrt in the next year and a half. JFTC ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 476, at 122; Japan Shipyards Set to End Production Cartel, supra
note 477.
589Shipbuilders consequently agreed to trim their total productive capacity by
more than 20 percent to 4.6 million cgrt. The peak of Japanese shipbuilding capacity
was 9.8 million cgrt 1974 fiscal year. Japan Shipyards Set to End Production Cartel,
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activity, and accordingly shipbuilders separately filed plans to cut their capacities.59O
Nine of the 33 companies withdrew from shipbuilding business.591
3. Assessment of the shipbuilders output restriction
This cartel involved no foreign shipbuilders, nor did it protect Japanese
shipbuilders from international competition. Foreign shipbuilders at least did not
suffer from the depression carte1.592
Buyers all over the world could choose any shipbuilders they wished. When
all Japanese shipbuilders had received orders up to the limit designated by the cartel,
they could not accept orders from buyers. The buyers nevertheless could place orders
to other shipbuilders, for example, in Korea and Germany. Demand in the world had
declined. Total tonnage of ships completed fell by 27 percent in 1987 and by 35
percent from 1986 to 1988.593 It is hard to say that the depression cartel deprived
buyers of the right to choose Japanese shipbuilders.594
supra note 477.
590 Three Major Japan Shipyards in Talks on Link, supra note 584.
591 Japan Shipyards Set to End Production Cartel, supra note 477.
592 Foreign shipbuilders could take a business opportunities while the depression
cartel was formed.
593 LLOYD'S REGISTEROF SHIPPINGSTATICALTABLE,supra note 580, at 37-38;
Total gross tonnage of ships completed in the world was: 16,844,909 in 1986;
12,259,419 in 1987; and 10,909,340 in 1988.
594 If Japanese shipbuilders had naturally been offered from buyers more than the
limit, the market might have recovered from the recession. The restraint on output
would prohibit an extremely attractive sales offer which must bring deficits to the
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Further, the cartel did not playa role of export subsidies. It was impossible for
Japanese shipbuilders to expand their exports by the low prices achieved by profits
from the domestic market. Under this depression cartel, shipbuilders could not earn
excessive profits which affords low prices to attract consumers abroad. This
production restriction among shipbuilders does not seem contrary to the order of
international trade.
4. Effect of the restriction
Japan's shipbuilding industry recovered after the support by the depression
cartel. After the end of the cartel, the growth of Japanese shipbuilders exceeded that
of others. While the amount of ships built in the world raised by 21 percent from
1988 to 1989, Japan increased its output by 33 percent.595 Orders for new
shipbuilding Japan received in 1989 were nearly a half of the total in the world and
increased by 136.4 percent from the previous year.596 It is clear that Japan's
shipbuilders regained their competitive advantage while they underwent retrenchment
and became efficient manufacturers under the depression cartel approved by the JFfc.
shipbuilders.
595 LLOYD'S REGISTEROF SHIPPINGSTATICALTABLE, supra note 580, at 37-38;
With respect to the total gross tonnage of ships completed, the world increased from
10,909,340 in 1988 to 13,236,169 in 1989; Japan increased from 4,040,199 to
13,236,109.
The market share of Japan increased from 37 percent in 1988 to 41 percent in
1989. [d.
596 JAPANEXTERNALTRADEORGANIZATION,supra note 6, at 43; Japanese
shipbuilders received orders for 741 ships, 9.7 million gross tons while orders for 1720
ships, 19.3 million gross tons were placed in the world.
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The output restriction in the depressed shipbuilding industry is one successful
example of an adjustment policy during a recession. It did not protect nine inefficient
shipbuilders, which withdrew their business. Consumers' were kept from unjustly
injuries as much as possible. The cartel was approved for only a proper period and
was terminated even before the legal expiration. It did not restrain competition with
foreign shipbuilders nor caused them bad effects.
Although a formation of a cartel in a recession may be dangerous for fair and
free competition, it is possible to use the cartel as a useful adjustment tool as long as
Section 24-3 of the Antimonopoly Act is strictly and carefully enforced.
VII. CONCLUSION
Japan strictly prohibits the horizontal restraint of trade no less than the United
States. The notable difference in general is that, in order to apply the Antimonopoly
Act, it must be proved that the cartel substantially restrains competition. The market
power of defendants is an important factor to judge whether the cartel substantially
restrains competition. In the United States, the horizontal restraint is held illegal
regardless of the defendants' market power.597 While the Antitrust laws in the
United States prohibit the acts constituting horizontal restraints, the Antimonopoly Act
in Japan eliminates the adverse effect on free and fair competition.
The most important difference is in regard to the exemption system from
antitrust liabilities. Japan has the extensive exemption system including the cartel
formed in a recession. The Antimonopoly Act itself has exemption provisions in
addition to some separate exemption laws. Further, the Industry Conversion
Smoothing Act has no exemption provision but has a similar effect to exemptions.
Why does Japan rely upon the exemption system? One reason seems to be that
Japan did not have a concept of free and fair trade competition before World War II,
and such a concept, which was introduced from the United States, is not the same as
the American one. For instance, the lawful depression cartel shows that Japan has the
597 Cf. Group boycotts are recognized as an exception.
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intention to eliminate harmful effects caused by excessive competition as well as to
keep free competition. However, the important effect of the exemption system is to
clarify lawful exceptional cases which seem to have an anticompetitive effect but have
a redeeming virtue otherwise unattainable. By showing such exceptional cases, other
horizontal restraints can be held illegal without a doubt. The public is not left
uncertain.
On the other hand, the Antitrust laws in the United States analyze the
horizontal restraint involving some procompetitive effects under either the per se rule
or the rule of reason analysis. Nevertheless, the standard of when and how the courts
decide an applicable doctrine is still vague.
The exemption system is possibly dangerous to free and fair competition and
consumers. In order to minimize the detrimental effects, the rigid and prudent
application of the exemption system is necessary. Especially recently, Japan is
decreasing the usage of the exemption system.598 Moreover, Japan reviews the
current exemption systems to diminish them.599
It is, nonetheless, also true that the proper application of the exemption system,
for example the depression cartel among shipbuilders, can support an industry with
less anticompetitive effects and without adverse effects on the international trade
order. The successful depression cartel may consequently keep competitive entities.
598 THE ANNUALREPORT,supra note 14, at 54-59 app.
599 THE STATUSQUO ANDIMPROVEMENTOF EXEMPTION,supra note 363. at 5. 21-
30 general remarks.
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Finally, it is the author's hope that the United States and Japan will deepen a
mutual understanding concerning the Antitrust policy. A heated but dispassionate
discussion between them is indispensable.600 Thereby, free and fair competition in
the world trade will be successfully kept.
600 The United States and Japan have discussed their competition policies. But
usually, for example in Sll, the United States has requested Japan strict
implementation of the Antimonopoly Act. E.g. The Antimonopoly Act: Difference
Foundation Between Japan and the United States, supra note 8.
However, on June 8, 1992, the MITI issued the report named "the Unfair Trade
Report in 1992" which is criticizing unfair trade policies and regulations in Japan and
several countries including the United States. This report shows that Japan changed its
passive attitude from just accepting foreign countries' criticism toward a positive
attitude counter-arguing its belief. Tsusan Kaizen Motome Sekkyoku Shisei [The Mfl'I
Shows the Positive Attitude Seeking Improvement], ASAHI SHIMBUN[ASAHI
NEWSPAPER],June 9, 1992, at 9.
The New York Times called it an "aggressive new strategy." James Sterngold,
Japan Accuses U.S. of Breaking Rules of Trade Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1992, at
AI, C5.
The author hopes that this movement will encourage an animated discussion
rather than an emotional one.
